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Abstract 
 
 
Background: Interdisciplinarity is one of the current trends in the 
scientific world today, that began with the uneasiness about the loss of the 
unity of science. This trend also opens possibilities for explaining complex 
phenomena more comprehensively and creating more advanced applications 
and implementations of scientific theories. One of the biggest challenges to 
conducting interdisciplinary research is theoretical integration, how can we 
combine theories from various disciplines such that the combination is 
fruitful? 
Method: This dissertation attempts to answer this challenge by 
analyzing the intertheoretical connections of some theories from various 
disciplines for some real interdisciplinary research. The structuralist 
metatheory of science is applied as the basic theory to model the 
intertheoretical connections formally. This research begins with modeling 
the scientific theories in question before modeling the intertheoretical 
connections and some modifications needed. This research focuses on some 
researches in cognitive science that involve psychology, neuroscience, and 
artificial intelligence. The first research is the research conducted by van 
Veen et al., who research the activity of neurons in a brain's field called 
dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex during a phase of dissonance between 
cognitions. This research serves as a context for the analysis of 
intertheoretical reduction between the Festinger theory of cognitive 
dissonance and the Hawkins-Kandel computational neuroscientific theory.  
The other research is the consonance model of simulation built by Shultz 
and Lepper, which implements the Hopfield network to build a simulation 
of the cognitive dissonance. The third research is the connectionist model of 
simulation built by van Overwalle and Jordens, which implements the two-
layers feed-forward perceptron and the delta rule as its learning rule to build 
a simulation of forced compliance dissonance. 
Result: Through this research, the author concludes that the 
structuralist metatheory of science can be applied for modeling and 
analyzing intertheoretical connections in the same discipline and between 
disciplines in real scientific research. The structuralist metatheory of science 
enables us to model and analyze the structure of the theories and their 
intertheoretical connections with great detail and brings very fruitful results. 
This research delivers some results not only for the structuralist theory 
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science itself but also for the philosophy of science in general and 
interdisciplinary researches, especially cognitive science. First, by analyzing 
the models, a revision of the definition of intertheoretical specialization, and 
specialization of the concept of theory-holon according to the structuralist 
theory of science, called the V-pattern and strategy for combining scientific 
theories, are proposed. These V-pattern and strategy can serve as a tool for 
combining scientific theories. 
Second, unlike other approaches on intertheoretical reduction such as 
the GNS model, the structuralist metatheory of science does not intend to 
formulate a generalized model of reduction nor focus only on 
intertheoretical reduction. It provides us powerful tools for modeling 
various intertheoretical relations, including intertheoretical reduction, case 
by case. Although the intertheoretical reduction in the structuralist model is 
more epistemological than ontological, the structuralist models show how 
the reduction has empirical claims and intended applications by applying the 
r* function that maps the T-theoretical level to T-non-theoretical level.  
Third, related to the notion of the unity of science, this dissertation 
still sees that the unity of science is still a plausible and essential agenda for 
the philosophy of science and the scientific world in general. This 
dissertation's idea of the unity of science proposed does not assume 
essentialism, reductionism, and epistemological monism. This dissertation 
sees that the unity of science is closely related to scientific practice. 
Fourth, for interdisciplinary research, primarily cognitive science, 
this dissertation proposes an approach to model and analyze intertheoretical 
connections for any scientific research or any philosophical school in 
philosophy of science related to the idea of intertheoretical relation. This 
dissertation is the first example of such modeling and analysis. 
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Eine Analyse der intertheoretischen Relationen in 
interdisziplinären Bereichen: Einige Fälle der 
Kognitionswissenschaft 
Eine Zusammenfassung 
 
"Interdisziplinarität" ist eines der wichtigsten Wörter, um einen Trend in der 
heutigen wissenschaftlichen Welt zu beschreiben. Dieser Trend der 
Interdisziplinarität begann mit Unbehagen über den Verlust der 
wissenschaftlichen Einheit am Anfang des 20. Jahrhundert und hat heute 
zugenommen. Dieser Trend eröffnet auch Möglichkeiten, komplexe 
Phänomene umfassender zu erklären und fortgeschrittenere Anwendungen 
und Implementierungen wissenschaftlicher Theorien zu schaffen. Laut 
Jungert spielen fünf Aspekte einer Disziplin eine wichtige Rolle bei der 
Untersuchung der Merkmale interdisziplinärer Beziehungen: Objekte, 
Methoden, Probleme, theoretischer Integrationsgrad und 
Personen/Institutionen (Jungert, 2013, S. 7–9).  
Eine der größten Herausforderungen bei der Durchführung interdisziplinärer 
Forschungen sind die Fragen der theoretischen Integration. Wie können wir 
Theorien aus verschiedenen Disziplinen so kombinieren, dass die 
Kombination fruchtbar ist? Diese Dissertation versucht, diese 
Herausforderung durch Analyse der intertheoretischen Zusammenhänge 
einiger Theorien aus verschiedenen Disziplinen zu beantworten, die für 
einige echte interdisziplinäre Forschungen kombiniert werden. Diese 
Forschung konzentriert sich auf einige Forschungen in der 
Kognitionswissenschaft, die Psychologie, Neurowissenschaften und 
künstliche Intelligenz umfassen. 
Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, wird die strukturalistische Metatheorie der 
Wissenschaft angewendet, um die intertheoretischen Verbindungen 
iv 
 
zwischen wissenschaftlichen Theorien aus verschiedenen Disziplinen durch 
Implementierung der Modelltheorie formal zu modellieren und zu 
analysieren. Ein Modell einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie wird als 
„Theorieelement“ bezeichnet und besteht aus einem Konzept des 
theoretischen Kerns und einer Menge von intendierten Anwendungen. Die 
strukturalistische Metatheorie der Wissenschaft modelliert die 
intertheoretischen Verbindungen als Beziehungen zwischen der Klasse 
potentieller Modelle verbundener Theorien, die eines der wesentlichen 
Elemente eines Theoriekerns sind. 
Diese Dissertation befasst sich ausschließlich mit den synchronischen 
intertheoretischen Relationen. Die strukturalistische Wissenschaftstheorie 
hat verschiedene intertheoretische Verbindungen definiert, nämlich den 
Entailment Link, Determining Link, die in dieser Dissertation ebenfalls 
überarbeitete intertheoretische Spezialisierung, intertheoretische Reduktion, 
intertheoretische Äquivalenz und intertheoretische Approximation. Diese 
verschiedenen intertheoretischen Verbindungen verbinden die 
wissenschaftliche Theorie und bilden zwei Arten von Relationen, d. H. Das 
Theorie-Netz und das Theorie-Holon. Während der Begriff des Theorie-
Netzes eine Vorstellung von lokaler oder enger intertheoretischer Relation 
beinhaltet, beinhaltet der Begriff des Theorie-Holons eine Vorstellung von 
globaler intertheoretischer Relation. 
Die Analyse intertheoretischer Verbindungen in der Kognitionswissenschaft 
erfolgt in zwei Schritten: Zunächst werden mehrere Theorien formal nach 
dem Konzept der Theorie-elemente modelliert. Dies sind die Festinger 
Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz und ihre Spezialisierung, die Theorie der 
forced compliance Dissonanz aus dem Fachgebiet der Psychologie, die 
Computational Neuroscientific Theory nach Hawkins-Kandel und das 
McCulloch-Pitts-Modell von Neurons aus dem Gebiet der 
Neurowissenschaften sowie das Rosenblatt-Perzeptron, das two-layers feed-
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forward Neuronale Netz, die Delta-Regel und das Hopfield-Netzwerk aus 
dem Bereich der künstlichen Intelligenz. 
Der zweite Schritt ist die Modellierung synchroner intertheoretischer 
Beziehungen nach dem Konzept des Theorie-Netzes oder nach dem 
Konzept des Theorie-Holons. Die intertheoretischen Relationen zwischen 
den obigen Theorien, die modelliert werden, beruhen auf mehreren 
Forschungen.  
Die erste Fallstudie handelt von intertheoretischen Verbindungen im von 
van Veen et al gemachten Forschung. In diesem Fall ist die Theorie der 
forced-compliance Dissonanz mit der Computational Neuroscientific 
Theory von Hawkins-Kandel verbunden, um die Aktivität von Neuronen in 
einem Gehirnfeld namens dorsal Anterior Cingular Cortex während der 
Phase der kognitiven Dissonanz zu erklären. Da die Konzepte beider 
Theorien sehr unterschiedlich sind, gilt für die Modellierung der 
theoretischen Verbindungen beider Theorien die Definition des determining 
links. 
In der zweiten Fallstudie geht es um die intertheoretischen Verbindungen 
der von Shultz und Lepper entwickelten Simulation, die Konsonanz Modell 
genannt ist. Dieses Konsonanz Modell basiert auf der Idee: „dissonance 
reduction can be viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem“. (Shultz und 
Lepper, 1996, S. 220.) Das Modell implementiert das Hopfield-Netzwerk, 
um ein Subjekt zu simulieren, welches sich in einer Situation oder einer 
psychologischen Problemstellung befindet und nach der Harmonie seiner 
Kognition strebt. Die Problemstellung wird durch die klassichen Probleme 
der kognitiven Dissonanz geschaffen (Shultz und Lepper, 1996, S. 220). In 
dieser Simulation entspricht die Erhöhung der Konsonanz dem Prozess der 
Verringerung der Dissonanz oder dem Streben nach Harmonie zwischen den 
Überzeugungen und Einstellungen des Individuums. Für diesen Fall wird 
die Definition der determining links wieder angewendet, um die 
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intertheoretischen Verbindungen zwischen dem Hopfield-Netzwerk und der 
Festinger-Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz zu modellieren. Anders als im 
ersten Fall sollte auch das Hopfield-Netzwerk modifiziert werden, damit die 
Simulation wie erwartet funktioniert.  
Der dritte Fall handelt von intertheoretischen Verbindungen einer 
Simulation der kognitiven Dissonanz, die von van Overwalle und Jordens 
entwickelt und als Connectionist Modell bezeichnet wird. Dieses Modell 
behandelt einige Aspekte, die vom Konsonanz Modell nicht abgedeckt 
werden. Die Grundidee dieser Simulation ist inspiriert von der von Cooper 
und Fazio (1984) vertretenen attributionellen Neuformulierung der Festinger 
Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz: Die Reduktion der kognitiven Dissonanz 
wird von einem rationalen Prozess angetrieben, bei dem das kausale 
Verständnis von Gedanken, Gefühlen und Verhalten eine wichtige Rolle 
spielt (van Overwalle und Jordens, 2002, S. 205). Dieses Modell 
implementiert das two-layers feed-forward Neuronale Netz und die Delta-
Regel als Trainingsalgorithmus (van Overwalle und Jordens, 2002, S. 206–
207), um ein spezifisches Beispiel für ein Kognitionsexperiment zu 
simulieren, das von Freedman als erstes Paradigma für unzureichende 
Rechtfertigung bezeichnet wird (1965). 
Die Charakterisierung des Modells intertheoretischer Verbindungen für das 
Connectionist Modell erfolgt in mehreren Schritten: Im ersten Schritt soll 
das Theorieelement des Rosenblatt-Perzeptrons, das Theorieelement des two 
layers Feed-Forward Neuronalen Netzes und das Theorie-Element der 
Delta-Regel vereinheitlicht werden und ein neues Einheitsmodell von ihnen 
bauen. Im zweiten Schritt modifizieren wir das neue Einheitsmodell, um es 
an die Bedingungen des Connectionist Modells anzupassen. Der dritte 
Schritt besteht darin, die Theorie der forced-compliance Dissonanz zu 
modifizieren, indem einige Konzepte gemäß der Idee von Cooper und Fazio 
hinzugefügt werden. Im letzten Schritt sollen die intertheoretischen 
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Verbindungen zwischen der modifizierten Festinger-Theorie der kognitiven 
Dissonanz und dem modifizierten Einheitsmodell des Rosenblatt-
Perzeptrons, dem two layers feed-forward Neuronalen Netz und der Delta-
Regel charakterisiert werden. Diese Modellierung besteht aus verschiedenen 
intertheoretischen Verbindungen, wie z. B.: Determining links, 
Spezialisierung und Reduktion. 
Die letzte intertheoretische Verbindung zu modellieren ist die 
intertheoretische Verbindung des McCulloch-Pitts-Neurons und des 
Rosenblatt-Perzeptrons. Dieses Modell zeigt, wie zwei in zwei 
verschiedenen Disziplinen entwickelte Theorien sich in Beziehung setzen 
können, weil eine davon die andere verallgemeinert. In diesem Fall ist das 
später in der künstlichen Intelligenz entwickelte Rosenblatt-Perzeptron eine 
Weiterentwicklung des zuerst in den Neurowissenschaften entwickelten 
McCulloch-Pitts-Neurons. Aus der synchronischen Perspektive ist die 
intertheoretische Verbindung beider Theorien eine intertheoretische 
Reduktion, bei der das McCulloch-Pitts-Neuron vom Rosenblatt-Perzeptron 
reduziert wird. Da beide Theorien nahe beieinander liegen, handelt es sich 
bei diesem Fall nicht um die globale intertheoretische Relation, sondern um 
die lokale intertheoretische Relation. Daher müssen wir lokal intendierte 
Anwendungen nicht besprechen. 
Diese Forschung liefert mehrere Ergebnisse, die nicht nur in der 
Philosophie, sondern auch in Studien in interdisziplinären Bereichen, 
insbesondere der Kognitionswissenschaft, einige Beiträge leisten: Erstens 
schlägt diese Dissertation eine kleine Überarbeitung der Definition der 
intertheoretischen Spezialisierung und einer Weiterentwicklung für den 
Begriff des Theorie-Holons, d.h. des V-Musters und der V-strategie vor. 
Das V-Muster und die V-Strategie wurden als Werkzeuge entwickelt, um 
mehrere Theorie-Elemente zu kombinieren und daraus ein neues 
Einheitstheorie-Element zu erstellen. Dieses V-Muster und diese V-
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Strategie haben einen praktischen Zweck, der auf dem Konzept des Theorie-
Holons und seinem empirischen Klaims basiert, nämlich wie man mehrere 
Theorien in einer globalen intertheoretischen Relation kombiniert und seine 
lokale intendierte Anwendung bestimmt, indem nur dyadische 
Verbindungen implementiert werden. 
Zweitens, da es sich bei allen untersuchten Fällen um eine intertheoretische 
Reduktion handelt, können wir das strukturalistischen Modell mit dem 
generalisierten Nagel-Schaffner Modell (das GNS-Modell) vergleichen. Die 
Unterschiede von beiden lauten wie folgt: (1) Der Hauptunterschied liegt in 
der strukturalistischen Forderung, dass die wissenschaftlichen Theorien in 
der Mengenlehre modelliert werden müssen, um ihre innere logische 
Struktur zu modellieren. Dieser Ansatz erfordert eine kompliziertere 
Modellierung als das GNS-Modell, bietet jedoch gleichzeitig mehr Details 
und eine genauere Analyse. (2) Der zweite Hauptunterschied besteht darin, 
dass nach Ansicht der Strukturalisten die intertheoretische Reduktion eher 
epistemologisch als ontologisch ist, obwohl sie eine empirische Basis haben 
sollte - charakterisiert durch die partiellen Potentialmodelle. Es bezieht sich 
eher auf die Struktur der Theorien als auf die Realität. (3) Der dritte 
Hauptunterschied besteht darin, dass in der strukturalistischen Theorie der 
Wissenschaften der Strukturalisten die intertheoretische Reduktion nur eine 
von mehreren anderen intertheoretischen Verbindungen (Verknüpfungen) 
ist und die Strukturalisten einige von ihnen bereits formal charakterisiert 
haben. (4) Es gibt kein als solches verallgemeinertes Modell der 
intertheoretischen Reduktion für die Strukturalisten. Die Strukturalisten 
haben eine formale Definition als ein Werkzeug definiert, wie eine 
intertheoretische Reduktion von einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie auf einer 
anderen Theorie modelliert werden kann, aber die Strukturalisten haben 
nicht die Absicht, ein allgemeines Reduktionsmuster für wissenschaftliche 
Praktiken zu formalisieren. (5) Der letzte Unterschied soll zeigen, dass die 
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intertheoretische Reduktion etwas mit den erklärten Phänomenen zu tun hat, 
das strukturalistische Modell verwendet die interpreting links, die die 
Potentialmodelle eines Theorie-Elements mit dem partiellen Potentialmodell 
der anderen Theorie-Elements verbinden. Das GNS-Modell verwendet 
einige Verbesserungen, die von Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R. und 
Hartmann S. (2009) in ihrer Arbeit „Who’s afraid of Nagelian Reduction?“ 
Und von van Riel, Raphael (2011) in seiner Arbeit vorgeschlagen wurden 
„Nagelian Reduction beyond the Nagel Model“. 
Drittens zeigt diese Dissertation meine einzigartige Position in Bezug auf 
den Begriff der Einheit der Wissenschaft in der Wissenschaftstheorie. Im 
Allgemeinen gibt es zwei entgegengesetzte Positionen in Bezug auf den 
Begriff der Einheit der Wissenschaft in der Wissenschaftstheorie, nämlich 
die Stanford-Schule, die den Begriff der Einheit der Wissenschaft auf der 
Grundlage der Metaphysik der Wissenschaft aufgibt, und andere 
Philosophen, die immer noch einen Begriff der Einheit der Wissenschaft 
vertreten. Die Position stimmt mehr mit der Stanford-Schule überein, 
obwohl diese Dissertation sieht, dass die wissenschaftlichen Theorien auf 
der Grundlage der wissenschaftlichen Praxis miteinander verbunden sind. 
Diese Position ist sehr ähnlich zum integrativen Pluralismus.  
Viertens, in interdisziplinären Forschungen, insbesondere in der 
Kognitionswissenschaft, schlägt meine Dissertation einen Ansatz vor, wie 
wir intertheoretische Verbindungen zwischen wissenschaftlichen Theorien 
modellieren und analysieren oder verschiedene wissenschaftliche Theorien 
kombinieren können.   
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Chapter 1 
The Problem and Its Context: Background and Relevance 
 
 
1.1. Interdisciplinarity: Its Brief History, Concept, and Aspect(s) Related 
to This Project 
 ‘Interdisciplinarity’ is one of the most important words to describe a 
trend in the scientific world today. As Palmer has put it, “interdisciplinarity 
has become a topic of wide interest, penetrating the sciences, social sciences, 
and humanities. Many researchers practice it, and others study it. Scholars in 
the emergent area of knowledge studies have made many observations that 
call attention to the importance of interdisciplinary inquiry for the 
advancement of knowledge. For example, they have claimed that path-
breaking ideas usually come from the cross-disciplinary investigation (Turner, 
1991) and that disciplinary boundaries are the fault line that conceals future 
scientific revolutions (Fuller, 1988).” (Palmer, 1996, p. 30). This trend of 
interdisciplinarity began in the 20th century and has grown stronger today. 
Nevertheless, what is ‘interdisciplinarity’? Why has this trend become so 
popular in the sciences? Why is it important to understand? This dissertation 
will start to answer these questions by giving a simple definition of the word 
‘interdisciplinary,’ telling a brief story of the development of science, and 
delivering in-depth explanations of this trend. 
 The Meaning of ‘Interdisciplinarity’ and ‘Interdisciplinary.’ The 
word ‘interdisciplinary’ is a compound adjective word consisting of a prefix 
‘inter’ and the word ‘disciplinary.’ The prefix ‘inter’ means “between; among” 
or “mutually; reciprocally” (Oxford Dictionary of English). The word 
‘disciplinary’ means “concerning or enforcing a discipline,” and the word 
‘discipline’ means “a branch of knowledge” (Oxford Dictionary of English). 
The Oxford Dictionary of English gives a simple meaning for 
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‘interdisciplinary’ as ‘relation between more than one branch of knowledge’ 
and for ‘interdisciplinarity’ as ‘the quality or fact of involving or drawing on 
two or more branches of knowledge.’ Before we try to give a deeper and more 
precise understanding of what ‘interdisciplinary’ and ‘interdisciplinarity’ 
really mean, it would be beneficial to get first an intuitive idea by examining 
its historical background in the history of science. 
 A Brief History of Interdisciplinarity. Concerning the idea of 
interdisciplinarity, the history of science can be divided into three periods: the 
period of pre-disciplinarity, the period of shaping disciplinarity, and the 
period of developing interdisciplinarity. In the pre-disciplinary period, the 
search for knowledge seemed to be interdisciplinary because there were no 
specialized branches of knowledge like in current time. Several philosophers 
in ancient Greece and Rome, like Aristotle and the stoic philosophers, tried to 
categorize human knowledge and to understand how that knowledge was best 
gained and ordered. “Aristotle differentiated ‘scientia’ (episteme) as the 
knowledge about causes and reasons from mere opinions (doxa) that are often 
subjective, and from technology (techne) and the arts (ars) as the knowledge 
requisite to create or construct. In this classification, only scientific 
knowledge (scientia) can claim to be universally valid. Science is, distinct 
from practical orientation, a theoretically oriented activity. Theoretical 
knowledge is gained by observation and contemplation and comprises three 
areas (or disciplines in the modern sense): mathematics, physics, and (first) 
philosophy. Mathematics consists of geometry, arithmetic optics, and 
harmonics. Physics is the knowledge of the material world and all forms of 
life (i.e., today’s biology). Philosophy includes knowledge of the cosmos and 
theology. The Roman Stoa (c. 300 BC) subsequently developed a 
classification of knowledge in opposition to Aristotle’s that included practical 
knowledge and distinguished logics, physics, and ethics. Subsequently, 
Aristotelian and Stoic classifications overlapped and merged with the 
medieval concepts of the ‘artes liberales’ that constituted what was then 
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considered the comprehensive system of knowledge: grammar, rhetoric, logic, 
arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy.” (Weingart, 2010, p. 3). 
 After that, the classification and the theory of science and knowledge 
production continued to be developed. For example: “Bacon differentiated, 
on the one hand, between natural and civil history dealing with works of 
nature and man, respectively. On the other hand, the sciences were 
distinguished into theology and philosophy, and philosophy into a doctrine of 
the deity (natural theology), a doctrine of nature and a doctrine of man. … 
The hierarchy of faculties as organizational structures of the universities, 
institutionalized since the Middle Ages, placed philosophy at the bottom, and 
medicine, law, and theology above it. Although this hierarchy of the faculties 
had also represented a classification of knowledge, it subsequently lost 
acceptance. At the end of the eighteenth century, the notion of a ‘lower’ 
faculty and ‘higher faculties' counted as past.”  (Weingart, 2010, pp. 4–5). 
 The epoch of shaping disciplinarity already began in the time of Bacon. 
However, at that time, “these disciplines did not have a social function of their 
own but only served as repositories of certified knowledge. Disciplines were 
relatively unimportant until the end of the eighteenth century (Stichweh 1984, 
pp. 14–15).” (Weingart, 2010, p. 4). At the end of the eighteenth century, the 
notion of discipline took over the role of the hierarchy. The most important 
reason for this was the growing pressure that data collection had on the 
disciplines. It caused problems of overload and integration (Weingart, 2010, 
p. 4). 
  To solve this problem, the scholarly activities were differentiated into 
disciplines through two developments, namely increasing abstractions and the 
number of new subject matters. Weingart writes: “One was increasing 
abstraction, for example, through the mathematical conceptualization of 
objects. It means that science to a decreasing degree gained its information 
about the world directly from its environment. … A growing stock of concepts, 
theories, and instruments mediated the experiences gathered, i.e., experience 
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was no longer grasped immediately but rather constructed on the level of the 
concept. At the same time, and this is the second development, the modern 
scientific mode of gaining knowledge was expanded to new subject matters.” 
(Weingart, 2010, pp. 5–6). This development brought some other results, 
namely: (1) The birth of specialization, (2) the self-referential specialized 
communication among the scholars, that caused a division between specialists 
and laypersons, (3) the loss of the unity of science, (4) a fundamental change 
in the orientation of scientists from becoming knowledgeable in several fields 
of science to discovering new phenomena and explanations, (5) organizing 
researches on the basis of a division of labor into numerous highly specialized 
activities, and (6) switching roles between academic and university: the 
academies became the institutional place for the collection and conservation 
of knowledge, while the university produced and disseminated new 
knowledge (Weingart, 2010, pp. 6–7). 
 According to Weingart, a discipline is formed and developed through 
self-referential communication, which is ‘closed’ towards its environment; 
the evaluation of relevance and quality of research is limited to the members 
of the respective disciplinary community (Weingard, 2010, p. 8). Therefore, 
every discipline has a social identity and a factual identity. Discussing both 
identities, Weingart writes: “Their social identity is constituted by the rules of 
membership, i.e., teaching, examinations, certificates, careers, the attribution 
of reputation, and, thus, the formation of a hierarchical social structure. Their 
factual identity is constituted by the contents of the communication. It 
concerns the delineation of a subject matter, a common set of problems and 
theories, concepts and specific methods to study it, the criteria of quality of 
achievement which are the basis for the evaluation and attribution of 
reputation by peer review” (Weingart, 2010, p. 8). 
 Institutionalization of disciplines occurs not only in university 
faculties but also in scholarly associations. These scholarly associations have 
functions not only for the internal aspects of the disciplines via coordinating 
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the communication process by staging conferences and running disciplinary 
journals, but also for their economic, political, and social environments via 
representing the interests of the disciplinary communities in various ways, 
such as the certification of disciplinary training and formal accreditation as 
attempts to secure a monopoly for a specific sector of the professional or 
semiprofessional job market (Weingart, 2010, pp. 8–9).  Although the 
disciplines have a significant degree of autonomy in determining their 
development, they depend on external resources that are distributed by 
research councils and foundations – government departments and industry – 
according to their priorities and political or economic goals (Weingart, 2010, 
p. 9).   
  The epoch of interdisciplinarity began with the uneasiness about the 
loss of the unity of science, which brought back a call for reunification or 
interdisciplinarity. According to Weingart (2010), several successive 
occasions mark the coming of this new epoch (p. 12): First, in the 1930s the 
first ‘unity of science’ movement was initiated by philosophers of science and 
natural scientists, especially those of the Vienna Circle, but this movement 
had no impact. Second, in the late 1960s and the 1970s in the context of 
debates about technology gaps, technology forecasting, and protection of the 
environment, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) triggered a new debate on interdisciplinarity (Apostel et al., 1972). 
Erich Jantsch’s term ‘transdisciplinarity’ from that publication was used by 
Gibbons et al. (1994) to diagnose the emergence of a new mode of knowledge 
production. Gibbon named it ‘mode 2.’ His thesis states that the traditional 
disciplinary ‘mode 1’ of knowledge production has given way to a new 
transdisciplinary mode of knowledge production. Since that time, there were 
many animated discussions among analysts and the mobilization of 
conflicting evidence. Together with a series of similar pronouncements of a 
fundamental change in knowledge production, these analyses beg the 
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question of whether they genuinely signal the advent of a new order of 
knowledge formation or if they only describe surface phenomena (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1993; Ziman, 1994). The difference between ‘interdisciplinary’ 
and ‘transdisciplinary’ will be discussed later in this chapter – for our purpose 
here, it is sufficient for us to look at the history of interdisciplinarity and some 
essential, related terms have been discussed. 
 The claims of change – insofar as they are relevant here – can be 
summarized as follows: “the university has lost its monopoly as the institution 
of knowledge production since many other organizations are also performing 
that function. Transitory networks and contexts are formed which replace 
traditional disciplines. Knowledge production outside disciplines is no longer 
the search for basic laws (fundamental research) but takes place in contexts 
of application (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, p. 121; Gibbons et al., 1994, p. 
4). Disciplines are no longer the crucial frames of orientation for the 
delineation of subject matters and the formulation of research problems. 
Research is, instead, characterized by transdisciplinarity: solutions to 
problems appear in contexts of application, and research results are no longer 
communicated in journals. The criteria of quality are no longer determined by 
disciplines alone, but additional criteria, social, political, and economical, are 
applied to determine quality (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, p. 90; Gibbons et 
al., 1994, p. 8)” (Weingart, 2010, p. 12). 
 There are two historical and sociological reasons for the emergence of 
inter- and transdisciplinary structures that would replace traditional 
disciplines. As Weingart writes: “First, with the continuously growing 
number of specialties (i.e., research fields below the level of disciplines) the 
probability increases that, due to the proximity of such fields, new re-
combinations will occur which will result in new ‘interdisciplinary’ research 
fields. ...Second, inter- and transdisciplinary research fields are promoted by 
funding agencies in the interest of directing research to politically desired 
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goals. This process is conditioned by the fact that the ‘externally’ defined 
subject matters, research problems, and values or interests can trigger 
sustained research” (Weingart, 2010, p. 12, see also Jungert, 2013, p. 10). 
 The Concept of Interdisciplinarity. It is not easy to give an exact 
definition of the term interdisciplinarity. In several works discussing 
interdisciplinarity, there exist different ways to define interdisciplinarity. The 
first way is defining interdisciplinarity by the goals of the cooperation. There 
are various ways of applying multiple disciplines at the same time for the 
same purpose. And not all of them deserve to be called ‘interdisciplinary.’ A 
relationship between management sciences and philosophy cannot be called 
‘interdisciplinary’ just because a university applies several management 
theories in planning to start a philosophical department. To be called 
‘interdisciplinary,’ these various disciplines must be related to each other in 
such a way that in their activities their relationship has a purpose of gaining 
knowledge (Voigt, 2013, p. 32). In search of knowledge, the activities, such 
as changing, limiting, or expanding the object-fields and modifying, newly 
developing, or giving up the methods beyond the constraints of the disciplines, 
are the elements of interdisciplinary cooperation (Voigt, 2013, p. 32). A 
comprehensive definition is given by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development: “Interdisciplinary—An adjective describing 
the interaction among two or more different disciplines. This interaction may 
range from a simple communication of ideas to the mutual integration of 
organizing concepts, methodology, procedures, epistemology, terminology, 
data, and organization of research and education in a fairly large field. An 
interdisciplinary group consists of persons trained in different fields of 
knowledge (disciplines) with different concepts, methods, and data and terms 
organized into a common effort on a common problem with continuous 
intercommunication among the participants from the different disciplines” 
(OECD, 1972, pp. 25–26). To find out whether cooperation between 
disciplines is interdisciplinary or not, Birnbaum (1977) developed a set of 
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indicators to determine the extent to which a project meets the criteria for 
interdisciplinary research. These indicators are: “(1) different bodies of 
knowledge are represented in the research group, (2) group members use 
different problem-solving approaches, (3) members of the group perform 
different roles in solving problems, (4) members of the group work on a 
common problem, (5) the group is responsible for the final product, (6) the 
group shares common facilities, (7) the nature of the problem determines the 
selection of group members, and (8) members are influenced by how others 
perform their tasks” (in Lattuca, 2001, p. 13). 
 Several Other Related/Similar Terms. In many books about 
interdisciplinarity, two other terms refer to a similar kind of relation, where 
various disciplines stand together, namely multidisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity.1  Therefore, it is important here to explain the differences 
between them. Multidisciplinarity refers to several different disciplines 
speaking about a common or similar theme without trying to build any 
structured cooperation or synthesis among their results. The most striking 
difference from pure disciplinary research is that in multidisciplinary research 
there is a minimal knowledge about the relevant research from the other fields 
(Jungert, 2013, p. 2). Klein says that juxtaposing, sequencing and 
coordinating are the characteristics of multidisciplinarity (Klein, 2010, p. 16). 
The concept of transdisciplinarity means more intensive cooperation between 
 
1 Jungert (2013) gives several other words related to the notion of interdisciplinarity. They 
are multi-, pluri-, cross-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity. Here we discuss only multi-, inter-, 
and transdisciplinarity because these three represent a full relationship among various 
disciplines. The word ‘pluridisciplinarity’ is rather a synonym for multidisciplinarity. It 
describes a relationship similar to multidisciplinarity with the extra notion “to enhance the 
relationship between them” (Jantsch, 1970 in Jungert, 2013, p. 2). The word 
‘crossdisciplinarity’ refers to the following phenomenon: “The axiomatics of one discipline 
are imposed upon other disciplines at the same hierarchical level, thereby creating a rigid 
polarization across disciplines toward a disciplinary axiomatics” (Jantsch, 1970 in Jungert, 
2013, p. 3). In this cross-disciplinarity methods and research programs of another discipline 
are taken over as its subject. Its goal is neither a fusion of given disciplines nor a molding of 
new disciplines (Jungert, 2013, p. 3), but “to solve important and urgent problems that cannot 
be defined and solved from the perspective of any one of the existing disciplines” 
(Kockelmans, 1979, p. 82). 
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the disciplines that finally lead to the crossing and merging of different 
disciplines. This cooperation leads to a continuous system of scientific, 
systematic change that changes the technical and disciplinary orientations 
(Sukopp, 2013, pp. 23–24). Klein describes the characteristics of a 
transdisciplinarity as transcending, transgressing, and transforming (Klein, 
2010, p. 16). By contrast, the concept of interdisciplinarity was defined by 
Heckhausen: “Die Rede von der ‚interdisziplinären Forschung‘ besagt 
gewöhnlich nicht mehr, als dass einige Wissenschaftler, die verschiedenen 
Fächern gehören, zusammen an einem Problem arbeiten, das so allgemein, 
alltagsnach oder fachfremd betitelt ist, daß noch kein Vertreter der beteiligten 
Fächer bereits das Problem unter den Aspekten seiner eigenen Fachlichkeit 
eingegrenzt und definiert hätte. [In English: The talk of ‘interdisciplinary 
research’ usually just means that some scientists who belong to different 
disciplines work together on a problem that is so general, every day or 
unfamiliar that no representative of the specialties involved has the problem 
delimited and defined from the point of view of his own specialty.]” 
(Heckhausen, 1987, p. 129). This leads to working or researching together in 
cooperative scientific action. As for the characteristics of interdisciplinarity, 
Klein (2010) mentions integrating, interacting, linking, focusing and blending. 
(P. 16). These differences can be summarized in the following table: 
Relation Multidisciplinarity Interdisciplinarity Transdisciplinarity 
Characteristics juxtaposing, 
sequencing, and 
coordinating 
integrating, 
interacting, linking, 
focusing, and 
blending. 
transcending, 
transgressing, and 
transforming 
Cooperation no cooperation cooperation cooperation 
 
Table 1.1. The differences between multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and 
transdisciplinarity regarding their characteristics and the cooperation between their 
discipline-elements. (Adapted from Klein, 2010, p.16) 
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 Aspects of Interdisciplinary Studies or Researches Regarding 
This Project. According to Jungert, there are five aspects of a discipline that 
play an important role in examining the characteristics of interdisciplinary 
relations: Gegenstände (objects of investigation), Methoden (methods), 
Probleme (problems), theoretisches Integrationsniveau (level of theoretical 
integration), and Personen/Institutionen (persons/institutions) (Jungert, 2013, 
pp. 7–9). These five aspects must be present to form an interdisciplinary 
relationship. However, there are different degrees of each among various 
interdisciplinary researches. This dissertation will focus solely on one of the 
biggest challenges in interdisciplinary researches related to the issues of 
theoretical integration; how can we connect scientific theories from various 
disciplines such that the intertheoretical relation built is fruitful? This work 
aims to suggest a formal approach to build a model of how several theories 
from various disciplines are related to each other in interdisciplinary research.   
 Cognitive Science as A Case Study of Intertheoretical Relations. 
The subject of interdisciplinarity is both broad and vast. This dissertation will 
only focus on one interdisciplinary field, namely cognitive science. The 
reasons for choosing cognitive science are as follows: (1) Cognitive science 
fulfills the criteria of interdisciplinary studies. For studying the mind, 
cognitive science integrates many fields of science. Furthermore, it is not 
merely that several different disciplines speak about the same or a similar 
theme without any structured cooperation or trying to build a synthesis of 
their results – cognitive science is not merely multidisciplinary. (2) There are 
many fruitful researches in cognitive science. Intuitively, we are right in 
hoping that we can learn more from something successful, rather than from 
something unsuccessful or not yet successful. (3) Cognitive science is not 
only interdisciplinary but also a multicategory discipline. The term 
‘categories’ here refers to our classification of the various scientific 
disciplines into three categories that we normally use, i.e., natural sciences, 
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social sciences, and humanities. The disciplines in cognitive science do not 
only belong to natural sciences but also the social sciences and the humanities. 
 However, cognitive science is a vast interdisciplinary field, that 
contains at least six disciplines, hundreds of theories, and research programs 
– and it seems that these numbers are still increasing. Therefore, there shall 
be a limitation of the number of cases discussed. This dissertation will build 
and analyze formal models for the intertheoretical relation between cognitive 
dissonance and the corresponding computational neuroscientific theory in the 
functionality of dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC), between two 
models of neurons, and two simulations of the theory of cognitive dissonance. 
The first simulation is the consonance model built by Thomas R. Shultz and 
Mark R. Lepper and the second is the adaptive connectionist model built by 
Frank van Overwalle and Karen Jordens. The purpose of modeling several 
models of intertheoretical relations is to show how this approach is also 
applicable to many other synchronic intertheoretical relations. Synchronic 
intertheoretical relations occur in those cases where scientists connect several 
theories assumed existing together for their research. The complete 
description of these combined theories and their place in cognitive science 
will be discussed in Chapters 4–8. 
 
1.2. State of the Art of the Problem: Studies about Intertheoretical 
Relations in Interdisciplinary Fields 
 Although the topic of intertheoretical relations has recently become 
more and more interesting for philosophers of science, the discussions are 
mostly dominated by the discussions about reduction or intertheoretical 
reduction.2 This fact is understandable for the two following reasons: an 
ontological reason and a historical reason. 
 
2 In several renowned encyclopedias of philosophy, a subject of intertheoretical relation 
cannot be found in their table of contents, whereas a subject of reduction or intertheoretical 
reduction can. These encyclopedias are the following: the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
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 Historical reason. Although many aspects of science have been 
thought over since the Greek philosophers, modern philosophy of science 
began with Ernst Mach’s program and logical positivism. They systematically 
consolidated this heritage into a brand new approach to philosophy and 
science by implementing modern logic and engaging in the conceptual 
foundations of empirical science. The goals of their program were (1) to 
create new foundations for physics with a strong consideration of the results 
of the physiology of the senses, (2) to recover the unity of all sciences, and 
(3) to eradicate the metaphysical speculations from the field of science for 
good (Moulines, 2008, p. 26). Thus, the topic of reduction became one of the 
most critical issues in the agenda of modern philosophy science. A 
monumental work from one of those thinkers, Der logische Aufbau der Welt 
by Rudolf Carnap (1928), tries to reduce physics and the other sciences to 
elementary psychology. Carnap’s other work, Unity of Science, is an attempt 
to build the unity of science from the language of physics by reduction: “… 
science is a unity, [such] that all empirical statements can be expressed in a 
single language, all states of affairs are of one kind and are known by the 
same method” (Carnap, 1934, p. 32). Although the reduction is not the only 
epistemological proposal for the unity of science today, this topic is still an 
important and relevant topic with a most extensive historical background in 
philosophy of science.    
 Ontological reason. To obtain a richer explanation of a specific 
phenomenon x, it is evident that we can refer to more basic phenomena, which 
constitute x. Therefore, the concept of reduction is a significant component in 
the discussion about intertheoretical relations. According to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the reduction can be understood as follows:    
 
Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, and Kaldis, Byron Ed. (2013): The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Social 
Science. None of these have an entry about intertheoretical relations, but all of them have 
an entry about reduction. 
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“The English verb ‘reduce,’ derives from the Latin ‘reducere,’ 
whose literal meaning ‘to bring back,’ informs its metaphorical use in 
philosophy. If one asserts that the mental reduces to the physical, that 
heat reduces to kinetic molecular energy, or that one theory reduces to 
another theory, one implies that in some relevant sense the reduced 
theory can be brought back to the reducing theory, the mental can be 
brought back to the physical, or heat can be brought back to molecular 
kinetic energy. The term ‘reduction’ as used in philosophy expresses 
the idea that if an entity x reduces to an entity y, then y is in a sense 
prior to x, is more basic than x, is such that x fully depends upon it or 
is constituted by it. Saying that x reduces to y typically implies that x 
is nothing more than y or nothing over and above y. 
... ‘Reduction’ is a term of natural language. Building upon its 
common metaphoric meaning, philosophers use it to designate 
relations of particular philosophical importance in many closely 
related fields, especially in the philosophy of science, the philosophy 
of mind, and metaphysics. 
The notion of scientific reduction as used in contemporary 
analytic philosophy differs from conceptions of reduction according 
to which we learn about the instantiation of reduction relations on a 
purely a priori basis from basic religious, metaphysical or 
epistemological principles. ‘Scientific reduction’ applies to 
reductionist claims supposedly justified by scientific evidence and the 
success of science.” (van Riel and van Gulick, 2014). 
It is important to note that this concept of reduction is not to be confused with 
reductionism, which is also a popular term or school in philosophy of science. 
“Reductionism is the adoption of reduction as the global ideal of the unified 
structure of scientific knowledge and a measure of its progress.” (Cart, 2013). 
People can agree with the existence of reduction as an intertheoretical relation, 
without agreeing with reductionism. 
 
 
 
14 
 
  Because of its importance, there are attempts to conceptualize the 
concept of reduction or, respectively, the concept of scientific reduction. One 
of the popular approaches is the generalized Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model 
of reduction, outlined by Ernst Nagel in his Structure of Science and improved 
by Schaffner and others. In Chapter 8 the GNS model of reduction will be 
compared to the structuralist models of intertheoretical reduction. In this 
dissertation, the structuralist theory of science will be applied to modeling 
intertheoretical reduction in some existing researches and analyzing them to 
understand how intertheoretical reduction works. 
 At this point, it is important to be clarified that this dissertation has no 
agenda to develop or to support any idea of reductionism. However, the 
purpose of this dissertation in this matter is to propose an approach to evaluate 
the modern notion of intertheoretical reduction and the notion of reductionism 
by applying the structuralist metatheory of science.  
 Related to intertheoretical reduction, another issue to consider is the 
idea of the unity of science. In the birth of modern philosophy of science, 
recovering unity of science was set as one of its goals, but now there are many 
discussions to evaluate this goal – or respectively the idea. The reasons are: 
(1) there is no sign of its realization until now. Furthermore, (2) the idea of 
the unity of science, especially in its original version, is merely incompatible 
and implausible concerning the real scientific practices and the real 
development of science (Dupré, 1995). Members of the Stanford School, such 
as Dupré, Ian Hacking, Peter Galison, Patrick Suppes, and Nancy Cartwright, 
have launched attacks against universalism and uniformity both in the 
methodological and the metaphysical sense: “Disunity appears characterized 
by three pluralistic theses: against essentialism, there is always a plurality of 
classifications of reality into kinds; against reductionism, there exists equal 
reality and causal efficacy of systems at different levels of description, that is, 
the micro level is not causally complete, leaving room for downward 
causation; and against epistemological monism, there is no single 
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methodology that supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a universal 
domain of its applicability, only a plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic 
virtues” (Jordi, 2013, about Dupré). On the other side, many philosophers, 
such as Hempel, Nagel, Friedman, Kitcher, Cat, Klein, Putnam, etc., still 
think that the unity of science is an important idea. They propose many ideas 
to evaluate and sharpen the concept in many ways by asking the following 
questions: Is the unity of science ontological or epistemological? How can 
the unity of science be achieved – by which method, under which 
requirements, etc.? Of course, my position can easily be ascertained from the 
title of my dissertation. This dissertation assumes that there is so-called unity 
of science, but the kind and the way still need to be clarified. Hopefully, this 
dissertation can provide some clues to make the discussion about the unity or 
disunity of science more fruitful (in Chapter 8) by giving some concrete 
examples from the real scientific practice in interdisciplinary fields, 
especially in cognitive science (in Chapters 5–7).   
 
1.3. Studies on Intertheoretical Connections in Cognitive Science 
 As an interdisciplinary field, cognitive science also becomes an 
exciting field for discussions about intertheoretical relations. In the discussion 
about the reduction mentioned above, the relationship between the mind and 
the body, which is one of the most central topics in cognitive science, often 
becomes an object of debate. During the rapid development of cognitive 
science, there are four views about intertheoretical connections in cognitive 
science according to Ezquerro and Manrique (2004), namely: (1) the classical 
view, (2) the connectionist revision, (3) the pragmatist approach, and (4) the 
reductionist approach. This categorization is based on the position of these 
authors with respect to the notion of the privileged level. The privileged level 
is understood here as a level (or a discipline) “at which all the different 
disciplines come to converge” (Ezquerro and Manrique, 2004, p.61): 
“Research in Cognitive Science has often assumed the existence of a 
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privileged level at which all the different disciplines come to converge. 
Computational theories were the first ones to offer themselves as such a level. 
The equation ‘cognition = information processing,’ on which the cognitive 
revolution was founded, seemed to find its natural place in the technical and 
mathematical developments provided by those theories. The possibility of 
obtaining a system of computational mechanisms that accounted for the 
totality of cognitive phenomena offered the promise of a ‘unified theory of 
cognition’ (Newell, 1990).” The classical view and the connectionist revision 
agree with the existence of such a privileged level, without being reductionist. 
The classical view holds the view that “to explain a particular mental 
phenomenon … required giving the right computational account between the 
right kinds of representations, which were conceived as a symbol system” 
(Ezquerro and Manrique, 2004, p. 65), whereas the connectionist approach 
does not use a symbol system or manipulations of symbols but an artificial 
neural network. However, the proponents of connectionism claim that " their 
systems offer a real possibility to bridge neuroscientific, computational, and 
intentional descriptions” (Ezquerro and Manrique, 2004, p. 68). The 
pragmatist approach denies the existence of a privileged level because they 
see that “the different ways of formulating levels depend just on our different 
approaches to the phenomena we want to study, and this, …, depends on 
pragmatic considerations” (Ezquerro and Manrique, 2004, p. 81). 
Furthermore, the reductionist approach, as proposed by Bickle, agrees with 
the existence of a privileged level and tries to give a more detailed and smooth 
intertheoretical reduction using the set-theoretical approach characteristic of 
the structuralist theory of science. Chapter 8 will also respond to this 
discussion about the intertheoretical reduction in cognitive science and show 
the position and the contributions of this research concretely.  
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1.4. Why the Structuralist Approach? 
 From the description of the current state of the research on 
intertheoretical relations both in the philosophy of science and cognitive 
science above some points can be concluded as follows: (1) The discussions 
about intertheoretical relations are dominated by the idea of reduction as if 
there were no other intertheoretical relations3 (2) Most examples presented in 
the discussion of intertheoretical relations are reasonable speculative sketches 
about intertheoretical relations – the theories are real, but the models of 
intertheoretical relations presented have just a minimal relation – if not 
without any relation at all – to scientific practice. Therefore, there is no way 
to verify those models, and they only give small contributions to 
interdisciplinary practices. (3) There may be models of intertheoretical 
relations that are based on real scientific practice besides the models based on 
speculative sketches. However, they are not detailed enough to give 
significant contributions to scientific practices, and (as far as the author can 
see) none is a model of interdisciplinary intertheoretical relations.  
 Because of these points, this research focuses on building a model of 
intertheoretical relations for a specific interdisciplinary field and take 
cognitive science as a real case. The models are based on concrete examples 
in cognitive science, namely the explanation or simulation of a psychological 
property by the network in the brain or the artificial neural network. It is 
generally assumed that our mental properties or faculties are connected to our 
brain, and several scientific research about these connections have been done 
in cognitive science. The implementation of artificial neural networks comes 
 
3 Of course, I do not mean to say that all philosophers of science know only intertheoretical 
reduction. Many philosophers surely know that there are different kinds of intertheoretical 
relations besides intertheoretical reduction. Structuralists know several types of 
intertheoretical relations, and intertheoretical reduction is just among them (see Chapter 2). 
We may also look at Schaffner’s revision of Nagel’s notion of reduction called the 
Generalized Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model of reduction.  
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into the playground because it is currently still impossible for us to understand 
the networks of the brain entirely.   
 The structuralist theory of science is chosen as the underlying theory 
for this project because of the following reasons: (1) To trace how scientists 
add some constraints or assumptions to the theories and how those constraints 
or assumptions affect the theories, it requires a theory that can help for 
building a detailed model of the combined theories and their relations. The 
structuralist metatheory of science provides tools for analyzing and building 
models of scientific theories by identifying their important components. (2) 
The structuralist theory of science implements the formal approach that 
enables us to reach high clarity and consistency in modeling and analysis. It 
is crucial because some terms from various disciplines often have a different 
meaning or reference, although they use the same word. To understand 
intertheoretical connections between theories from various disciplines, it is 
important to identify precisely which parts of the theories in question are 
interconnected and how they are connected. The structuralist theory of 
science provides powerful tools by modeling the theory in several classes of 
terms or their relations, i.e., potential models, actual models, etc. With these 
classes, it becomes possible to identify not only the inner structure of the 
connected theories but also the connected parts of the theories and the 
properties of the connections. Modeling individual theories in question will 
be presented in Chapter 3, whereas modeling intertheoretical connections 
between them will be in Chapters 5–7. (3) The structuralist theory of science 
has high flexibility for modeling because it implements set theory instead of 
first-order predicate logic. (4) The structuralist theory of science has already 
identified and characterized several kinds of intertheoretical connections. It 
will be of a great help in analyzing the intertheoretical relationships, which 
no other approach in the philosophy of science can offer. 
 By applying the structuralist theory of science, the research will be 
conducted as follows. First, several formal models of the theory-elements that 
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will be combined are presented in Chapter 3. After that, some preparations 
for the modeling of intertheoretical connections in interdisciplinary fields 
should be done in Chapter 4, i.e., explaining some formal tools and revisions 
that will be helpful for the modeling and a short overview of cognitive science 
related to our investigation. Chapters 5–7 will explain some interdisciplinary 
researches and build formal models of intertheoretical relations between their 
theories in question. In the last stage, analysis of the types of intertheoretical 
relations and how they work will be a part of Chapter 8.    
 
1.5. Research Plan 
 This last section systematizes the plan of discussion as follows: 
Chapter 2 will describe the structuralist theory of science as the basic 
metatheory of this project and its application. Chapter 3 will deliver some 
structuralist models of several theories needed from psychology, 
neuroscience, and artificial neural network. These theories are the Festinger 
theory of cognitive dissonance, the McCulloch-Pitts neuron, the Hopfield 
network, the Rosenblatt perceptron, the architecture of artificial neural 
network, and the delta rule. Chapter 4 will discuss several preparations for the 
modeling of the intertheoretical connections. They include a revision of the 
definition of specialization, the notion of an echelon set, and a brief overview 
of cognitive science. Chapter 5 will deliver a structuralist model of the 
intertheoretical relations between a specialization of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, i.e., for the case of forced compliance dissonance, and the 
corresponding computational neuroscientific theory. In this modeling, the 
case of the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex investigated by van Veen, et. al. 
will be used. Chapter 6 will show how the McCulloch-Pitts neuron in 
neuroscience is in synchronic relation to the Rosenblatt perceptron in artificial 
intelligence. It will be a model of intertheoretical relation between the models 
of neurons in both disciplines. Chapter 6 will also deliver a structuralist model 
of the intertheoretical relations between the Festinger theory of cognitive 
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dissonance and the Hopfield network according to the consonance model. 
Chapter 7 will be about building a structuralist model of intertheoretical 
relations between the theory of forced compliance dissonance and the feed-
forward neural network according to the connectionist model. Chapter 8 will 
discuss the relevance and the contributions of this research for the current 
state of the related discussion about intertheoretical relations (or respectively 
reduction) and the unity of science in the philosophy of science and cognitive 
science. Chapter 9 contains a critical reflection about how this research 
contributes to the scientific practice in interdisciplinary fields and suggests 
the possible developments and improvements of this project for some future 
works. 
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Chapter 2 
The Structuralist Theory of Science and Intertheoretical 
Connections 
 
 
 This chapter will describe the basic idea of the structuralist theory of 
science and how it will work to give an account of intertheoretical 
connections. This topic will be discussed in several parts as follows. The first 
part will explain the basic concept of formal modeling of scientific theories. 
The second part will discuss the notion of intertheoretical connection and its 
kinds. The third part will discuss the results of the intertheoretical links, 
namely the notions of a theory-net and a theory-holon. Scientific theories are 
connected to other scientific theories, and this results in two kinds of relation 
networks. The first kind is a local relation network, which is called a “theory-
net.” And the second kind is a global one, which is called a “theory-holon.” 
The fourth part of this chapter will discuss the idea of theoreticity with respect 
to intertheoretical connections. And finally, the idea of a fragment will be 
discussed in the last part. 
 
2.1. The Basic Concept for Formal Modeling of Scientific Theories 
according to the Structuralist Theory of Science 
 The structuralist theory of science was developed by Joseph Sneed, 
Wolfgang Stegmuller, Wolfgang Balzer, and C. Ulises Moulines. Although 
many books and articles have been written about this theory, its central book 
is An Architectonic for Science, written by Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed in 
1987. This dissertation will use the abbreviation ‘BMS’ to refer to this book.    
 The structuralist theory of science as a kind of metatheory has scientific 
theories as its objects of investigation. Therefore, the structuralist theory of 
science does not (want to) create scientific theories – it assumes that they 
 
22 
 
already exist. The goal of this metatheory is the modeling and analyzing the 
deep logical structure of scientific theories. For this goal, the structuralist 
program applies several formal tools, including, most importantly, set theory 
and model theory.  
 The structuralist metatheory of science understands scientific theories 
as models to explain phenomena. As a model, a scientific theory unifies 
various aspects of phenomena to explain those phenomena. Under the model 
concept, the structuralist theory of science, as Bartelborth (1996) depicts it, 
makes clear in general terms that a model is merely a representation that is 
specifically designed to serve as a representation of something in the 
theoretical level of knowledge. A model does not necessarily have to be an 
isomorphic image of objects and their properties and relations. A model must 
only be able to show the isomorphic correlations between certain aspects of 
reality and certain parts of the model (Bartelborth, 1996, p. 364). In the case 
of a scientific theory, the structuralist theory of science links this intuitive idea 
of a model mainly to the formal notion of model in logic and mathematics. 
According to the structuralist approach, logic, and mathematics, especially 
set theory, represent the terms (or concepts) of scientific theory and the 
relations between those terms (or concepts). Therefore, the structuralist 
theory of science under the concept of ‘model’ always conceives it as a formal 
or logical-semantic model. 
 The first and smallest model-theoretic concept for a scientific theory 
is called ‘theory-element’ in the structuralist theory of science. The term 
‘theory-element’ is understood as “the smallest unit of empirical science that 
has all the features required to say something interesting about the world.” 
(BMS, p. xx). Each theory-element contains a vocabulary or conceptual 
structure and an empirical law-statement or a law-like statement formulated 
with this vocabulary, and “a specification of the things to which this law is 
intended to apply” (BMS, p. xx). This theory-element is a construct in terms 
of set theory and model theory. The basic intuition of this approach is “that 
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the smallest significant or interesting parts of empirical science are best 
characterized, not as linguistic entities, but as model-theoretic entities” (BMS, 
p. xxi). 
 For building a theory-element, the structuralist theory of science sees 
that the simplest structure of a scientific theory can be modeled formally as a 
structure of the form: D1, ... Dm, R1, ..., Rn, where Di is the basic set and Rj 
is the relation between these basic sets. The Di contains the objects of a theory 
– they can be both empirical objects and purely mathematical objects. The Rj 
represents the relation or function between the objects of the modeled theory; 
in the quantitative disciplines, the Rj is often a function of empirical objects 
to real numbers or vectors. This way of representation serves as the first step 
for the modeling of scientific theories. The selected sets of axioms determine 
most precisely those classes of models that represent the specific areas of the 
phenomena that are important for the theory.   
 The next step consists in distinguishing among the selected axioms 
two classes, namely, the class of the ‘frame conditions’ (which defines the 
class of the potential models (Mp)) and the class of the substantial laws (which 
defines the class of the actual models (M)). While the potential models 
contain only the basic concepts and the formal characteristics of the theory – 
it does not say anything interesting about the world – the actual models, which 
contain the essential laws of the theory, say something interesting about the 
world. For the formation of these two kinds of models, the structuralist theory 
of science uses the method introduced by Patrick Suppes known as 
‘axiomatization by means of a set-theoretical predicate’ (Moulines, 1996, p. 
6). The formal definitions of the potential models and the actual models are 
given as DI-8 and DI-8* in BMS, p.17. From the definition of Mp(T) and 
M(T), we can see that the relation between Mp(T) and M(T) is as follows: 
M(T) is a subset of Mp(T) or M(T)  Mp(T). This step characterizes the 
identity of the scientific theory as the pair Mp, M. This pair can be called 
 
24 
 
the ‘model element’ because it provides the essential unit to comprehend the 
essence of the theory.  
 However, for some analyses of scientific theories, especially for 
analysis of their intertheoretical connections, these two classes are not enough. 
For this purpose, the structuralist theory of science provides us with a 
fundamental concept of intertheoretical connections (links) – symbolized by 
‘L’ for such purposes. The structuralist sees that scientific theories are not 
isolated units, but they are joined together with one another in specific 
connections or relations. The definition of the links is given in BMS, p. 61. 
 Another useful tool that the structuralist theory of science provides is 
the distinction between two different conceptual and methodological levels 
of a theory, namely the T-theoretical level and the T-non-theoretical level. 
The T-theoretical level is to be understood as specific concepts of a theory 
which can be obtained only on the assumption of the theory itself (see the 
criterion of T-theoreticity in BMS, p. 55). Other concepts of the theory, which 
can be obtained without presupposing the theory itself, belong to the T-non 
theoretical level. The T-non-theoretical concepts come from observations or 
from other theories. This distinction leads to a new substructure that contains 
only the non-theoretical elements, the “class of partial potential models,” and 
is symbolized by Mpp – while the potential models Mp contain both the T-
theoretical and the T-non-theoretical elements. The class of partial potential 
models can be obtained by the function r: Mp(T) → Mpp(T). The definition 
of the class of partial potential models Mpp is given in BMS, p. 57. 
 The potential models Mp, the actual models M, the partial potential 
models Mpp, and the global links GL, – together with the global constraint 
GC and the approximations A, which are not discussed here because they are 
not relevant for this dissertation, – form the core of the theory-element K. The 
definition of a theory-core is given in BMS, p.79. The components of the 
theory core K do not yet reflect the empirical side of empirical theory. For 
this reason, another domain must be added so that the concept of a theory-
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element can represent a real empirical theory. A scientific theory must in 
principle be applicable to real phenomena so that explanations, predictions, 
and applications are possible in the form of technologies. This domain is the 
domain of intended applications and is symbolized by I. The characterization 
of a theory-element is given in the structuralist theory of science by a tuple 
K, I. 
  The structuralist theory of science holds three assumptions for the 
determination of the domain of intended applications. According to the first 
assumption, the intended applications are neither pure reality nor pure 
experience. The domain of intended applications does not contain pre-
conceptual things or sense-data. According to this, the domain of intended 
applications of a theory is conceptually determined by the existing terms. 
According to the second assumption, the intended applications of the theory 
are not concerned with all human experience, but with local and diverse parts 
of human experiences. The structuralist concept of science does not assume 
there exists a kind of theory of everything. Each scientific theory has its 
domain of intended applications I; these domains of different theories can 
overlap, partially overlap, loosely connect, or be completely apart. The 
structuralist theory of science regards the domain of intended applications as 
a subclass of the partial potential models (Mpp). This approach is a weak 
characterization of the intended applications. To discuss the domain of 
intended applications in more detail, it cannot be stated in the pure 
formulation utilizing set theory or model theory, since the intended 
applications are not independent of historical and pragmatic factors. The 
definition of the intended application is given in BMS, p. 88. 
 Since scientific theories are not isolated units but are related to other 
theories, the theory-elements, as their formal models, appear in groups and 
are connected through intertheoretical connections (links). Intertheoretical 
links serve to transmit ‘information’ between theory-elements (BMS, p. xx). 
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Certain intertheoretical connections such as specializations link theory-
elements with the same vocabulary, and different laws, in networks that 
represent another general conception of a scientific theory. Moreover, global 
empirical science is a network of (all) theory-elements that connect with other 
theory-elements through various intertheoretical connections L. In this way, 
the structuralist theory of science divides the formal explication of the 
intuitive idea of a scientific theory into three different concepts. The simplest 
level is the idea of a theory-element. In the next level, some (at least two) 
theories having the same basic conceptual apparatus appear connected and 
form a theory-net. After that, many (though not all) theories in the second 
sense (i.e., theory-nets) form a global structure of scientific theories called a 
‘theory-holon.’ 
 In real scientific practice, scientific theories can change over time in 
three directions: “First, the things to which the laws in individual theory-
elements are expected to apply ... may grow or diminish. Second, theory-
elements may appear and disappear from the complex. Finally, 
intertheoretical links between the theory-elements may appear and disappear 
from the complex” (BMS, pp. xx–xxi). In these transformations of scientific 
theories and intertheoretical connections already discussed, two kinds of 
representations of the links between scientific theories are considered. First, 
there is the concept of ‘theory-evolution.’ A theory-evolution is a 
development of ‘theory-nets’ through time. Secondly, the synchronic 
representation shows how many scientific theories can be assembled at a time 
and can be linked to each other to provide explanations of certain phenomena 
or specific intended applications. This dissertation focuses on this synchronic 
representation of intertheoretical relations.  
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2.2 The Concept of Intertheoretical Connections and Their Varieties 
2.2.1. The Concept of Intertheoretical Connections 
 Scientific theories are always connected to other scientific theories. 
Therefore, the structuralists understand intertheoretical connections in two 
ways, i.e., intertheoretical connections as a kind of bridge connecting several 
scientific theories and intertheoretical connections as essential components of 
each scientific theory. 
 As one of the essential components of a scientific theory, the 
structuralist theory of science includes the concept of intertheoretical 
connection in the concept of theory-core. Intertheoretical connections belong 
to the concept of a scientific theory because the idea of an isolated theory in 
science is fundamentally deficient. A scientific theory’s identity can only be 
adequately understood if one considers its links with other scientific theories. 
 As intertheoretical bridges, intertheoretical relations are not relations 
between statements or sets of statements but relations between models or sets 
of models. In this case, it is important to formulate more precisely, in a formal 
way, either that a connection is a bridge between models of the same theory 
or a bridge between models of different theories. The first is called 
intratheoretical bridge or constraint (C), while the second is an 
intertheoretical bridge or link (L). The definition of a bridge can be seen in 
Moulines & Polanski, 1996, p. 220.  
As stated above, a model element E = Mpi, Mi is the smallest pair 
that forms the identity of a scientific theory. If there is an intertheoretical 
connection, such as λ  Mpi' Mpj, it is convenient to write the intertheoretical 
connection between two different theories as EiλEj. If there are two models 
to be considered, xi and xj, the intertheoretical connection between them is xi, 
xj, and can be written as xixj. 
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2.2.2. The Varieties of Intertheoretical Connections 
 Because it is important to understand the nature of intertheoretical 
relations between scientific theories, the structuralist theory of science 
provides us with many tools for the analysis of intertheoretical relations. The 
structuralist metatheory of science identifies various kinds of intertheoretical 
connections as relations between scientific theories. According to Moulines 
(1992), two basic intertheoretical connections are the entailment 
intertheoretical connection and the determining intertheoretical connection. 
All other intertheoretical connections can be derived from these two types 
either by adding further conditions or by combining them. There are at least 
five types of specific intertheoretical connections formally characterized by 
the structuralist metatheory of science for synchronic intertheoretical 
relations. Some of them can be attributed to the entailment intertheoretical 
connections because they are specific types of entailment links – 
specialization, reduction, equivalence, and approximation. However, the 
partial reduction is a specific type of determining link. 
 In addition to these five specific synchronic intertheoretical 
connections, Moulines (2014) also characterized four specific diachronic 
intertheoretical connections that capture the dynamic development of a 
scientific theory, namely crystallization of a theory, evolution of a theory, 
embedding of one theory into another one, and replacement of one theory by 
another accompanied by partial (semantic) incommensurability. Since 
diachronic intertheoretical connections are not the topic of this dissertation, 
they will not be discussed here. This notwithstanding, the case discussed in 
Chapter 6 is historically a case of intertheoretical embedding, namely the 
embedding of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron into the Rosenblatt perceptron. 
This intertheoretical connection is a connection from the model of a neuron 
in neuroscience into the mathematical model of a neuron, called perceptron, 
that is used in the artificial neural network for the simulation of cognitive 
dissonance.  
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2.2.2.1. Entailment Intertheoretical Connections (Links) 
 Entailment intertheoretical connections are intertheoretical 
connections that connect the whole of the actual models of two theories. 
Therefore, they form a unity of classes from the structures of different theories. 
The formal definition of entailment intertheoretical connections is to be found 
in Moulines & Polanski, 1996, p. 223. This definition of the entailment 
intertheoretical connections (links) can also be applied to the analysis of 
theory-holons by adding some additional conditions for the T-non-theoretical 
level or an intended application (See DVIII-2 in BMS, p. 392). The additional 
conditions are as follows: (1) the entailment link must connect the actual 
models of both theories, and (2) the entailment link provides a mapping to the 
set of intended applications of one of both theory-elements according to the 
function r. This mapping defines the local empirical claims of the links in the 
theory-holon.     
 
2.2.2.2. Determining Intertheoretical Connections (Links) 
 Determining intertheoretical connections represent relations between 
single terms or concepts (i.e., they are term to term relations), which 
connected theories contain. The formal definition of determining 
intertheoretical connections is given in Moulines & Polanski, 1996, p. 223.  
 
2.2.2.3. Intertheoretical Specialization 
 Specialization is another type of intertheoretical connections that arise 
because of an addition of special laws or law-like statements to a theory T, 
such that a new theory T’ comes into existence. The additional law(s) cause 
an improvement of the explanatory power with the cost of a limitation of the 
explanatory range. From the model-theoretical point of view, this addition of 
special law(s) into the existing laws can be considered as creating a subset 
M’(T) from the current models M(T). The subset M’(T) satisfies more 
constraining conditions for a partial set of I(T) in a more limited empirical 
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range. This notion of specialization is defined formally as DIV-1 of BMS, p. 
170. 
 A specialization relation has the following characteristics: (a) the 
specialization is used for special cases, (b) the specialization limits the 
empirical content of the initial theory-element core. These properties are 
expressed in BMS, p. 170. 
 
2.2.2.4. Intertheoretical Theoretization 
 The essential idea of theoretization can be understood through the 
difference between T-theoreticity and T-non-theoreticity. The T-theoretical 
concepts of a theory are the concepts that can only be determined by 
presupposing the theory itself. The other concepts, which do not require the 
theory T itself for their determination, are called T-non-theoretical concepts. 
The T-non-theoretical concepts can be derived from other theories, 
measurements, and observations. Here we can easily see that a T*-non-
theoretical concept of theory T* can be a T-theoretical concept of the theory 
T if the theory T* is linked to theory T or applies or accepts certain concepts 
of theory T. Thus, whether a concept is theoretical or non-theoretical, is not 
an inherent property of the concept. The identity of a concept can change from 
one theory to another through such intertheoretical relations. Such an 
intertheoretical relation is called theoretization. More precisely, the concept 
of theoretization can be understood as follows: T* is a theoretization of T, if 
T*-non-theoretical concepts are concepts of T, either T-theoretical or T-non-
theoretical. There is a distinction between two cases: T* is a theoretization of 
T in the weak sense, if some of the T*-non-theoretical concepts come from 
T; while T* is a theoretization of T in the strong sense, when all T*-non-
theoretical concepts come from T. The intertheoretical theoretization is 
defined formally as DVI-1 in BMS, p. 251. 
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2.2.2.5. Intertheoretical Reduction 
 The intertheoretical reduction is one of the most important topics in 
many discussions of the philosophy of science. There are several types of 
reductions in these discussions. The first type is the historical reduction, 
which can be comprehended intuitively by considering historical 
developments of specific scientific explanations, such as the development of 
the explanation of the motion of planets from Ptolemy via Copernicus and 
Kepler to Newton. Historically, these relations were sometimes shown in the 
following circumstances: a theory T is replaced by a new and conceptually 
different theory T* with related or similar, but better constructed intended 
applications (BMS, p. 252). There are intense discussions about the 
justification of this transition, but this discussion is no longer the subject of 
this work because this work is not intended to discuss the diachronic 
intertheoretical relations. The second kind of reduction that can be made is 
due to the simplification of applications of theory. Such a reduction is called 
‘practical reduction.’ In many interdisciplinary cases, there are also 
reductions due to the speculative view that one particular area is viewed as 
more basic than another. However, this speculative mode of reduction will 
not be discussed in this work, although interdisciplinarity is at the center of 
my research. The distinction between historical reduction, practical reduction, 
and speculative reduction plays no role in our discussion about reduction as 
long as the modeling is concerned. What is crucial is the distinction between 
exact reduction and approximative reduction. The expression “reduction” 
used here denotes the exact reduction, and the expression “approximation” 
refers to the approximate reduction, which can be modeled by implementing 
the notion of intertheoretical approximation grounded on exact reduction. For 
simplicity and clarity of modeling intertheoretical connections, I will not 
consider the notion of approximation in the case studies in this dissertation. 
 The reduction discussed here is a kind of intertheoretical relation 
between the structural classes of the theories and not simply between the 
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concepts or the terms of the theories. For a formal definition of the reduction 
relation between a T ‘the reduced theory’ and a T* ‘the reducing theory,’ the 
structuralist metatheory of science has considered seven conditions for an 
adequate reduction relation. (See BMS, pp. 275–276) However, we do not 
discuss these details here, since they are not relevant to the present discussion.  
 
2.2.2.6. Intertheoretical Equivalence 
 In discussing the fourth kind of intertheoretical connections, the so-
called equivalence, the structuralist distinguishes two kinds. The first is 
empirical equivalence, while the second is theoretical equivalence or simply 
equivalence. 
 Empirical Equivalence. Empirical equivalence focuses on the T-non-
theoretical level of the theory, namely the intended applications. This 
approach considers theories as a tool for explaining particular phenomena that 
they take up or for solving problems in the area of the phenomena. In this 
approach, the structures of the complete theoretical instruments can be 
neglected as long as both theories provide the ‘same’ explanations and solve 
the ‘same’ problems with the ‘same’ systems or if they have the ‘same’ 
empirical content. This empirical equivalence is formally defined in BMS, on 
pages 288-289 as D VI-9 and TVI-7. By giving the formal definition, the 
structuralist theory of science assumes that empirical equivalence is a kind of 
global intertheoretical relations without further investigation of its 
components.  
 Theoretical Equivalence. Theoretical equivalence also takes the 
theoretical concepts of the theories into account, which belong to the potential 
models. Two theories are equivalent if their complete theoretical structures 
are in some respects isomorphic, and the two theories explain the ‘same’ 
phenomenon. Moreover, this relationship between potential models provides 
a satisfactory comparison between the intended applications. The relation, 
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however, does not have to be bijective between models. This equivalence 
relation is formally defined as DVI-11 in BMS, p. 297. 
 
2.2.2.7. Intertheoretical Approximation 
 The last special type of the intertheoretical connections characterized 
in BMS is intertheoretical approximation. The term “intertheoretical 
approximation” is understood as a kind of inexact intertheoretical relation 
between two theory elements T and T’, where Mpp(T)Mpp(T’) and 
Mp(T)Mp(T’). The two theoretical elements, which are compared or 
connected here by the intertheoretical approximation, belong to two 
synchronically different theories. Therefore, the intertheoretical 
approximation is a relation between theory elements in the form K, A, I and 
K’, A’, I’, where K and K’ are conceptually different, and A and A’, which 
are the sets of admissible blurs of both theories T and T’ related to the 
intertheoretical connection between them, are also different. If Mp and Mp’ 
are different, then A and A’ will also be different. Therefore, there are no 
“common” blurs that express the relation between the two theories.   
 
2.3. Modeling Relations (or Networks) between Theories 
 After discussing various kinds of intertheoretical connections, now we 
can move on to discussing how extensive intertheoretical relations can be 
produced from these various kinds of intertheoretical connections. The 
structuralist metatheory of science has already characterized two products of 
intertheoretical relations, namely: theory-nets and theory-holons. 
 
2.3.1. Theory-nets 
 With the term ‘theory-net,’ the structuralist metatheory of science 
describes a relation between two or more theory-elements with the same 
potential models and same partial potential models and are related through a 
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particular intertheoretical connection, i.e., specialization(s). The notion of a 
theory-net corresponds to a ‘local’ idea, that is, the combination of a scientific 
theory with other closely linked theories. A standard example is classical 
particle mechanics with its specializations such as Newtonian classical 
particle mechanics, Hooke’s classical particle mechanics, and others. The 
notion of theory-net is defined in DIV-2 of the BMS, p. 172. The 
specialization connection in theory-nets is a partial order relation; that is, it 
has the following properties: reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric (BMS, 
p.172). 
 There are various types and cases of nets of scientific theories – we 
can represent them by graph theory. In the normal situation, a theory-net (N) 
consists of at least two different theory-elements, which are connected to each 
other. The cases must be that they are either specializations of another 
common ‘higher’ theory-element or else one is a specialization of the other. 
In such a theory-net, there is always at least one theory-element that is not a 
specialization of other theories, and there are also theory-element(s) that have 
no specializations. Theory-elements, which are not a specialization of other 
theory elements, are called the basic theory-element(s). An important type of 
theory-net is the theory-net with a single basic theory-element. In graph-
theoretical representation, it forms a tree-like structure. Therefore, it is called 
a theory-tree. This kind of theory-net, the basic theory that forms it, and the 
condition of connectedness are discussed and defined in BMS, pp. 173–175.     
 The structuralist metatheory of science conceives a theory element as 
a pair K, I. Therefore, the relations between the cores and the intended 
applications of the theories involved in the network should also be considered 
in the construction of a theory-net. The relations between the cores and the 
relations between the intended applications of the theories in the network are 
formulated as DIV-6 and D IV-7 in BMS, pp. 176–177. In a tree-like network, 
the net of cores and the nets of applications have the same net structure as the 
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original theory-net, if there is only a set of the intended applications for each 
core in the original network, and vice versa (BMS, p. 177 see T IV-5). 
 Since the empirical content of a theory-element is interpreted as the 
statement ICn(K), the theory-net has as many individual empirical contents 
as the theory-elements in the net. BMS summarizes the global empirical 
content of the net as the conjunction of all these individual empirical contents 
of the theory-elements, as formulated in D IV-8 (BMS, p. 177). 
 In the case of an unconnected theory-net with possibly unrelated sub-
nets, its empirical claim contains more or less amorphous conjunction of 
individual empirical claims. However, in the case of the connected theory-net, 
the empirical claim is important to be considered inasmuch as all individual 
claims refer to the same Mpp. All the individual sets of intended applications 
Ii of theory-elements in such a connected, tree-like net, are the subsets of the 
basic set I0. These individual subsets Ii can be subsumed under the basic core 
K0 as supplemented by the addition of certain restricting conditions to the 
basic core K0. These specific conditions are the conditions that define Ki. 
However, we have to consider that the empirical claim of the basic theory-
element can be vacuous because of Cn(K0) = Po (Mpp). However, even in 
such a case, the global empirical assertion of the network may not be vacuous 
because of Cn(Ki)  Po (Mpp) at least for some specializations Ki. At any 
rate, even if the basic statement is not vacuous, it usually is very weak. 
 
2.3.2. Theory-holons 
 The relations between some theories of different theory-nets, which 
enter further intertheoretical connections, build a ‘theory-holon.’ The concept 
of theory-holon contains a ‘global’ idea. In a theory-holon, scientific theories 
have connections not only with their close relatives, but also with many other 
theories from other areas of empirical science, be it within one and the same 
discipline, or else from different disciplines. The connections here are much 
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more complicated than in a theory-net because many different intertheoretical 
connections are involved. There are even several types of intertheoretical 
connections between two theories T and T’ in such a global relation. To make 
it simple, the discussion is firstly held as if there is always only one 
connection. This approach is based on reality that the conjunction of several 
links – set-theoretically expressed by their intersection – is also a link. The 
general idea of theory-holon is defined as D VIII-1 in BMS, p. 389. The 
notation N used in the original definition in BMS is replaced by H in this 
dissertation to differentiate the theory-holons from the theory-nets. 
 In a theory-holon, the intertheoretical connections  are a partial 
function mapping a theory-element T to another theory-element T’. As a 
partial function,  implies that there is at most one link between T and T’ and 
there is room for pairs of theory-elements in H that are not connected. The 
pair T, T’ as a domain of  means that  is a subset of the relation between 
the potential models of both theories, namely Mp(T) and Mp(T’). Defining a 
theory-holon requires that all theory-elements in H must be connected at least 
to a theory-element in H. Any theory-element which does not satisfy this 
requirement is called “isolated” and has no connection with a holon. 
Therefore, there is the possibility of linking many theory-elements in 
networks through different links because of the transitivity of the 
intertheoretical connections – if a theory-element T is connected to another 
theory-element T’ by  and T’ is connected to T” by ’, then we can always 
define a new ” as link between T and T”. 
 The network structure of the theory-holon is more complicated than 
the structure of theory-nets. It contains the global way of connecting various 
theory-elements. Graph theory represents the structure of the relations created 
by links. This network of theories H,  consists of binary relations between 
theory-elements and can also be expressed as follows: TT’ iff T, T’ Dom 
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(). In BMS, pp. 393–394, we can find the definition of a theory-holon in the 
graph-theoretic expression. 
 Although a theory-holon deals with global intertheoretical relations, it 
does not refer to the global empirical claim of the holon, nor to its (global) 
intended applications. The problem with the global notion of empirical claims 
and intended applications is that on the practical level of such notions, they 
are implausible and impractical. In practice, it is more plausible if we refer 
only to the empirical claim(s) and the intended application(s) of a small piece 
of the holon. For this reason, we discuss the local empirical claims and the 
intended applications of a theory-element or a theory-net in the context of the 
theory-holon, including them. 
 To discuss the local empirical claims and the ‘local’ intended 
applications, we must begin with an (individual) theory-element. Then, the 
examination of the theory-elements that contribute to the theory-holon 
follows. In this context, an interpreting link must be considered. By 
“interpreting link,” we mean an intertheoretical connection, which gives 
interpretations about the non-theoretical concepts of a theory-element. Thus, 
a theory-element T’ interprets another theory-element T (in holon H) iff. T’, 
TDom(), and (T’, T) is an interpretive link. In the holon, a theory-
element may play both an interpreting and an interpreted role (BMS, p. 396).  
 
2.4. The Intertheoretical Connections and the Concept of T-Theoreticity 
 As a result of the discussion about the notion of a theory-core, a 
criterion about the difference between T-theoreticity and T-non-theoreticity 
must be present in order to identify the theoretical level conceived as the 
potential models and the practical or non-theoretical level conceived as the 
partial potential models. In contrast to the classical metatheory of science, the 
structuralist metatheory of science assumes that not only the observational 
concepts belong to the practical level, but also the concepts adopted from 
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other theories. Therefore, the criterion of T-theoreticity can be sharpened 
through the relations of theory with other theories in the same holon. 
 
2.5. The Fragment 
 Although the concept of a fragment does not belong to the theoretical 
part of the structuralist metatheory of science, BMS discusses this for 
practical reasons. The term ‘fragment of empirical science’ refers to a part of 
empirical science that serves as a unit of empirical science in the usual 
discussions of science. A fragment consists of a few theory-elements 
connected to each other in specific networks or in a particular scientific field. 
A fragment is only a part of a theory-holon, but it is larger than single theory-
elements or theory-nets. An example is what I will analyze in this dissertation: 
The fragment of psychology, including the theory of cognitive dissonance as 
one of its parts, is connected not only with its specializations in the theory-
net but also with other theories in psychology. Moreover, as an 
interdisciplinary field in science, cognitive science forms a larger fragment 
that connects fragments of psychology with fragments of neuroscience and 
with fragments of artificial intelligence.  For such a practical reason, and for 
delimiting the discussion, the idea of a fragment of empirical science will be 
needed later.   
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Chapter 3 
Structuralist Models of Several Scientific Theories in 
Cognitive Science: The Case of Dissonance Reduction in the 
Cognitive Process 
 
 
 This chapter will discuss the building of set-theoretical models of 
several theories in various scientific fields in cognitive science. Since 
cognitive science is a vast discipline, it will be realistic if this work limits 
itself only to the relations between several theories from two or three 
connected fields for explaining a specific case of phenomena. Thus, this 
dissertation will focus on the phenomena of dissonance reduction in the 
cognitive process. These phenomena are explained well by the theory of 
cognitive dissonance from Leon Festinger. There are also many kinds of 
research in neuroscience and simulation by using artificial neural networks 
related to these phenomena. This chapter will present several structuralist 
models of several theories from these fields before we model the 
intertheoretical connections for such research.    
 
3.1. Psychology 
 The first scientific field of cognitive science that will be modeled here 
is psychology, especially the theory of cognitive dissonance from Leon 
Festinger in 1957. Rainer Westermann has already built the structuralist 
models for the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance and its specializations 
in 1989 and 2000. The content of the theory will be described first and then 
followed by the structuralist models built by Rainer Westermann.  
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3.1.1. A Brief Description of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
 Leon Festinger develops the theory of cognitive dissonance in his 
book A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, first published in 1957, and then 
republished in 1985. The basic idea of the theory is that we have an inner 
drive to hold all attitudes and beliefs in harmony, and therefore, we have 
tendencies to avoid, reduce, or eliminate disharmony or dissonance (McLeod, 
2008, updated 2014). This dissonance theory has great importance and 
influences in the psychology of motivation and social psychology and has led 
to many experiments and considerable theoretical progress. The book itself 
consists of 10 chapters. Chapter 1 presents the general theory of cognitive 
dissonance, whereas the rest present the specific modifications of the theory 
in four different specific situations, namely (1) Post-decision Dissonance 
(Chapters 2 and 3), (2) Forced Compliance Dissonance (Chapters 4 and 5), 
(3) Dissonance and Information Exposure (Chapters 6 and 7), and (4) Social 
Disagreement Dissonance (Chapters 8–10). This structure fits well the 
structuralist idea of theory-element and theory-nets, which are connected by 
the kind of intertheoretical connection called specialization. This dissertation 
will only use the theory of cognitive dissonance itself and the forced 
compliance dissonance for modeling and analyzing the intertheoretical 
connections.   
 The Main Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. The theory of cognitive 
dissonance begins with the idea that “the individual strives toward 
consistency within himself” (Festinger, 1985, p.1). However, in real life, there 
are many occasions where a person makes decisions or behaves in ways that 
cause inconsistencies with her other existing knowledge, opinions, or beliefs 
about the environment, about herself, or about her behavior, for example, 
smoking and the knowledge of its side effects. For his theory, Festinger 
replaces the word ‘consistency’ by ‘consonance’ and the word ‘inconsistency’ 
by ‘dissonance’ (Festinger, 1985, pp. 2–3). The hypothesis of the theory is as 
follows: (1) the existence of dissonance will motivate a person to reduce the 
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dissonance in order to achieve consonance and (2) when dissonance is present, 
the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely 
increase the dissonance. 
  The dissonance may occur in the two following situations: (1) new 
events or new information becomes known to a person that does not have 
complete control over them. These events or information creates a momentary 
dissonance with the existing knowledge, opinion, or cognition concerning her 
behavior or decision. (2) the dissonance can also arise in an everyday situation, 
where only a few things are clear-cut enough related to behavior or decision 
about right or wrong, safe or dangerous, etc. There are widely various 
situations in which dissonance is nearly unavoidable (Festinger, 1985, p. 5). 
To reduce, or respectively to eliminate the dissonance, there are two possible 
options for the person. “He might simply change his cognition about his 
behavior by changing his action, … [or] he might change his ‘knowledge’ 
about the effect of [his actions]” (Festinger, 1985, p. 6).     
  According to Festinger, there are three possible kinds of relations 
between two cognitions: irrelevance, consonance, and dissonance. Two 
cognitions are irrelevant if they have nothing to do with each other. “Under 
such circumstances where one cognitive element implies nothing at all 
concerning some other element, these two elements are irrelevant to one 
another” (Festinger, 1985, p. 11). Two cognitions are in dissonance if they are 
inconsistent or contradictory to each other according to cultural or specific 
group standards. Otherwise, they are in consonance (Festinger, 1985, p. 13). 
The reasons for dissonance could be a logical inconsistency, cultural custom 
and manners, a specific opinion about particular more general opinion(s), 
experience(s) in the past, etc. (Festinger, 1985, p. 14).   
“All dissonance relations are not of equal magnitude, [therefore] it is 
necessary to distinguish the degree of dissonance and to specify what 
determines how strong a given dissonance relation is” (Festinger, 1985, p. 16). 
The notion of the magnitude of dissonance is defined by the importance of 
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the elements of cognition. “If two elements are dissonant with one another, 
the magnitude of the dissonance will be a function of the importance of the 
elements. The more these elements are important to, or valued by, the person, 
the greater will be the magnitude of a dissonance relation between them” 
(Festinger, 1985, p. 16).    
  This magnitude of dissonance is an essential variable in determining 
the pressure to reduce dissonance. “The strength of the pressures to reduce 
the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the dissonance” (Festinger, 
1985, pp. 17–18). In his book, Festinger mentions several options for a person 
to reduce dissonance, namely: (1) by changing a behavioral, cognitive 
element, (2) by changing an environmental, cognitive element, or (3) by 
adding new cognitive elements. Despite these possible ways of reducing 
dissonance, the attempts to reduce or eliminate dissonance are not always 
successful. Some dissonance might have resistance against these attempts. 
This success or failure to reduce dissonance defines the maximum magnitude 
of the dissonance. “The maximum dissonance that can exist between any two 
elements is equal to the total resistance to change of the less resistant element. 
The magnitude of dissonance cannot exceed this amount because, at this point 
of maximum possible dissonance, the less resistant element would change, 
thus eliminating the dissonance” (Festinger, 1985, p. 28). Besides attempting 
to reduce or eliminate dissonance, a person also has tendencies to avoid the 
increase of dissonance. 
 The Theory of Forced Compliance Dissonance. Sometimes a 
person behaves in a manner counter to her convictions or will publicly make 
a statement, which she does not really believe. She does it because of public 
compliance – in the form of threat of punishment or special rewards – without 
accompanying changes of private opinion (Festinger, 1985, p. 85). It will 
increase dissonance and the pressure to reduce it.   
 For recognizing a case of public compliance in changes of a person’s 
private opinion from her genuine opinion, there are two strategies according 
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to Festinger, namely: (1) by removing the source of influence or pressure, and 
(2) by direct measurement of her private opinion that can be done by assuring 
the person’s anonymity – by saying that her identity will not be exposed.  
     The strength of dissonance is determined by the number and importance 
of cognitive elements that are dissonant with the cognition about the overt 
behavior. It is also determined by elements of cognition that “correspond to 
the knowledge that a reward has been obtained or that a punishment has been 
avoided” (Festinger, 1985, p. 90). Both determining elements must be in one 
of the following relations: (1) “The expected reward or punishment had to be 
sufficient, in relation to the resistance to change, to produce the compliant 
behavior in the first place. Consequently, it is reasonable inference to suppose 
that the sum of consonant relations is greater than the sum of dissonance. ... 
However, if the reward or the punishment is a too great reward or punishment, 
dissonance will be small” (Festinger, 1985, p. 91). The smaller the rewards or 
punishment is, the higher the magnitude of dissonance is. (2) Alternatively, 
the expected reward or punishment is too small to produce overt behavior so 
that the person stays with his private opinion or decision. In this case, the 
bigger the reward or punishment is, the higher the dissonance that will be 
produced. (Festinger, 1985, pp. 91–92)   
 Festinger suggests some strategies to reduce this specific kind of 
dissonance as follows: (1) by adding the weight of reward and punishment, 
or (2) by specific actions to change the private opinion or its – as much as 
possible – cognitive elements becoming consonant to the overt action. 
 
3.1.2. A Structuralist Model of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
 For a structuralist model of Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, 
this dissertation just takes over the models, which are built by Rainer 
Westermann. These models can be found in two of his works, namely 
Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Revised Structural 
Reconstruction (1989) and Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A 
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Structuralist Theory-Net (2000). The first work focuses more on the building 
of the model and the considerations behind it, whereas the second focuses 
more on the model and its specializations. 
  In the first work, Westermann builds two models for Festinger's theory 
of cognitive dissonance, namely: the full version, called DissA, and the 
simplified version, called DissB. This research uses the simplified version for 
two reasons: (1) according to Westermann DissA does not adequately 
represent the theoretical basis of all empirical studies on dissonance theory 
for two reasons: (a) empirical research refers to additional terms and 
relationships, and (b) empirical dissonance research does not make use of all 
terms and relations of element DissA. (2) DissB represents the common 
theoretical reference point of all dissonance research and is hypothesized to 
be the basic model of all theory-elements from which various parts and 
versions of dissonance theory can be reconstructed.   
 
3.1.2.1. The Theory-Element of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
(DissB) 
 In building his structuralist model, the DissB, Westermann considers 
the following concepts as the elements of the potential models (Mp), 
respectively, the following basic concepts. Firstly, the most fundamental 
concept of the theory is “cognition” or “cognitive element” (Westermann, 
1989, p. 34), which means “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the 
environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior” (Festinger, 1985, p. 3). 
To define the cognition that plays an essential role in increasing or reducing 
dissonance in a particular moment, Westermann differentiates between the set 
of relevant cognitions that are present (Cognition) and the set of interesting 
raw elements of cognition of a specific subject or group (RawCog). RawCog 
refers to the set of cognitions belonging to the subject or the group. Cognition 
is the set of cognitions that plays a role in dissonance or consonance. This 
differentiation is made by the time when the dissonance takes place or 
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increases. Therefore, Cognition is defined as a subset of RawCog. An 
auxiliary set for this task is the set of time points (Time),    
 Secondly, the other fundamental concepts are the concepts of possible 
relations between several cognitions or cognitive elements: consonance, 
dissonance, and irrelevance. In the construction, according to Westermann, 
only the two first concepts are relevant. Conscog and Disscog model the 
concepts of consonant and dissonance relations between pairs of cognitive 
elements. “The subsets Disscog and Conscog of the cartesian product 
Cognition  Cognition are mutually exclusive and encompass the dissonant 
and the consonant pairs of cognitions, respectively” (Westermann, 2000, p. 
191).   
The next important concepts are the degree of dissonance or 
consonance. These concepts are pairdiss for the degree of dissonance and 
paircons for the degree of consonance. These functions map the elements of 
Disscog and Conscog into a set of positive real numbers representing the 
degree of the relations. Westermann adds a note: “these functions are defined 
so that the degree of dissonance and consonance may vary over time” 
(Westermann, 2000, p. 191). 
 The magnitude of dissonance and the magnitude of consonance in 
Festinger’s theory depend on the degree of importance of the relationship. 
Therefore, Westermann introduces a function pairimp. With this function, the 
degree of importance is represented by a positive real number. The magnitude 
of dissonance and the pressure to reduce it are represented by the functions 
diss and redpress that attribute a positive real number to each element of 
Cognition for their measure. 
  Finally, the auxiliary functions confl and suppo (magnitude of conflict 
and support) are defined by Westermann as sums of the value of importance. 
“For each element of Cognition, the summation runs overall relationship to 
other cognitive elements that are dissonant or consonant, respectively. The 
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support of an element also represents the resistance to change for that 
cognition” (Westermann, 2000, p. 192). 
 From the concepts above, Westermann builds the potential model as 
follows (Westermann, 2000, p. 190): 
DIII-1: x is a potential model of Festinger’s theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
(x  Mp(DissB) ) iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, 
pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress 
(2) Time  IR is a finite, non-empty set of points of time 
(3) Rawcog is a finite, non-empty set of raw elements of cognition 
(4) Cognition  Rawcog  time   (actual elements of cognition) 
(5) Disscog  Cognition  Cognition  (dissonant cognitions) 
Conscog  Cognition  Cognition  (consonant cognitions) 
Disscog  Conscog =  
(6) pairdiss: Disscog → IR0+   (dissonance within pairs) 
paircons: Conscog → IR0
+   (consonance within pairs) 
(7) Pairimp: (Disscog  Conscog) → IR0+ (importance of pairs) 
(8) diss: Cognition → IR0+   (magnitude of dissonance) 
redpress: Cognition → IR0
+   (dissonance reduction pressure) 
(9) confl (cit) := (cit, ckt)Disscog pairimp(cit, ckt) (degree of conflict) 
(10) suppo(cit) := (cit, ckt)Conscog pairimp(cit, ckt) (degree of support) 
 
 The next crucial step in building a structuralist model of the theory of 
cognitive dissonance is building an actual model, which contains the law-
statements or the law-like statements of the theory. Westermann uses the 
following indexing system to refer to typical elements of Cognition: cit with 
iRawcog and tTime. (1) The first law statement or law-like statement is if 
two cognitive elements are dissonant with one another. The magnitude of the 
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dissonance “will be a function of the importance of the elements” (Festinger, 
1957, p. 16 in Westermann, 2000, p. 193) and “increases as the importance or 
value of the elements increase” (Festinger, 1957, p. 18 in Westermann, 2000, 
p. 193). Westermann follows Festinger’s assumption of “a strictly monotone 
increasing relationship between importance and dissonance of the pairs of 
cognition” (Westermann, 2000, p. 193). (2) The second law statement or law-
like statement is that the same is also the case for the consonant relation 
between a pair of cognitive elements.   
 (3) The magnitude of dissonance between the element in question and 
the remainder of the person's cognition, “will depend on the proportion of 
relevant elements that are dissonant with the one in question” (Festinger, 1957, 
p. 17 in Westermann, 2000, p. 194) and “is a function of the weighted 
proportion of all relevant relations … that are dissonant. The term ‘weighted 
proportion’ is used because each relevant relation would be weighted 
according to the importance of the elements involved in the relation” 
(Festinger, 1957, p. 18 in Westermann, 2000, p. 194). The two functions confl 
and supp can be used to formulate this relationship. Here, Westermann 
assumes that ‘depend on’ and ‘is a function of’ have a strictly monotone 
relationship.  
 (4) According to Westermann, the central point of Festinger's theory 
refers to the consequences of dissonance arousal: “The presence of 
dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce dissonance. … The strength of 
the pressure to reduce the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the 
existing dissonance” (Festinger, 1957, p. 263 in Westermann, 2000, p. 194). 
The existing dissonance between cognitive elements can be reduced or 
eliminated by changing one of these elements, by adding new elements, or by 
decreasing the importance of the elements involved. The activity of reducing 
dissonance does not ensure that dissonance will be reduced; sometimes, it can 
even be increased. The dissonance theory does not predict this, but only says 
“that in the presence of a dissonance, one will be able to observe the attempts 
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to reduce it” (Festinger, 1957, p. 24, in Westermann, 2000, p. 194). The 
function redpress represents the magnitude of these attempts. 
 The actual models of the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance can 
be defined as follows: (Westermann, 2000, p. 193) 
DIII-2: x is an actual model of the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance 
(x M(DissB)), iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, 
pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress  Mp(DissB) 
(2) For all (cit,cjt), (cku, clu) Disscog: if pairimp (cit,cjt) < pairimp(cku,clu), 
then pairdiss(cit,cjt)<pairdiss(cku, clu)   
(If the importance of the pair cku and clu is greater than the importance 
of the pair cit and cjt, then the dissonance of the pair cku and clu is 
greater than the dissonance of the pair cit and cjt) 
(3) For all (cit, cjt), (cku, clu) Conscog: if pairimp (cit,cjt) < pairimp(cku,clu), 
then paircons(cit,cjt)<paircons(cku, clu) 
(If the importance of the pair cku and clu is greater than the importance 
of the pair cit and cjt, then the consonance of the pair cku and clu is 
greater than the consonance of the pair cit and cjt) 
(4) For all cit, cju Cognition: if confl(cit)/(confl(cit) + suppo(cit)) < 
confl(cju)/(confl(cju) + suppo (cju)), then diss(cit) < diss(cju). 
(If the proportion between the degree of conflict of cju and the sum of 
the importance of cju is greater than the proportion between the degree 
of conflict of cit and the sum of the importance of cit, then the 
dissonance of cju is greater than the dissonance of cit) 
(5) For all cit, cju Cognition: If diss(cit) < diss(cju), then 
redpress(cit)<redpress(cju). 
(If the dissonance of cju is greater than the dissonance of cit, then the 
attempt to reduce cju will be greater than the attempt to reduce cit) 
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 According to Westermann, the T-theoretical terms of the Festinger 
theory are pairdiss, paircons, diss, and redpress, because these terms are 
determined by assuming the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance itself.  
Therefore, its partial potential models are as follows: 
DIII-3: y is a partial potential model of Festinger’s theory of cognitive 
dissonance (y  Mpp(DissB)) iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress  Mp(DissB) 
(2) pairdiss, paircons, diss, redpress are T-theoretical. 
(3) y = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairimp   
Mpp(DissB) 
 
3.1.2.2. The Theory-Element of Forced Compliance Dissonance (DissF) 
 The potential models for the specialized theory element of forced 
compliance dissonance can be built by adding the following new components 
to the potential model of DissB (Westermann, 2000, pp. 203–204): Firstly, 
Forcecom is a subset of the cognition and pertain to the behaviors that are not 
in harmony with personal attitudes. Secondly, the function attidiff represents 
the difference between the real personal attitudes and the attitudes expressed 
in her behaviors. Thirdly, the function imp represents the subjective 
importance of cognition. Moreover, fourthly, the function reward shows the 
subjective magnitude of promised reward for the counter-attitudinal behavior 
or the magnitude of threatened punishment for refusing to do the counter-
attitudinal behavior. This specialized theory element is called DissF, and its 
potential models can be defined as follows (Westermann, 2000, p. 203): 
DIII-4: x is a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance (x  
Mp(DissF)) iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, 
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pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward 
such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
(2) Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress  Mp(DissB) 
(3) Forcecom  Cognition   (cognitions on counterattitudinal 
     behavior) 
(4) attidiff: Forcecom → IR   (attitudinal difference) 
(5) imp: Cognition → IR0+   (importance of cognition) 
(6) reward: Forcecom → IR0+   (magnitude of reward or  
     punishment) 
  
 The actual models for DissF M(DissF) can be defined by assuming 
that the potential models Mp(DissF) are held and by adding the following law 
or law-like statements: firstly, “the more important the opinions or the 
behavior involved, and the smaller the promised reward or threatened 
punishment, the greater is the magnitude of dissonance that is created” 
(Westermann, 2000, p. 204). Secondly, “pressure to reduce forced compliance 
dissonance may be manifested in a reduction of the importance or value of 
the behavior and opinion involved, an enhancement of the subjective 
magnitude of the promised reward or threatened punishment, and a change of 
private opinion in accordance with public behavior, i.e., in a smaller 
difference between real and expressed personal attitude” (Westermann, 2000, 
p. 204). The actual models of the specialization in the forced compliance 
dissonance are defined as follows (Westermann, 2000, p. 204): 
DIII-5: x is an actual model of the forced compliance dissonance (x 
 M(DissF)) iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, 
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pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward 
such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
(2) For all cju  Forcecom: 
ifcp imp(cit) < imp(cju) 
or reward(cit) > reward(cju) 
thenp diss(cit) < diss(cju). 
(3) For all cit, cju, cit+, cju+  Forcecom with t<t+, u<u+: 
ifcp 0 < redpress(cit) < redpress(cju) 
thenp 0 > imp(cit+) - imp(cit) > imp(cju+) - imp(cju) 
or 0 < reward(cit+) - reward(cit) < reward(cju+) - reward(cju) 
or 0 > attidiff(cit+) - attidiff(cit) > attidiff(cju+) - attidiff(cju). 
 
 The additional terms are non-theoretical with respect to dissonance 
theory because their values can be determined by direct ratings, magnitude 
estimations, pair comparisons, or other standard scaling methods. Since DissF 
is a specialization of DissB, the T-theoretical terms of DissF are similar to 
those of DissB with respect to the theory-net according to DVIII-3 in BMS, 
p. 392. The partial potential models of DissF can be built by omitting its T-
theoretical elements as follows:   
DIII-6: y is a partial potential model of the forced compliance dissonance  (y 
 Mpp(DissF)) iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
(2) pairdiss, paircons, diss, redpress are T-theoretical. 
(3) y = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairimp, Forcecom, 
attidiff, imp, reward  Mpp(DissF) 
 
 
 
52 
 
3.2. Neuroscience 
 The second scientific field, whose theories will be modeled here, is 
neuroscience. In the recent development of cognitive science, there are many 
kinds of research dedicated to exploring the relationship between mind and 
body, especially the brain and neural systems. On the neurobiology level, 
mental processes depend on two primary processes, namely the information 
processed by the neural network and the chemical processes by the enzymes. 
The network process is how the neurons in their network process the data 
input to give appropriate responses. The chemical process is how enzymes or 
some chemicals play a role in making the network process more effective or 
less effective.  
 There are many types of research in both processes related to the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. Because of the time limitation, this 
dissertation will focus on the network process. Therefore, in this part of 
Chapter 3, two theory elements will be presented: the McCulloch-Pitts neuron 
and Hawkins-Kandel’s computational neuroscientific theory (CNT). The 
author created the structuralist model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron, whereas 
the structuralist model of Hawkins-Kandel’s CNT was created by John Bickle 
– with some adaptation for this dissertation by the author.    
 
3.2.1. Building a Structuralist Model of Hawkins-Kandel’s 
Computational Neuroscientific Theory (CNT) 
 John Bickle builds a structuralist model of Hawkins-Kandel’s 
Computational Neuroscientific Theory (CNT) based on their paper entitled Is 
There a Cell-Biological Alphabet for Simple Forms of Learning? (1984) In 
their paper, Hawkins and Kandel discuss the correlation between the 
phenomena of learning and the interneuron activities in the brain. Some 
progress has been made in identifying cellular mechanisms for habituation, 
sensitization, and conditioning in simple vertebrate systems and higher 
invertebrates such as Aplysia, Drosophila, Hermissenda, locust, and crayfish. 
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From these studies, Hawkins and Kandel (1984) summarize the general 
features of neural activities in the brain with respect to learning as follows: 
“(1) Elementary aspect of learning are not distributed in the brain but can be 
localized to the activity of specific nerve cells; (2) Learning produces 
alterations in the membrane properties and the synaptic connections of those 
cells; (3) The changes in synaptic connections so far encountered have not 
involved the formation of the new synaptic contacts. Rather, they are achieved 
by modulation the amount of chemical transmitter released by the presynaptic 
terminal of neurons; And (4) In several instances, the molecular mechanisms 
of learning involve intracellular second messengers and modulation of 
specific ion channels” (p. 375).   
 Bickle does not build the model of all these features, but only a part 
of them. He focuses on the connections among neurons in the learning process 
and broadens his approach to the general idea of mental representations. 
“[Mental] Representations are usually characterized in one of two ways: as 
patterns of activation values (values of non-negative real numbers 
representing the firing rates of some or all of the neurons in the network), or 
as patterns of synaptic weight values that regulate activation values in all but 
the input neurons of the network” (Bickle, 1998, p. 191). Bickle identifies the 
fundamental features of Hawkins and Kandel's neurobiological theories: “(1) 
a set of neurons, (2) a state of activation and an output function for each 
neurons, (3) a pattern of connectivity among the neurons (4) an intraneuronal 
activation rule for combining the inputs to a neuron with its current activation 
state to produce a new activation state, and (5) various intraneuronal 
processes for adjusting the synaptic strengths between a neuron and others 
receiving its output as part of their input” (Bickle, 1998, p. 191).   
 To build his structuralist model, Bickle uses the following notations: 
“N is a network (hence the well-ordering condition) of neurons (n). Act is a 
set of action commands (to the motor system). T is a set of time instances (t). 
AV is the activation-value relation, taking neurons at times into positive real 
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values. O is the neurons’ output at times, determined by some mathematical 
function A on each neuron's activation value. I is [the] input at times coming 
into any neurons from outside the network (e.g., from the sensory periphery). 
CW is the connection weight relation at times, with the restriction that no unit 
is actively connected to itself. Cause is the causation relation from the 
activation values of a subset of neurons (seemingly without exception a 
proper subset, the output neurons) onto action commands. [Italic is used here 
to indicate the sets’ names]” (Bickle, 1998, p. 192).   
 The potential models of the Computational Neuroscientific Theory 
(Mp(CNT)) according to Bickle are defined as follows: 
DIII-7: x is a potential model of the Computational Neuroscientific Theory (x 
 Mp(CNT)) iff there exist N, Act, T, AV, O, I, CW, Cause such that:   
(1) x =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mp(CNT) 
(2) N is a finite, non-empty, non-singleton, well-ordered set of neurons 
(3) Act is a finite, possibly empty set of the action command 
(4) T is a finite, non-empty set, non-singleton, well-ordered set of point 
of time 
(5) AV := N  T → IR+       (Activation of neurons) 
(6) O := N  T → IR, and for all nN, tT, O(n,t) = AV(n,t)  
(Neuron’s Output) 
(7) I := N  T → IR     (Neuron’s Input) 
(8) CW := N  N  T → IR, & for all nN, tT, CW (n,n,t) = {x| xIR} 
(Connection Weight at t) 
(9) Cause := AV* → Act, where AV*  AV   
(Seemingly without exception, AV* AV) 
 
 The actual models contain the following laws or law-like statements 
as follows (Bickle, 1998, pp. 192–193): “(1) the activation value of each 
neuron at some time is the result of some arithmetical function F on 
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connection weights multiplied by the output of all neurons actively connected 
with the one in question, inputs to the neuron from outside the network [if 
any], and the neuron’s activation value at the time instant just before. (2) If 
the right relation obtains between inputs to the network over time, then the 
connection weights times outputs of the presynaptic units differ by quantity 
D from those products at an earlier time. (3) if the same inputs to the network 
obtain over time, then the output of some units will be less at a later time 
compared to the earlier time.” The set of the actual models of the 
Computational Neuroscientific Theory (M(CNT)) according to Bickle is 
defined as follows: 
DIII-8: x is an actual model of the Computational Neuroscientific Theory (x 
M(CNT)) iff there exist N, Act, T, AV, O, I, CW, Cause such that: 
(1) x =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mp(CNT) 
(2) For all n1, n2  N: AV(n1, t) = CW(n2, n1) . O(n2) I(n1) AV(n1, t-1).  
(3) If Relation between I(N) at t & I(N) at t-1 &...& I(N) at t-n, then 
CW(N) at t times O(N) at t differs by D from CW(N) at t-n times O(N) 
at t-n). 
(4) If I(N) at t= I(N) at t-1 = … = I(N) at t-n, then O(N) at t differs from 
O(N) at t-n in that for some nN, O(n,t) < O(n,t-n).   
 
 The partial potential models of computational neuroscientific theory 
can be defined by omitting the T-theoretical elements. Because all the 
elements can be observed empirically or be modeled by some other theory, 
the partial potential models of CNT are identical with its potential models. 
The partial potential models of the computational neuroscientific theory 
(Mpp(CNT)) can be characterized as follows: 
DIII-9: y is a partial potential model of the Computational Neuroscientific 
Theory (y  Mpp(CNT)) iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mp(CNT) 
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(2) There is no T-theoretical element. 
(3) y =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mpp(CNT) 
 
3.2.2. Building a Structuralist Model of the McCulloch-Pitts Neuron 
 The McCulloch-Pitts neuron (1943) is an abstract and simplified 
model about the activity of a neuron in neural networks from 
neurophysiological data based on the following five assumptions: “1) The 
activity of the neuron is an “all-or-none” process. 2) A certain fixed number 
of synapses must be excited within the period of latent addition in order to 
excite a neuron at any time, and this number is independent of previous 
activity and position on the neuron. 3) The only significant delay within the 
nervous system is the synaptic delay. 4) The activity of any inhibitory synapse 
absolutely prevents excitation of the neuron at that time. 5) The structure of 
the net does not change with time” (McCulloch-Pitts, 1943, p. 118).   
  The McCulloch-Pitts model shows that a neuron has the 
characteristics of a digital automaton in its activities. A neuron consists of a 
soma and an axon. In a neural network, axons connect to other neurons at 
synapses. These synapses are a place where the information is transmitted 
from one neuron to another one. A neural network is an arrangement of a finite 
number of neurons, whereas every axon of a neuron is in connection with the 
soma of other neurons (or maybe its own) at the synapse. In a network these 
neurons have just two possible conditions – they fire (in excitation) or do not 
fire (in inhibition). These conditions can be achieved because each neuron has 
a threshold. If the amount of total input received by a neuron is higher than 
or the same as its threshold, the neuron is in an excitatory state; otherwise, the 
neuron is in an inhibitory state.    
The threshold of neurons, according to the McCulloch-Pitts model, 
enables the neurons in a neural network to perform all logical operations. We 
can build various logical switches from such neurons by controlling the input 
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signal and the threshold: for a logical AND-switch, we choose the input signal 
1/m and the threshold (m-1)/m, such that the neuron fires, if all inputs are 
active – m is here the number of input neurons. For a logical OR-switch, we 
choose the threshold 1/(m-1). Moreover, for the logical negation, we choose 
the threshold -1/2 and the synaptic weight -1, such that the threshold can be 
exceeded if the input signal is 0. A combination of these three operations can 
build the rest of the logical switches. Nowadays, this idea is developed and 
applied for various usages not only as an explanatory model in neuroscience 
but also in several other scientific fields, where the simulation of cognitive 
dissonance is just one among them.   
 The McCulloch-Pitts model and other models in artificial neural 
networks studies are typically presented as a directed graph. The vertices 
represent the neurons, whereas the edges represent the synaptic connections 
(axon and its synaptic connection). Every edge is labeled with a real number 
representing the strength of synaptic connections. A positive number indicates 
excitatory synapses, whereas the 0 (zero) or a negative number indicates the 
inhibitory synapses. For each neuron in the networks, there is a specific 
threshold value to fire. If the neuron’s threshold value is surpassed at the time 
(t-1) by a single or several firing neurons connected to the soma of this neuron, 
the neuron will be in the excitatory condition and fires on time t.   
 In the McCulloch-Pitts model, the neurons (N) receive their input (Inp) 
from a number n of other neurons through a synaptic connection (C). The 
neurons that serve as input-giver are called “input neurons” (N0). The synaptic 
connections between neurons have a synaptic weight (W), whereas every 
neuron has a threshold (). Suppose some input-neurons fire at time t0. They 
give an input (Inp) for the neuron after them in a synaptic connection. As a 
response, a neuron will fire at time t1, by giving its output (Outp). In the 
McCulloch-Pitts model, each neuron has only two conditions, namely 
inhibitory, represented by 0, and excitatory, represented by 1.   
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 Three processes occur in the McCulloch-Pitts neuron. (1) The neuron 
unifies all inputs, that are received. This process forms the network-input for 
it. The process is represented here as a network-input function (fnet) as 
follows:   
  fnet (Inp, W, t0) = netn = i=1
n wi.inpi 
(2) The second process is activation (fact). In this process, the network-input 
is compared with the neuron's threshold: if the network input is greater than 
or the same as the threshold, a neuron is in the excitatory condition; otherwise, 
a neuron is in the inhibitory condition. 
     |1, if netn  
  fact (netn, ) = Actn = | 
     |0, otherwise 
(3) If the neuron is in the excitatory state, it will fire (output = 1) according 
to the output-function fout, otherwise, it will not fire (output = 0): fout (actn) 
= output neuron at t1. 
 
Figure 3.1. The McCulloch-Pitts model of a neuron (Adapted from Borgelt, C. et. 
al., 2003, p.33) 
 
 Based on the considerations discussed above, a theory-element of the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron can be built as follows: Firstly, the potential models 
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of the McCulloch-Pitts model of a neuron (Mp(MCP-N)) can be characterized 
as follows: 
DIII-10: x is a potential model of McCulloch-Pitt model of neuron (x  
Mp(MCP-N)) iff there exist N, N0, T, IR, IN C, W, ,  Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, 
fout, such that 
(1) x =  N, N0, T, IR, IN, , C, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(MCP-
N) 
(2) N = a finite non-empty set of neurons 
(3) N0 = non-empty set of input neurons = {mN| (m, n)C} (Input units) 
(4) T = a discrete order of points of time t = 0, 1, 2, ...           (Time) 
(5) =  → IR    
(Threshold – assigns to every neuron a real number as its threshold) 
(6) C  NN     
(a finite non-empty set of connection between neurons) 
(7) W:= C → IR        
(Synaptic Weight – assigns to each pair of neurons a real number as 
synaptic weight, where w(i,j) = w(j, i) and wW) 
(8) Inp:= N/N0C T →     
(Input – assigns to each neuron, except input neurons, at the point of 
time T several real numbers as its input, that is sent by its input units 
(N0) in the network; 0 = by an inhibitory input neuron and 1 = by an 
excitatory input neuron)    
(9) Outp:= N/N0 T →     
(Output – assigns to each neuron, except input neurons, at the point of 
time T a real number as its output, that is sent to the next neuron in the 
network; 0 = inhibitory and 1 = excitatory) 
(10) fnet:= W  Inp → IR   
(Network Input function – assigns to each neuron (except input units) 
at every point of time t from T a real number as network input) 
 
 
60 
 
(11) fact:= fnet   → IR   
(Activation function – compares the result from fnet with θ and 
assigns to the neuron a real number. The result is either 0 or 1) 
(12) fout:= fact → Outp  
(Output function – assigns every neuron a number 0 (inhibitory) or 1 
(excitatory) as its output according to Outp.) 
 
 The actual models of McCulloch-Pitts model of neuron (M(MCP-N)) 
can be defined as follows: 
DIII-11: x is an actual model of McCulloch-Pitts model of neuron (x  
M(MCP-N)) iff there exist N, N0, , C, W, T, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout, IR, 
IN such that: 
(1) x =  N,  N0, T, IR, IN, , C, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(MCP-
N) 
(2) There is n  N/N0, ci C for i IN, t0,t1T,  and let netn, actn, outn so 
that: 
 (2.1) netn = fnet (Inp, W, t0) = i=1
n  Inpi (n, ci, t0).W(ci) 
 (2.2) actn = fact( netn, ): 
  (i) actn = 1, if netn  , 
  (ii) actn = 0, otherwise. 
 (2.3) outn = fout (actn) = Outp (n, t1). 
 
 Now we define the partial potential models of the McCulloch-Pitts 
neuron by omitting the T-theoretical concepts. In the McCulloch-Pitts model, 
only the three function terms – fnet, fact, and fout – are T-theoretical because 
the concepts of the neuron, connections, synaptic weight, time, and threshold 
are empirical. These three terms are T-theoretical because these terms 
presuppose this theory of neuron itself. According to this theory a neuron 
must have the following three characteristics: First, receiving input-signals 
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from the sending neurons, called the input neurons, as represented by fnet. 
The second characteristic is comparing the input signal with a specific weight 
called ‘threshold.’ The neuron will fire if the input signal is greater than its 
threshold (excitatory state); the neuron will not fire if the input signal is 
smaller than its threshold (inhibitory state). fact represents this characteristic. 
Moreover, fout represents the third characteristic, namely that of sending the 
result to other receiving neurons. Therefore, the partial potential models of 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron are characterized as follows:   
DIII-12: y is a partial potential model of McCulloch-Pitts neuron (Mpp(MCP-
N)) iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x =  N, N0, T, IR, IN, , C, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(MCP-
N) 
(2) fnet, fact, fout are T-theoretical. 
(3) y =  N, N0, T, IR, IN, , C, W, Inp, Outp  Mpp(MCP-N) 
 
3.3. The Artificial Neural Network 
 Today it is still impossible to know exactly how the network of 
neurons in the brain works produce the phenomena of cognition because of 
its complexity. In neuroscience, we can only learn about the parts of the brain 
on various levels of explanation that play an essential role in cognitive 
processes, such as neurons and their network, regions in the cerebrum, the 
interconnection between parts of the brain and so on. Our brain has 1011 
neurons, and therefore, there are n.2n possibilities of connections among 
neurons, where n = 1011; we have no chance to fully understand the cognitive 
process in the brain with our current scientific development.   
Many neuroscientists and psychologists seek another way out to 
understand the brain’s information processing from a branch of computer 
science, called Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). In the history of artificial 
intelligence, there are two approaches developed to modeling cognition 
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namely, by symbol manipulation and by the artificial neural network (also 
known as connectionism) (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2002, p. 2): “Both 
connectionist and symbolic systems can be viewed as computational systems. 
However, they advance quite different conceptions of what computation 
involves. In the symbol approach, computation involves the transformation 
of symbols according to [logical] rules. … We treat a traditional computer as 
a symbolic device, and we view it as performing symbolic manipulations 
specified by rules which typically are written in a special data structure called 
the program. [Italics in the original] The connectionist view of computation 
is quite different. It focuses on causal processes by which units excite and 
inhibit each other and does not provide either for stored symbols or rules that 
govern their manipulation.” The symbolic manipulation approach, whose 
proponents are Dennett, Fodor, Pylyshyn, and others, has its roots more in 
logic and linguistics, whereas the connectionist approach is inspired by a 
model of a neuron from neuroscience and statistics or probability theory. Its 
proponents are Frank Rosenblatt, John Hopfield, Geoffrey Hinton, David 
Rummelhart, Paul Smolensky, David McClelland, among others. Because of 
this close relation between neuroscience and the artificial neural network, I 
have chosen to use the artificial neural network as a model, or respectively a 
simulation of cognitive dissonance reduction.    
Giving an explanation via a simulation of the brain’s computational 
process is just one of the goals of the artificial neural network research. The 
other goal is to solve some technical issues, such as face recognition, 
controlling, voice recognition, and so on. This dissertation will limit itself to 
the first goal, i.e., to analyze the intertheoretical connections between 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance and the artificial neural network 
by the simulations of cognitive dissonance according to the following models:   
(1) Thomas R. Shultz and Mark R. Lepper: the consonance model. 
(2) Frank van Overwalle and Karen Jordens: the adaptive connectionist 
model. 
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The abbreviation ANN stands for the artificial neural network.   
In the simulation of psychological phenomena by using ANN, they 
built a specific network of several artificial models of the neuron – normally 
the Rosenblatt perceptron. These artificial neurons are placed in a certain 
network pattern, such as a feed-forward network or a recurrent network. Then 
specific learning algorithms (or learning rules), such as the delta rule (also 
called Widrow-Hoff rule), will be executed. Whereas the consonance model 
uses the Hopfield network – a kind of recurrent network, the adaptive 
connectionist model – to simplify it will be called the connectionist model – 
uses the two layers feed-forward neural network and the delta rule as its 
learning algorithm. In this third section of Chapter 3, we will build several 
structuralist models for the Rosenblatt perceptron, the Hopfield network, the 
two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule. 
  
3.3.1. Building a Structuralist Model of the Rosenblatt Perceptron 
 The McCulloch-Pitts model has several limitations. Firstly, the input 
from input neurons is only either 1 or 0. Secondly, the connection weights and 
the threshold are initially set from the beginning to perform certain logical 
functions. Therefore, the McCulloch-Pitts neuron cannot learn. In history, 
these limitations were removed by the theory of the perceptron due to Arthur 
Rosenblatt in 1958.   
 The Rosenblatt perceptron is the second generation of the model of a 
neuron. In the perceptron, the input(s) are not only 0 and 1, as in the 
McCulloch-Pitt neuron. The input can be various numbers depending on the 
use of the network. Therefore, instead of just having the characteristics of a 
digital automaton, the perceptron has a statistical character. It can now 
analyze a given set of data and build an approximative model for those data 
by its activation function (and learning rule). 
 Perceptrons (or neurons), which are not input-perceptrons, (N/N0) 
receive input-value in real numbers from input-perceptrons (or also input 
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neurons) (N0) through a (synaptic) connection (C). The synaptic connections 
between neurons have a synaptic weight (W), whereas every neuron, which is 
not input neuron, has a bias () that is normally set as 1. The notion of bias 
here is like the notion of threshold in the McCulloch-Pitts neuron. By setting 
bias =1, the bias gives the perceptron a trainable constant value, because the 
connection weight of bias can be adjusted according to the learning rule. By 
implementing a learning rule, such as the delta rule, the bias helps to adjust 
the function to approximate the data. The synaptic weight of the connection 
between the bias and the neuron also has a weight W0. Because of bias and its 
connection, the perceptron has the characteristics of the statistical function in 
its network-input function.    
 Like the McCulloch-Pitts neuron, the perceptron also has three 
processes. (1) The neuron unifies all inputs that are received. It forms the 
network-input for it. This process is represented here as a network function 
(fnet) as follows: 
  fnet (Inp, W) = netn = i=1
n
  Inpi (n, ci,).W(ci). 
(2) The second process is the activation function (fact). In this process the 
network-input is processed according to a certain activation function.1 The 
activation function that will be used in the connectionist model in Chapter 7 
is the linear regression:   
  fact(netn, b, w0) = actn= netn + b.w0 
 
1 For neurons in the hidden layer one of the following activation functions is normally applied: 
a. The sigmoid activation function: 
fact(netn, b, w0)= actn = 1/ (1 + e^(netn + b.w0)) 
b. The Tanh activation function: 
fact(netn, b, w0)= actn = (e^(netn + b.w0) - e^-(netn + b.w0))/ (e^(netn + b.w0) 
 + e^-(netn + b.w0)) 
c. The Rectified linear (ReLU) activation function: 
     0   for (netn + b.w0) < 0 
fact(netn, b, w0)= actn =  or 
     (netn + b.w0) for (netn + b.w0) >= 0 
And the neurons in the output layer normally use linear regression:   
  fact(netn, b, w0) = actn= netn + b.w0 
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(3) The neuron gives a real number as its output according to: 
  fout(actn) = outn. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The Rosenblatt model of a perceptron (Adapted from Borgelt, C. et. al., 
2003, p.33) 
  
From the description above, we can build a structuralist model of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron according to the following steps: First, we define the 
potential models of the Rosenblatt perceptron (Mp(RP)) as follows: 
DIII-13: x is a potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x  Mp(RP)) iff 
there exist N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout, such that: 
(1) x=N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout  Mp(RP) 
(2) N = a finite non-empty set of neurons 
(3) N0 = a non-empty set of input-neurons = {mN| (m,n)C }   
(Input units) 
(4) B=  → IR    
(Bias – assigns to every neuron besides the input neurons a real 
number as its bias. Bias is normally set = 1) 
(5) C  NN      
(a finite non-empty set of connections between neurons) 
(6) W0 := BN/N0 → IR   (Synaptic Weight from Bias) 
(7) W := C → IR       
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(Synaptic Weight – W assigns to each pair of neurons a real number 
as the synaptic weight.) 
(8) Inp:= N/N0C → IR      
(Input – assigns to each neuron several real numbers as its input, sent 
by its input-units in the network)     
(9) Outp:= N/N0 → IR     
(Output – assigns to each neuron a real number as its output, that is 
sent to the next neuron in the network) 
(10) fnet: W Inp → IR    
(Network Input function – assigns to neurons (except input units) a 
real number as the network input) 
(11) fact: fnet    W0→ IR   
(Activation function – there are various activation functions) 
(12) fout: fact → Outp   
(Output function – assigns every neuron a real number as its output 
according to Outp) 
 
Second, the actual models of the Rosenblatt perceptron (M(RP)) can 
be defined as follows: 
DIII-14: x is an actual model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x  M(RP)) iff 
there exist N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout such that. 
(1) x= N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout  Mp(RP) 
(2) There is n  N/N0, ci C for iIN, bB and let netn, actn, outn so that: 
(2.1) netn = fnet (Inp, W) = i=1
n  Inpi (n, ci,).W(ci),  
(2.2) actn = fact(netn, b, w0) = netn + b.w0. 
(2.3) outn = fout (actn) = Outp . 
 
Finally, the partial potential models of the Rosenblatt perceptron 
(Mpp(RP)) can be defined by omitting the T-theoretical elements. Like in the 
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McCulloch-Pitts model, only fnet, fact, and fout of the Rosenblatt perceptron 
are T-theoretical because the other concepts, such as the neuron, bias, 
connections, bias’s connection weight, and synaptic weight are ‘empirical’ – 
determined by inputs containing data from an empirical observation – and 
based on other theories. These three terms are T-theoretical because these 
terms presuppose this theory of a perceptron itself. Later in Chapter 6 we can 
see that these three are theoretical terms related to the net with McCulloch-
Pitts neuron. The partial potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron can be 
defined as follows: 
DIII-15: y is a partial potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (Mpp(RP)) 
iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x =  N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(RP). 
(2) fnet, fact, fout are T-theoretic.  
(3) y =  N, N0, IR, IN, W, B, W0, Inp, Outp   Mpp(RP). 
 
 Before discussing the architecture of the network, the following items 
are worthy of consideration: (1) There are two main streams of the artificial 
neural network regarding the goal and application of its development. The 
first develops the artificial neural network to build the simulation of the 
brain's functionality, and the second develops the artificial neural network to 
solve a specific problem or support some technology as a kind of artificial 
intelligence or machine learning. The first one tries to mimic how the brain 
works as precisely as possible. Therefore, it usually uses the perceptron with 
the input and output like the McCulloch-Pitts model – 0 for the inhibitory 
condition and 1 for the excitatory condition. As for the second idea, the 
perceptron model is generally used with various inputs and outputs in the real 
numbers. Because of its purposes, this dissertation will follow the first idea. 
(2) For a multi-layers feed-forward neural network with hidden layers, the 
model of the perceptron is usually used. For the simplest version with only 
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two layers – input-layer and output-layer – both the McCulloch-Pitts model 
and the Rosenblatt perceptron can be used. 
 
3.3.2. Building a Structuralist Model of the Network Architecture 
The perceptrons are placed in a specific architecture of networks in 
order to work according to our purpose. There are various network-
architectures in the study of artificial neural networks. However, we can 
categorize them into two main categories: feed-forward neural networks and 
recurrent neural networks. (People may also build a mixture of them).    
 A network-architecture of neural networks is normally described in 
the terms of directed graph-theory. As Borgelt et.al., 2003, pp. 29–30 say: 
“Ein (künstliches) neuronales Netz ist ein (gerichteter) Graph G = (U,C), 
dessen Knoten u  U Neuronen (neurons, units) und dessen Kanten c  C 
Verbindungen (connections) heißen. Die Menge U der Knoten ist unterteilt in 
die Menge Uin der Eingabeneuronen (input neurons), Uout der 
Ausgabeneuronen (output neurons) und die Menge Uhidden der versteckten 
Neuronen (hidden neurons). Es gilt [In English: An (artificial) neural network 
is a (directed) graph G = (U, C) whose nodes are called u  U neurons 
(neurons, units) and whose edges are c  C connections. The set U of nodes 
is subdivided into the set Uin of the input neurons, the set Uout of the output 
neurons, and the set Uhidden of the hidden neurons. It applies]”: 
 U = Uin  Uout  Uhidden, 
 Uin   Uout  Uhidden  (Uin  Uout)=” 
In this work, I will use notation N for Neuron, instead of U. 
In an artificial neural network-architecture, these three kinds of 
neurons-layers have each of their roles as follows: (1) Input neurons (Nin) are 
the neurons in the input layer. They receive the input values for the neural 
network and convey them to the neurons in the next layers, either the output 
layer (in two-layer neural networks) or the first hidden layer (in multi-layer 
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neural networks). (2) Output neurons (Nout) are the neurons in the output layer. 
They receive the values, that were processed and transferred by the other 
layers, either the last hidden layer or the input layer, and give them back as 
the output of the networks after processing them. (3) Hidden neurons (Nhidden) 
are the neurons in the hidden layer. Hidden layers are the layers of neurons 
that are neither the input layer nor the output layer. Hidden layers lie between 
the input layer and the output layer – they are called “hidden layer” because 
of their place. They received the output of the neuron in the previous layer, 
process it, and convey the result as an input to the next layer. 
 Between two neurons, which are connected by a directed connection 
C, we can define the neuron predecessors (pred) and the neuron successors 
(succ) as follows (Borgelt et al., 2003, p. 29): 
 pred = {n1 N| (n1, n2)  C} 
 succ = {n2  N| (n1, n2)  C} 
In the neural network “Jeder Verbindung (v,u)  C ist ein Gewicht wuv 
zugeordnet und jedem Neuron u  U drei (reellwertige) Zuständsgrößen: die 
Netzeingabe netu (network input), die Aktivierung actu (activation) und die 
Ausgabe outu (output). Jedes Eingabeneuron u  U in besitzt außerdem eine 
vierte (reellwertige) Zustandsgröße, die externe Eingabe extu (external input) 
[in English: Each connection (v, u)  C is assigned a weight wuv and each 
neuron u  U three (real-valued) states of operation: the network input netu, 
the activation actu (activation) and the output outu (output). Each input neuron 
u  U in also has a fourth (real-valued) state variable, the external input extu 
(external input).]” (Borgelt, et.al., 2003, p.30). In this work, the notations n1, 
n2 is used here instead of u, v. 
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Figure 3.3. The architecture of an artificial neural network  
 
 To build a structuralist model for a theory element of the architecture 
of the artificial neural network, we must define the potential model, the actual 
model, and the partial potential model. The potential models of the 
architecture of the artificial neural network (Mp(archNN)) can be 
characterized as follows: 
DIII-16: x is a potential model of the architecture of the artificial neural 
network (x  Mp(archNN)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, 
succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn   
Mp(archNN) 
(2) N is a finite non-empty set of neurons. 
(3) Nin is a finite non-empty set of input-neurons. 
(4) Nout is a finite non-empty set of output-neurons. 
(5) Nhidden is a finite set of hidden neurons. 
(6) C  NN     (a finite non-empty set of  
    directed connections between neurons) 
(7) pred = {n1 N| (n1, n2)  C}  (presynaptic neurons) 
(8) succ = {n2  N| (n1, n2)  C}  (postsynaptic neurons) 
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(9) W:= C → IR     (synaptic weight) 
(10) extn:= Nin → IR   (external input) 
(11) netn:= N → IR   (network-input) 
(12) actn:= N → IR   (activation) 
(13) outn:= N → IR   (output) 
 
 The following law or law-like statement determines the set of actual 
models of the architecture of artificial neural network (M(archNN)): (1) A 
network lets no single neuron excluded from the rest. All neurons are 
connected and play a role as input neurons, hidden neurons, or output neurons. 
(2) Input neurons play the role of predecessors in the network, whereas the 
output neurons play the role of successors, and the hidden neurons play both 
roles as successors and as predecessors. (3) Neurons in the hidden layer(s) are 
neither the input neurons nor the output neurons. The actual models for the 
architecture of artificial neural network (M(archNN)) can be formally 
characterized as follows: 
DIII-17: x is an actual model of the architecture of the artificial neural 
network (x  M(archNN)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, 
W, extn, netn, actn, outn such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn   
Mp(archNN) 
(2) N = Nin  Nout  Nhidden, 
(3) for all n  N it holds: 
(3.1) Nin = pred 
(3.2) Nout = succ 
(3.3) Nhidden = succ  pred 
(4) Nhidden  (Nin  out) =  
(5) n  Nhidden, n  Nout:   
(5.1) netn = fnet
(n) (w→n, in
→
n) = w
→
n in
→
n = n0pred(n) wn0,n outn0. 
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(5.2) For the Rosenblatt perceptron with the linear activation function:  
         actn = fact(netn, b, w0)= netn + b.w0 
(5.3) outn = fout (actn) 
  
 To characterize the partial potential models of the architecture of an 
artificial neural network (Mpp(archNN)), we omit the T-theoretical concepts 
from the potential models (Mp(archNN)). In the architecture of a neural 
network, the three terms – netn, actn, outn – are T-theoretical, because these 
terms presuppose the concept of a network of neurons. They are the results of 
the three functions of neurons in the network – either according to the 
McCulloch-Pitts model or the Rosenblatt perceptron. The partial potential 
models of the architecture of a neural network (Mpp(archNN)) are 
characterized as follows: 
DIII-18: y is a partial potential model of the architecture of neural network (y 
 Mpp(archNN)) iff there exist x such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn   
Mp(archNN) 
(2) netn, actn, outn are T-theoretic. 
(3) y =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn   Mpp(archNN) 
 
3.3.3. Building a Structuralist Model for the Two-Layers Feed-Forward 
Neural Network and the Hopfield Network 
 The two network architectures that we will use, i.e., the two layers 
feed-forward neural network and the Hopfield network, are understood as two 
among many specializations of the general model of a network architecture 
according to the concept of theory-net because they can be derived by adding 
several additional requirements.   
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3.3.3.1. The Theory-Element of the Two Layers Feed-forward Neural 
Network 
In feed-forward neural networks, the connections between neurons do 
not form a cycle. Through these connections, all neurons in a specific layer 
always send their outputs to neurons in the next layer in the direction from 
input to output. The neurons in the input layer send their output to the neurons 
in the output layer or the first layer of the hidden layer. The neurons in the 
hidden layer send their output to the neurons in the output layer or to the 
neurons in the next hidden layer. The neurons in the output layer receive the 
outputs of the neurons in the input layer or in the last hidden layer as their 
inputs.  
 From this scenario, we can see that there are two kinds of feed-forward 
neural networks. The simplest kind is called “two-layers feed-forward neural 
network,” consisting of only two layers of neurons, namely a layer of input 
neurons (input layer) and a layer of output neurons (output layer).  The input 
is fed directly by the input neuron to the neurons in the output layer because 
this kind of neural network has no hidden layer. 
  
Figure 3.4. A two-layers feed-forward neural network 
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 For this specialization, we add the following new laws statements (or 
law-like statements) in the actual models of two-layers feed-forward neural 
networks (M(2L-FFNN)), whereas the potential models of two-layers feed-
forward neural networks (Mp(2L-FFNN)) are identical with Mp(archNN): (1) 
There is no hidden layer of neurons; therefore each neuron is either an input 
neuron or output neuron. (2) The input neurons and the output neurons are 
not identical. (3) All connections in this architecture are connections between 
input neurons and output neurons. (4) For each output neuron, its network 
input (netn) is the result of the network input function of the neuron. Whereas 
its activation (actn) is the result of the activation function of the neuron, and 
its network output is the result of the output function of the neurons. The 
actual models of two-layers feed-forward neural network-architecture 
(M(2L-FFNN)) can be characterized as follows:   
DIII-19: x is an actual model of the two-layer feed-forward neural network (x 
 M(2L-FFNN)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, 
netn, actn, outn such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn   
Mp(2L-FFNN) 
(2) Nhidden =  
(3) N = Nin  Nout  Nhidden, 
(4) for all n  N it holds: 
(4.1) Nin = pred 
(4.2) Nout = succ 
(5) Nin  Nout =  
(6) C  Nin  Nout 
(7) n  Nout:   
 (7.1) netn = fnet
(n) (w→n, in
→
n) = w
→
n in
→
n = n0pred(n) wn0,n outn0. 
 (7.2) For perceptron with the linear activation function:  
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          actn = fact(netn, b, w0)= netn + b.w0 
 (7.3) outn = fout (actn) 
 
 The second type of feed-forward neural network is the multi-layers 
one. This kind consists not only of an input layer and an output layer but also 
some layers of hidden neurons (hidden layer) – at least one hidden layer. We 
do not discuss this type because it will not be used for the simulations 
discussed later.  
 
3.3.3.2. A Theory-Element of the Hopfield Network 
 In the recurrent neural networks, the connections between neurons can 
form a loop. There are several architectures of the recurrent neural network, 
such as the Hopfield network, Boltzmann machine, etc. For the goal of this 
dissertation, only a structuralist model of the Hopfield network will be built.   
 The Hopfield network is a form of a fully recurrent neural network 
popularized by John Hopfield in 1982 through his paper Neural Networks and 
Physical Systems with Emergent Collective Computational Abilities. The 
neurons in the Hopfield network are binary threshold units in strong backward 
coupling.2 They take only two different values for their states, 0 (inhibitory) 
 
2 “The processing devices will be called neurons. Each neuron i has two states like those of 
McCulloch and Pitts: Vi = 0 (“not firing”) and Vi = 1 (“firing at maximum rate”). When 
neuron i has a connection made to it from neuron j, the strength of connection is defined as 
Tij. (Nonconnected neurons have Tij = 0.) The instantaneous state of the system is specified 
by listing the N values of Vi, so it is represented by a binary word of N bits.  
The state changes in time according to the following algorithm. For each neuron i 
there is a fixed threshold Ui. Each neuron i readjusts its state randomly in time but with a 
mean attempt rate W, setting 
Vi → 0   >Ui 
If ji TijVi 
Vi → 1   <Ui 
Thus, each neuron randomly and asynchronously evaluates whether it is above or below 
threshold and readjusts accordingly. (Unless otherwise stated, we choose Ui = 0.) 
Although this model has superficial similarities to the perceptron, the essential 
differences are responsible for the new results. First, perceptrons were modeled chiefly with 
neural connections in a “forward” direction A→B→C→D. The analysis of networks with 
strong backward coupling  proved intractable. All our interesting results arise as 
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or 1 (excitatory), so the Hopfield network uses a kind of McCulloch-Pitt 
neuron. To build a structuralist model of the Hopfield network, we can use 
fnet, fact, and fout of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron for this network.   
 The network input function of each neuron n is the sum of all outputs 
of other neurons [plus the actual input] times the connection’s weight. In 
matrix form, it can be described as follows: 
 nN: fnet(n) (w→n, in
→
n) =   w
→
n in
→
n = m-{n} wmn outm. 
The activation function of each neuron n is a threshold-function as follows: 
 
     | 1, in case netn  n, 
 nN: fact(n) (netn, n) = | 
     | -1, otherwise. 
 
Or sometimes the activation function of the neurons of a Hopfield network 
is defined by using the old activation actn (Borgelt, C. et. al., 2003, p. 112): 
 
      | 1, in case netn > n, 
 nN: fact(n) (netn, n, actn) =  | -1, in case netn < n, 
      | actn, in case netn = n. 
 
The output function of each neuron is the following. 
 nN: fout(n) (actn) = actn. 
As a fully recurrent neural network, each neuron in the Hopfield network is 
connected to other neurons, except with itself. In the Hopfield network, every 
 
consequences of the strong back-coupling. Second, Perceptron studies usually made a 
random net of neurons deal directly with areal physical world and did not ask the questions 
essential to finding the more abstract emergent computational properties. Finally, 
Perceptron modeling required synchronous neurons like a conventional digital computer. 
There is no evidence for such global synchrony and, given the delays of nerve signal 
propagation, there would be no way to use global synchrony effectively. Chiefly 
computational properties which can exist in spite of asynchrony have interesting 
implications in biology” (Hopfield, 1982, p. 2554). 
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neuron serves both as an input neuron and as an output neuron. Because all 
neurons in the Hopfield networks serve as input and output, it has no hidden 
neurons. We need to add the following statements in our general model of a 
neural network above:  
 (i) Nhidden = ,   Nin=Nout=N, 
 (ii) C = NN – {(n, n)| n N}. 
The weight of each connection is symmetrical. 
 n0, n1 N, n0  n1: wn0n1 = wn1n0.  
  This network has its convergence statement. Therefore, the Hopfield 
network does not need any learning rule, unlike the feed-forward neural 
network. A convergence statement is a law or law-like statement that is 
connected to the learning process of the neural network. In the learning 
process, the activation of neurons in the Hopfield networks are newly and 
asynchronously calculated. After many finite steps (max. n.2n steps of a single 
realization, with n = number of neurons), it will reach a stable condition, when 
the Hopfield network reaches one of the ‘lowest’ cost (or to converge to a 
local minimum). The stable condition is called “convergence.” 
 As a function to reach a stable condition, the Hopfield network uses a 
so-called energy function. This energy function assigns to every state of the 
Hopfield network a real number as the energy of state. This function must 
become smaller or stay the same in every state-transition. The lowest energy 
defines the stable condition/state. The energy function of the Hopfield 
network is   
 E = - 1/2 act→T W act→  + →T act→ 
with act→ = (actu1, …, actun)
T  = the activation states of nets. 
W = the weight-matrix of nets 
→ = (u1, .., un)
T  is the vector of the threshold of neurons.  
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Figure 3.5. The Hopfield network with four neurons (Adapted from: Wikipedia) 
 
 To build a structuralist model of the Hopfield network, we must first 
modify the potential model by adding two extra concepts, namely state (State) 
and energy (E). The concept of state (State) is a three tuples relation between 
activation (actn) and connection weights (W) and activation (actn). Moreover, 
the energy (E) is a function mapping each state to a specific rational number. 
We can characterize the potential model of the Hopfield network (Mp(HN))as 
follows:   
DIII-20: x is a potential model of the architecture of the Hopfield network (x 
 Mp(HN)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, 
actn, outn, State, E so that: 
(1) x= N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR,  C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn, 
State, E   Mp(HN) 
(2) N is a finite non-empty set of neurons. 
(3) C  NN is a finite non-empty set of directed connections between 
neurons. 
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(4) Nin is a finite non-empty set of input neurons. 
(5) Nout is a finite non-empty set of output neurons. 
(6) Nhidden is a finite set of hidden neurons. 
(7)  := N→ IR     (Threshold/bias) 
(8) pred(n) = {n1 N| (n1, n2)  C}   (presynaptic neurons) 
(9) succ(n) = {n2  N| (n1, n2)  C}   (postsynaptic neurons) 
(10) W:= C → IR       (synaptic weight) 
(11) extn:= Nin → IR    (external input) 
(12) netn:= Inp  W → IR    (network input) 
(13) actn:= N→ IR     (activation) 
(14) outn:= N → IR    (output) 
(15) State  actn  W  actn    (a finite non-empty set of 
      states of Hopfield’s net) 
(16) E:= State → IR    (Energy function)  
 
 The second step is the modification of the actual models of the neural 
network architecture. The Hopfield network can be seen as a specialization of 
the standard model by adding the following laws or law-like statement in the 
actual model:   
(1) In the Hopfield network, there is no hidden layer. 
(2) Input neurons and output neurons are identical. All neurons in a 
Hopfield’s network serve both as input neurons and as output neurons. 
(3) Every neuron is connected to all other neurons, except with itself. 
(4) The connection weight between n1 and n0 is identical to the connection 
weight between n0 and n1. 
(5) Each neuron network input (netn) is the result of each neuron's input 
function (see above). 
(6) For each neuron, activation (actn) is the result of each neuron's 
activation function (see above). 
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(7) Each neuron network output (outn) is the result of each neuron's output 
function (see above). 
(8) Energy function: E = - 1/2 act→T W act→ + →T act→ (for the details 
see above). 
The actual models for the Hopfield network (M(HN)) can be characterized as 
follows: 
DIII-21: x is an actual model of the architecture of the Hopfield network (x  
M(HN)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR,  C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, 
actn, outn, State, E such that: 
(1) x= N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn, 
State, E   Mp(HN) 
(2) for all n  N it holds: 
(2.1) Nin = pred 
(2.2) Nout = succ 
(2.3) Nhidden = succ  pred 
(3) N = Nin  Nout  Nhidden, 
(4) Nhidden  (Nin  out) =  
(5) Nhidden =  
(6) Nin=Nout=N 
(7) C = NN – {(n, n)| n N}. 
(8) n1,n0 N, n1  n0: wn1,n0 = wn0,n1 
(9) Input-net: nN: netn = fnet(u) (w→n, in→n) =   w→n in→n = n0-{n1} 
wn0,n1 outn0. 
(10) Activation 
 () nN: actn = fact
(n) (netn, n) 
  (i) actn = 1, if netn  n ,or 
  (ii) actn = -1, otherwise. 
 or 
 (10.2) n: actn = fact
(n) (netn, ) 
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  (i) actn = 1, in case netn > n, or 
  (ii) actn = -1, in case netn < n, or 
  (iii) actn = actn, in case netn = n. 
(11) output: nN: fout(n) (actn) = actn 
(12) E = - 1/2 act→T W act→ + →T act→ 
  whereas: act→ = (actn1, …, actnm)
T is the activation state of the 
    network. 
      W is the matrix of the weight of the Hopfield network.   
      → = (n1, ..., nm)
T  is the vector of the thresholds of 
    the neurons. 
 
 The partial potential models of the Hopfield network can be derived 
from the potential models by omitting the T-theoretical concepts. In the 
Hopfield network, the terms netn, actn, outn, State, and E are T-theoretical 
because they presuppose the Hopfield network itself. The netn, actn, outn are 
T-theoretical concepts of the more general architecture of the neural network, 
and State and E are T-theoretical elements of the Hopfield network itself. The 
partial potential models of the Hopfield network (Mpp(HN)) are characterized 
as follows: 
DIII-22: y is a partial potential model of the Hopfield network (y  Mpp(HN)) 
iff there exists x such that: 
(1) x= N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR,  C, pred, succ, W, extn, netn, actn, outn, 
State, E   Mp(HN) 
(2) netn, actn, outn, State, E are T-theoretical. 
(3) y =  N, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR,  C, pred, succ, W, extn   Mpp(HN) 
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3.3.3.3. The Theory-Net for the Network-Architecture 
 Until the current discussion, we just see as if the network-architecture 
of the artificial neural network has only two immediate specializations, i.e., 
the two layers feed-forward neural network and the Hopfield network. The 
fact is that the general network-architecture has several specializations in the 
form of feed-forward neural networks by adding the new statement:  Nin  
Nout =  and recurrent neural networks by adding the new statement that there 
is a loop within the networks. The feed-forward neural networks have two 
specializations, namely the single-layer neural networks and the multi-layer 
neural networks. The specializations can be derived by adding some 
additional statements about the network and by applying several statements 
of the appropriate neuron models. The recurrent neural networks have many 
specializations, but here only the Hopfield network is discussed. We also get 
the Hopfield network by adding some additional statements and two 
theoretical terms about the network and by applying several statements of the 
appropriate neuron's models.   
 
3.3.4. Building A Structuralist Model of the Delta Rule 
  In order to operate as expected, artificial neural networks need to learn. 
They can learn to minimize error according to specific rules/algorithms. The 
learning rule plays the role of guiding the artificial neural network to reach 
the optimal state of operation by adjustment of the synaptic weight or the 
threshold of the neurons. The goal is to reach the minimal error or cost in 
supervised learning and unsupervised learning or maximal payoff by 
reinforcement learning. Related to the topic of this dissertation, the delta rule, 
as the learning rule, will be applied for the two-layers feed-forward neural 
network because the connectionist simulation of cognitive dissonance 
discussed later implements this learning rule.   
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 The basic idea of the learning rule used here is how to minimize error 
(normally called ‘cost’) by adjusting the weight of connectivity between 
neurons. If the neural network reaches the minimal cost, the learning step 
should be terminated. This condition is called convergence. Because of this 
goal, we need two basic functions, especially for feed-forward with the delta 
rule (and back-propagation), namely the cost-function and the gradient 
descent function.     
The Widrow-Hoff Model of Learning Rule or the Delta Rule. 
According to the delta rule, the neural network should be fed with a set of 
inputs (Inp) and trained with expected outputs (Out) as a training set L. 
Normally the Inp and the Out are written in the form of matrices Inp→ and 
Out→. The connection's weight W and the threshold   can be set randomly 
(Here we use the bias B, the bias is normally set =1 and its connection weight 
w0IR). With those inputs INP, the neural network will produce the actual 
output OUTn. In the first time of our network’s computation, there will be a 
difference between the actual output (OUTn) and the value of the desired 
output (Out→). These value differences, called the error (Error), will be 
corrected by training our neural network according to the delta rule. We also 
assign a real number as a learning rate .  With the delta rule, we update the 
weight of every synaptic weight.  
The general strategy of the Delta Rule is as follows: (1) We start with 
measuring the error in the output. It is defined by the difference between the 
actual output and the desired output according to the following formula:   
 Error= 1/n  (out – outn)2                     (the cost function) 
(2) The second step is to modify the weight to decrease the error of the 
network. Because the error is calculated for the whole pattern, the local error 
is not available. Therefore, we need to derive the error related to the activation 
of each output unit so that we can determine how the error will change 
according to each neuron’s activation. This step can be done by calculating 
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the error locally as the difference between the desired and the actual output 
activation (I use the symbol  for the local difference): 
 Error/outnn = (out – outnn)    (the derivation of Error by outn) 
It tells us how far the output of each neuron input must be changed to 
minimize the error.   
(3) Because we cannot change the input of the network (Inp), we must change 
the connection weight (W) in order to reduce the error. To do that, we can use 
the following chain rule: 
 Error/ weightn = Error/ outnn.outnn / weightn 
(4) To evaluate the partial derivative of actual output OUTn related to the 
connection's weight (W), we have the linear activation rule: 
 outnn = i(wni inpi) or  netn + b.w0 (activation-function of the 
 perceptron) 
For this partial derivative is: 
 outnn / weightn = inpi 
(5) The partial derivative of the error related to each weight (with negative 
sign) can be computed by multiplying the discrepancy by the input unit's 
activation. 
 Error/ weightn= – (out – outnn).inpi 
(6) The delta-rule multiplies this by the learning rate  
 wi = –  (out – outnn).inpi 
Alternatively, for the network: 
  wi = – i  (out – outnni).inpi 
Note: If we set the learning rate too small, the learning process will be very 
slow. However, if we set the learning rate too big, then the neural network 
will not reach the minimal cost (convergent state) because it takes a too big 
step in the gradient descent.    
(7) The last step is to update the connection weight by the following rule: 
 wi
(neu) = wi
(alt) + wi . 
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 Borgelt et al. give the Convergence-statement for Delta rule as follows 
(Borgelt, C. et al., 2003, p. 27): 
“Sei L={(x1
→, o1),..., (xm
→, om)} eine Menge von Trainingsbeispielen, jeweils 
bestehend aus einem Eingabevektor xi
→  IRn und der zu diesem 
Eingabevektor gewünschten Ausgabe oi {0,1}. Weiter sei L0 = {(x→, o)  L| 
o =0} und L1 = {(x
→, o)  L| o =1}. Wenn L0 und L1 linear separabel sind, 
d.h., wenn w→IRn  und   IR existieren, so dass  
(x→, 0) L0:  w→ x→ <  and 
 (x→, 1) L1:  w→ x→   
Dann terminieren [der Trainingsalgorithmus] 
[In English: Let L={(x1
→, o1),..., (xm
→, om)} be a set of training examples, 
each one consisting of an input vector xi
→  IRn and for this vector input there 
is a desired output oi {0,1}. Further let let L0 = {(x
→, o)  L| o =0} and L1 
= {(x→, o)  L| o =1}. If L0 and L1 are linearly separable, i.e., if there exist 
w→IRn and  IR, such that: 
 (x→, 0) L0:  w
→ x→ <  and 
 (x→, 1) L1:  w
→ x→   
Then [the training algorithm for the delta rule] is terminated.].” 
This dissertation uses the symbol B for bias instead of the symbol . 
The Structuralist Model of the Delta Rule. To build a structuralist 
model for the delta rule we characterize the potential models, the actual 
models, and the partial potential models. The potential models of the delta 
rule (Mp(DR)) can be formulated as follows: 
DIII-23: x is a potential model of the delta rule (x  Mp(DR)) iff there exist 
N, IR, Inp, Out, C, B, W, OUTn, , Error so that: 
(1) x =  N, IR, Inp, Out, C, L, B, W, OUTn, , Error   Mp(DR) 
(2) N is a finite non-empty set of neurons. 
(3) Inp  IR    (Input) 
 
 
86 
 
(4) INP→ is a set of the input vector.   
(5) Out  IR    (desired Output) 
(6) OUT→ is a set of an output-vector. 
(7) C  NN is a finite non-empty set of directed connections between 
neurons. 
(8) L  Inp  Out    (a finite non-empty set of  
     training examples) 
(9) B := N → IR    (Bias) 
(10) W:= C → IR    (weight) 
(11) Outn  IR       (actual output, if the neural  
     network is fed with input Inp)   
(12)   IR    (learning rate) 
(13) Error := Out  OUTn → IR2  (The network’s error is a 
 mapping into a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system) 
 
 The actual models of the delta rule (M(DR)) consist of the following 
law statements or law-like statements: (1) The network’s error can be 
calculated by dividing the sums of the square of the discrepancy between 
actual output and expected output by two. This method to calculate the 
network’s error is known as the mean square error (MSE) method. To correct 
each neuron's error, we need to derive this network’s error for each neuron. 
(2) The learning-rule is as follows: (a) For all neurons’ bias, the update is (old) 
+  with  = – (Out – OUTN). (b) For all neurons’ connection-weight 
the update is wi
(new) = wi
(old) + wi with wi = (Out – OUTN) Inpi and  is 
the learning rate. (3) The Convergence-statement for the delta rule is as 
follows: given a set of training-sample L containing pairs of input and desired 
output L={(Inp1
→, Out1),..., (Inpm
→, Outm)}, the set L contains L0 = {(Inp
→, 
Out)  L| Out =0} and L1 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =1}. If L0 and L1 are 
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linearly separable, and if w→IRn and B=IR exist, then for all L0 the net-input 
is <  and for all L1 the network input is  B  
The actual models for the delta rule (M(DR)) can be defined as 
follows: 
DIII-24: x is an actual model of the delta rule (xM(DR)) iff there exist N, 
IR, Inp, Out, C, L, B, W, OUTN, , Error such that: 
(1) x =  N, IR, Inp, Out, C, L, B, W, OUTn, , Error   Mp(DR) 
(2) i{1, ..., n}: Error= ½ i (Out – OUTN)2 and the derivation for each 
neuron's activation: (Out – OUTN) 
(3) bi i=1, ..., n: bi(new) = bi(old) + bi with bi = – (Out – OUTN). 
(4) wiW, i=1, ..., n: wi(new) = wi(old) + wi with wi = (Out – OUTN) 
Inpi 
(5) Convergence-statement: 
Supposed L={(Inp1
→ , Out1),..., (Inpm
→ , Outm)} is a set of training-
sample with 
L0 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =0} and L1 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =1}. 
If L0 and L1 are linearly separable and if w
→IRn  and B =IR exist, 
then 
 (Inp→, 0) L0:  w
→ Inp→ <  and 
 (Inp→, 1) L1:   w
→ Inp→   
 The partial potential models of the delta rule can be characterized by 
omitting the T-theoretical elements from the potential model Mp(DR), which 
are the learning-rate () and the error (Error) because both terms presuppose 
the delta rule itself. The learning rate () determines the learning's speed. The 
Error is here understood as the difference between actual outputs and the 
desired outputs in the output-layer. Therefore, the partial potential models of 
the delta rule (Mpp(DR)) can be defined as follows: 
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DIII-25: y is a partial potential Model of the delta-rule (yMpp(DR)) iff there 
exist x such that: 
(1) x = N, C, Inp, Out, L, B, W, OUTN, , ErrorMp(DR). 
(2)  and Error are T-theoretical. 
(3) y =  N, C, Inp, Out, L, B, W, OUTN   Mpp(DR). 
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Chapter 4 
Some Preliminary Work for Building the Structuralist 
Models of Intertheoretical Connections in Some Cases in 
Cognitive Science   
 
 
 Before starting with modeling intertheoretical connections between 
several theories in cognitive science, some preparations in this chapter should 
be made. The preparations involve some adjustments to the structuralist 
theory of science and an overview of cognitive science relevant to this 
dissertation. 
 
4.1. Some Adjustments in the Structuralist Theory of Science 
 Though the standard version of the structuralist metatheory of science 
in BMS is a powerful tool to represent scientific theories and their 
intertheoretical connections formally, two improvements are needed to 
deliver a better analysis of intertheoretical connections in interdisciplinary 
fields. The first improvement is the notion of echelon partial substructure 
developed by Moulines in his paper Intertheoretical Relations and the 
Dynamics of Science, 2014. And the second is a revision that I propose for the 
definition of a specialization. 
 
4.1.1. The Notion of Echelon Partial Substructure 
 In 2014, Moulines gave a formal definition of echelon partial 
substructure as a preparation for giving a formal structuralist account for four 
types of theoretical changes from the diachronic point of view, i.e., in the 
development of scientific theories. The notion of echelon partial structure is 
intuitively as follows: Given a set-theoretic operation Θ, which consist in 
successively applying a finite number of times the operations of power-set 
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construction and cartesian product to some given sets. The operation Θ 
always begins with power-set construction. S is an echelon partial 
substructure of S* iff for all Si components of S, there exist some S*k 
component(s) of S* where Si is the range of operation Θ applied to S*k. The 
complete definition of echelon partial substructure can be seen in Moulines, 
2014, p. 1512. This definition is beneficial to characterize subsets of potential 
models (Mp) that contents components of Mp, which some certain 
intertheoretical connection are applied to. Respectively this definition can 
also be applied to Mpp for characterizing (local) empirical claims of the 
intertheoretical connection. 
With the definition of echelon partial substructure, Moulines can 
distinguish in a precise manner between concepts that are connected to one 
another in a diachronic intertheoretical relation and concepts which are not. 
The notion of echelon partial substructure will also be applied here for the 
same reason to some cases of synchronic intertheoretical relations. To build 
several models of intertheoretical relations precisely, we need not only all 
definitions of intertheoretical connection and its varieties of Chapter 2, but 
also the definition of echelon partial substructure. The reason for this is that 
in many cases, there are some unconnected concepts and some other concepts 
in the potential models, which connect to specific concepts in another theory-
element through intertheoretical relations – These concepts must be 
distinguishable. Such cases can also be seen in most cases of intertheoretical 
reduction in Chapters 5–7.  They are examples of cases of partial reduction, 
of which only several concepts in the potential models (Mp) of a theory 
element T, as a higher-level theory, can be reduced by concepts in the 
potential models of another theory element T*, a lower-level theory. In the 
next three chapters, we will see that not all concepts in the potential models 
of Festinger’s theory Mp(DissB) (or in the potential models of forced-
compliance dissonance Mp(DissF)) can be reduced by the concepts of the 
potential models of the Hawkins-Kandel Computational Neurobiological 
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Theory Mp(CNT), the Hopfield network Mp(HN), or the two-layer feed-
forward neural network Mp(RP+2L-FFN+DL). The notion of echelon partial 
substructure will be implemented in order to characterize which concepts in 
Mp(DissB) or Mp(DissF) are being reduced by the concepts of Mp(CNT), 
Mp(HN), or Mp(RP+2L-FFN+DL). 
 Therefore, the procedure for our modeling and analysis will be as 
follows: Generally, a definition of special types of intertheoretical connection 
is applied to create a model of intertheoretical connections for our selected 
cases. However, the definition of both determining and entailment links are 
used to get a more detailed analysis of intertheoretical relations. By using the 
definition of both basic types of links, we can identify all connected concepts 
and build an echelon partial substructure of the potential models of the 
connected theories. Moreover, we will analyze how those intertheoretical 
connections work and connect the terms of those theories with respect to the 
T-non-theoretical level of the connected theories. 
 
4.1.2. A Revision of the Definition of Specialization 
 The second improvement is a revision of the definition of 
intertheoretical specialization DIV-1 in the BMS, p. 170. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Rainer Westermann had already built a theory-net of the Festinger 
theory of cognitive dissonance with its four specializations. Let us now look 
at one of its specializations, called the forced compliance dissonance. In this 
case, the specialization relation is built not only by adding some new law 
statements or law-like statements to the actual models of the Festinger theory 
of cognitive dissonance M(DissB), but also by modifying its potential models 
Mp(DissB) (see DIII-1 and DIII-2). The modification in the potential models 
is made by adding several restrictions, which make the extension of the 
potential models of forced compliance dissonance Mp(DissF) (see DIII-4) 
narrower than the Mp(DissB). 
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Similar cases also occur in three other specializations of the Festinger theory 
of cognitive dissonance, namely post-decision dissonance (DissD), 
information exposure dissonance (DissI), and social disagreement dissonance 
(DissS). In these three cases, additional restrictions are not only added to the 
actual model, but also to the potential model. Mp(DissD), Mp(DissF), 
Mp(DissI), and Mp(DissS) are no longer equal to Mp(DissB), but they become 
the subsets of Mp(DissB). Therefore, Mpp(DissD), Mpp(DissF) (see DIII-6), 
Mpp(DissI), and Mpp(DissS) are also the subsets of Mpp(DissB) (see DIII-3). 
From these cases, the author finds that the definition of specialization D IV-1 
in BMS, p. 170, is too strong – especially with respect to the condition DIV-
1 (1) Mp’ = Mp and Mpp’ = Mpp. This definition does not provide a possibility 
to modify the Mp by adding some more restrictions, which will be able to 
produce a type of specialization as well. Therefore, this dissertation suggests 
a modification to the definition of specialization as follows: (this definition 
will be used for the rest of this dissertation). 
D IV-1: If T = Mp, M, Mpp, GC, GL, I and T’ = Mp’, M’, Mpp’, GC’, GL’, 
 I’ are idealized theory-elements, then T’ is an idealized 
 specialization of T (abbreviated as T’T) iff: 
  (1) Mp’  Mp and Mpp’ Mpp, 
  (2) M’  M, GC’  GC, GL’  GL and I’  I, 
 
 This modification still retains the three characteristics of the 
specialization relation in Theorem IV-1 in BMS page 170, but diminishes a 
possible tension between DIV-1 (1) Mp’ = Mp and Mpp’= Mpp and TIV-18 (b) 
Cn(K’)Cn(K) of BMS. Also, it will be able to solve, or at least reduce, 
tension with the definition of intertheoretical connections as a bridge between 
theories in Moulines and Polanski, 1996, p. 222. In the new definition of 
specialization, there must not appear two statements that seemingly contradict 
each other: On the one hand Mp’ = Mp and Mpp’= Mpp (BMS, 1987, p. 170) 
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and, on the other hand, the definition of an intertheoretical connection i,j (1 
 i,j  n  Mpi  Mpj) (Def 6(2) in Moulines and Polanski, 1996, p. 222). 
 
4.2. An Overview of Cognitive Science Related to This Project 
 Although cognitive science is a relatively young interdisciplinary 
field, it has already been a very fruitful scientific field. There are many 
research programs in this field that are very helpful to provide us with a more 
comprehensive and in-depth explanation of phenomena of the mind, or that 
inspire us to develop many applications in the form of technologies and 
techniques (such as artificial neural networks for face or speech recognition, 
predictions for the stock exchange, and others). Cognitive science is an 
interdisciplinary field that studies phenomena of cognition – not only limited 
to human cognition but including animal cognition as well. There are at least 
six scientific fields that constitute cognitive science. They are philosophy (of 
mind), psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and 
anthropology – or other social sciences. (Figure 4.1) 
 
Figure 4.1. The fields in cognitive science according to Keyser et al. 1978; Solid 
lines indicate near or strong connections and dashed lines indicate far or weaker 
connections. (Source: Stephan, Achim, and Walter, Sven, 2013, p.3) 
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In this dissertation, our modeling of intertheoretical connections in 
cognitive science will cover only three areas, namely psychology, 
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. This modeling is based on the 
following description. Cognition comprises very complex phenomena that 
have been difficult to comprehend completely ever since ancient times. In the 
philosophy of mind, there are many theories that try to explain the mind (or 
cognition) and its relationship with the body. An interest in the mind and 
behavior can be found in the ancient civilizations. At that time, psychology 
was a part of philosophy. Psychology only started to be an independent field 
in 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt, who called himself as a psychologist, built the 
first laboratory for psychological research in Leipzig. Since then, many 
approaches and schools in psychology have been founded (especially in 
cognitive psychology) to explain the phenomena of mind and their aspects, 
such as behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and many more.    
 In cognitive science and modern philosophy of mind, all these schools 
are called folk psychology or commonsense psychology. The term folk 
psychology means “(1) commonsense psychology that explains human 
behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, expectations, preferences, 
hopes, fears, etc.; (2) an interpretation of such everyday explanations as part 
of a folk theory, comprising a network of generalizations employing concepts 
like belief, desire, and so on” (Baker, 1999, p. 319). In cognitive science, this 
folk psychology is occasionally seen as an anti-scientific view of our self-
understanding and, therefore, replaceable by other approaches related to 
neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Several cognitive scientists, such as 
Stephen P. Stich, Paul M. Churchland, and Patricia R. Churchland, who try to 
combine, or respectively reduce psychology to neuroscience, call themselves 
eliminative materialists. On the other hand, many philosophers admit a kind 
of reduction relation between psychological processes and brain processes but 
do not demand replacement of folk psychology theories, such as Jaegwon 
Kim, Terence Horgan, James Woodward, Daniel Dennett, among others. 
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 A second important discipline in the study of the mind is neuroscience, 
especially cognitive neuroscience. Neuroscience is the study of the brain and 
its neural networks explaining how our cognitive process takes place in our 
brains. In cognitive neuroscience, the study of the cognitive process is done 
in two ways. First, to discover the functionality of brain parts or regions in 
the cognitive process, neuroscientists observe the correlation between 
disturbances of cognitive capacities (e. g. aphasia) or personality-changes and 
damage to certain parts of the brain (e. g. lesions). From such observations, 
neuroscientists can identify the functionality of certain parts of the brain in 
cognitive processes. The second way is to do experiments – via models and 
observations – of how the neurons and their network produce certain aspects 
of cognition, of how the metabolism of a brain works and what its influence 
is in cognitive processes. The research is carried out not only on human brains 
but also on animal brains.   
 There are a huge number of neurons and their connections in a brain; 
for example, the human brain contains around 1011 neurons and 1014 synapses, 
and even now, it is impossible to identify all existing connections 
(connectome), especially in vivo. Sebastian Seung writes poetically:    
 “No road, no trail can penetrate this forest. The long and delicate 
branches of its trees lie everywhere, choking space with their exuberant 
growth. No sunbeam can fly a path tortuous enough to navigate the 
narrow spaces between these entangled branches. All the trees of this 
dark forest grew from 100 billion seeds planted together. And, all in one 
day, every tree is destined to die. This forest is majestic, but also comic 
and even tragic. It is all of these things. Indeed, sometimes I think it is 
everything. Every novel and every symphony, every cruel murder and 
every act of mercy, every love affair and every quarrel, every joke and 
every sorrow— all these things come from the forest. You may be 
surprised to hear that it fits in a container less than one foot in diameter. 
And that there are seven billion on this earth. You happen to be the 
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caretaker of one, the forest that lives inside your skull. The trees of 
which I speak are those special cells called neurons. The mission of 
neuroscience is to explore their enchanted branches— to tame the 
jungle of the mind” (Seung, 2012).   
To study how a brain works and produces cognition, cognitive scientists 
assume that a brain is a black box. They use artificial intelligence as an aid to 
model and simulate a cognitive process. One of the approaches in artificial 
intelligence that is often implemented is called artificial neural networks. It is 
so-called because it is strongly inspired by the concept of a neuron.     
The intertheoretical relations of these theories will be formally 
modeled according to the following interdisciplinary relations. Under the 
topic of interdisciplinary relation between psychology and neuroscience, the 
intertheoretical connections between the theory of forced compliance 
dissonance in psychology and the Hawkins-Kandel computational 
neuroscientific theory (CNT) in neuroscience will be modeled based on the 
result of research by Vincent van Veen, et al. The second interdisciplinary 
relation is between psychology and artificial intelligence. We will model the 
intertheoretical connections of two simulations of cognitive dissonance, 
namely the consonance and the connectionist models. The consonance model 
implements the Hopfield network to simulate the phenomena of dissonance 
reduction. Therefore, we are going to model the intertheoretical connections 
between the Festinger (general) theory of cognitive dissonance and the 
Hopfield network. For the connectionist model, which uses the two-layers 
feed-forward neural network with the delta rule, we are going to model the 
intertheoretical connection between the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two layers 
feed-forward neural network and the delta rule on one side and the forced 
compliance dissonance theory on the other side. And the last interdisciplinary 
relation is between neuroscience and artificial intelligence, namely between 
the McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the Rosenblatt perceptron. These concrete 
cases of intertheoretical relations can be seen in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. The map of the intertheoretical relations, that will be discussed in this 
dissertation; CD = the theory of cognitive dissonance (DissB model); DissD = the 
post decision dissonance theory; DissF= the forced compliance dissonance theory; 
DissI = the dissonance & information exposure theory; DissS= the social 
disagreement dissonance theory; CNT = the computational neuroscientific theory; 
MP= the McCulloch-Pitts neuron; RP= the Rosenblatt perceptron; Arch.NN= the 
architecture of neural network model; HN=the Hopfield network; FFNN+DR= the 
feed-forward neural network model and the delta rule; continuous lines = 
interdisciplinary relations/connections; continuous arrows = the specialization 
Relations in a theory-net. The researches modeled are VanVeen et.al’s (DissF & 
CNT), the consonance model (DissB & HN), and the connectionist model.   
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Chapter 5 
The Structuralist Model of Intertheoretical Connections 
between the Festinger Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and 
the Hawkins-Kandel Computational Neuroscientific Theory 
in the Process of Dissonance Reduction in the Dorsal Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (dACC) 
 
 
5.1. Van Veen’s Research Program and the Connection between 
Psychology and Neuroscience  
 Many scientists and philosophers believe that there are connections 
between human psychological phenomena and how the human brain works. 
They develop some relations between psychological theories and theories 
about how the brain works – intertheoretical relations in these matters are 
known as intertheoretical reduction. Many scientists attempted to show how 
experiments can confirm such intertheoretical relations. The first 
intertheoretical relation that will be modeled and analyzed is the relation 
between Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance and Hawkins-Kandel’s 
computational neuroscientific theory (CNT) by putting in context of a 
research conducted by Vincent van Veen et al. (2009). This analysis aims to 
show how far such a (widely) believed intertheoretical relation between two 
theories from different disciplines could be confirmed by research about the 
phenomena explained by it. In our case, both theories are from psychology 
and neuroscience. Van Veen et al. themselves had no intention to prove the 
intertheoretical reduction between Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance 
and the Hawkins-Kandel computational neuroscientific theory (CNT). Their 
research aims to show that a specific area of cerebral cortex in the human 
brain plays a vital role during a phase of cognitive dissonance.  
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In 2009 Van Veen et al. investigated a specific area of the cerebral 
cortex called dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) or Broadman’s area 
32. The Brodmann areas are areas of the cerebral cortex in human or other 
primate brains defined by the neurons’ cytostructure. The division and 
numbering of the Broadman areas were initially made by the German 
anatomist Korbinian Brodmann in 1909. The division of the Brodmann areas 
has been refined and renamed for more than a century and remains widely 
used as a reference of the cytoarchitectural organization of the human cortex.   
 The dACC is a part of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) that deals 
with cognitive processes, such as reward anticipation and decision making. 
The other area of the ACC is called ventral Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(vACC), which deals with emotional processes. The dACC is connected to the 
prefrontal cortex, the parietal cortex, the motor systems, and the frontal eye 
fields. This position gives it a central role in processing top-down and bottom-
up stimuli and assigning appropriate control to other areas of the brain. 
       
    
        
Figure 5.1. The dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (Source: quizlet.com) 
 
 Because of its position, Van Veen and others proposed that the dACC 
has a function to detect conflicts between prior attitudes and counter-
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attitudinal behavior in cognitive dissonance. “One of the dACC’s functions in 
cognition is to detect the conflict between active, but incompatible, streams 
of information processing, such as between the color and the meaning of a 
word in the Stroop task. dACC activation is consistently related to the amount 
of conflict occurring in such tasks. … We hypothesized that the dACC’s 
conflict monitoring function might generalize from detecting conflict in 
simple speeded-response tasks to detecting the conflict between prior 
attitudes and counter-attitudinal behavior in cognitive dissonance” (van Veen 
et al., 2009, p. 1469). They also said that these functions could be simulated 
by implementing the Hopfield network: “Computational simulations of 
conflict in simple speeded response tasks have measured conflict as 
Hopfield's energy and have shown that dACC activation in such tasks can be 
well modeled by this measure” (van Veen et al., 2009, p. 1469).   
 Van Veen et al. reported their observations using fMRI on the 
participants of an experiment of cognitive dissonance by applying the induced 
compliance procedure. The research was conducted as follows (van Veen et 
al., 2009, pp. 1469–1470): In the first step, participants performed a rather 
long (45 min) and tedious task in an uncomfortable environment, namely in 
a magnetic resonance scanner. While participants performed this task, they 
were randomly assigned to one of two groups: the dissonance group or the 
control group.   
 In the second step, the participants had to respond to sentences 
presented on a screen with their left or right ring, middle, or index finger, that 
represented 6 points on the Likert scale (1 = left ring finger, agree entirely; 6 
= right ring finger, disagree entirely). There were two types of sentences: 
target sentences, which consist of attitudes toward the scanner, and neutral 
sentences, composed of other topics or tasks. Participants in the control group 
were told to respond to the target sentences as if they were enjoying the 
scanner and the task, regardless of their actual feeling about the experience. 
They were informed that they would receive additional money for each 
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sentence, to which they responded as if they were enjoying the scanner and 
the task. However, they were told to respond honestly to the other sentences, 
namely the neutral sentences.    
 Participants in the dissonance group were given instructions about 
how to respond to the stimuli. They were told that a patient had been 
scheduled to be scanned after them and was to perform a similar task in the 
scanner. The participants were informed that this patient was now in the 
control room, watching the experimental control computer screen, and was 
very nervous and uncomfortable about his upcoming scanning session. The 
participants were informed that several of the sentences were about their 
attitudes toward the scanner and the task. They were asked if they would be 
willing to respond as though they enjoyed being in the scanner and doing the 
task, regardless of their real feelings about the experience. They were made 
to believe that the patient in the control room could see the responses on the 
screen. This situation was set to create a counter-attitudinal argument.   
 In the third step, participants were led into a private waiting room after 
the scanning was completed. There they were asked to fill out a set of forms, 
which also contained the target sentences. This time they were asked to 
respond according to their actual feeling about their experience in the scanner. 
A composite score was calculated for the participants’ enjoyment of the 
scanner and task. After completing the forms, the participants were carefully 
interviewed; participants who admitted having doubts about the validity of 
the cover story were not included in the analysis.   
 The result was as follows: “We found that participants in the 
dissonance group changed their attitudes more than participants in the control 
group following counter-attitudinal behavior. Furthermore, dACC and 
anterior insula activation during counter-attitudinal behavior predicted the 
participants' final attitude in the dissonance group, but not in the control 
group. In the dissonance group, these partial correlations were significant for 
the bilateral dACC and bilateral anterior insula regions (partial r range = 0.60–
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0.68, all P < 0.01); for those regions, these correlations were not significant 
in the control group (partial r range = –0.33–0.11, all P > 0.1). ANCOVA 
analysis verified that for the bilateral dACC and left Anterior Insula. These 
correlations were greater in the dissonance group than in the control group 
(F1,35 range = 4.10–9.43, all P < 0.05). For the right anterior insula, the 
ANCOVA was marginally significant (F1,35 = 3.186, P = 0.083)” (van Veen 
et. al, 2009, p. 1472).   
 In the discussion part of their article, van Veen, et al. (2009) write: 
“These findings are consistent with a number of prior observations. Both 
cognitive dissonance and dACC and anterior insula activation have been 
associated with negative affect and autonomic arousal. These regions might, 
therefore, be responsible for representing or triggering the negative affect and 
related autonomic arousal associated with the dissonance. … Our data expand 
on those findings, indicating that dACC activity during the counter-attitudinal 
argument, which is similar to lying, predicts subsequent attitude change, but 
only when counter-attitudinal behavior conflicts with other cognitions. … In 
short, our results are consistent with theories of cognitive dissonance that 
emphasize the conflict between different cognitions, such as the original 
theory. In particular, our results are consistent with the action-based model of 
cognitive dissonance, which posits that conflict between cognitions evokes 
an aversive state because it potentially interferes with unconflicted, effective, 
goal-driven action” (van Veen et al., 2009, p. 1472). 
 Based on van Veen et al.’s experiment, the Festinger theory of 
cognitive dissonance will be connected to the Hawkins-Kandel computational 
neuroscientific theory (CNT) according to the following principles. (1) 
Cognitions in the dissonance theory are defined as patterns of activation value 
or patterns of synaptic weight values that regulate activation values in all, 
except the input neurons of the network (Bickle, 1998, p. 191). (2) The 
network of neurons discussed here will be limited to the network of neurons 
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in dACC. (3) The research conducted by van Veen shows that cognitive 
dissonance is related to high activation of the dACC area and anterior insula.   
 
5.2. Building A Structuralist Model of the Intertheoretical Connection 
between the Festinger Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and the Hawkins-
Kandel Computational Neuroscientific Theory (CNT) 
 To build a model of the intertheoretical relation between the Festinger 
theory of cognitive dissonance and the computational neuroscientific theory, 
we follow the idea that cognition at the psychological level can be 
characterized as a pattern of activation values and synaptic weight values that 
regulate activation values in all neurons of the network. Therefore, the term 
Cognition in the theory of cognitive dissonance is related to the relation 
between activation values (AV) and connection weights (CW) of the 
computational neuroscientific theory. Because both theories assume that both 
cognition and this activation and connection weights occur at certain discrete 
point(s) of time, the terms time (T) of both theories are connected to each 
other.   
 To make this model more concrete, we are going to refer to van Veen 
et al.’s research about the connections between a special case of cognitive 
dissonance, namely forced compliance dissonance, and the neural activities 
in a particular brain region called the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(dACC) (for the detail experiment see Chapter 4). This brain area shows 
different activities between the event(s) of cognitive dissonance and event(s) 
of consonance. The experiment showed high activity of dACC and Anterior 
Insula during counter-attitudinal behavior. The terms Disscog and Conscog 
in the theory of forced compliance dissonance are connected to the high 
neural activities or the low neural activities of dACC.   
 Based on the case observed by van Veen et al., we have to build a 
model of the intertheoretical relation between a specialization of cognitive 
dissonance (DissB), called forced compliance dissonance (DissF), and the 
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computational neuroscientific theory (CNT). The specialization for the forced 
compliance dissonance (DissF) has several special terms, such as Forcecom, 
attidiff, imp, and reward. The Forcecom is a subset of cognition. Therefore, it 
must be connected to the relation between the set of activation values (AV) 
and the set of connection weights (CW). However, we have several 
uncertainties about connecting the attidiff, imp, and reward with terms in 
CNT. This fact is understandable because we cannot give such empirical 
evidence1.     
 Because only several terms in the potential models of forced 
compliance dissonance (Mp(DissF)) are connected with the potential models 
of the computational neuroscientific theory (Mp(CNT)), the definition of 
determining link is used to identify the intertheoretical relation between the 
terms of both models. By identifying all determining links between them, we 
can determine the echelon partial substructure from the potential model of 
both theory-elements. The intertheoretical connections between both echelon 
subsets are now a kind of entailment link (see the definition of entailment link 
in Moulines & Polanski, 1996, p. 223). Based on these entailment links, we 
can apply the definition of interpreting links to connect the respective 
elements in the partial potential models of the forced compliance dissonance 
Mpp(DissF). In this way, we determine the local intended applications of the 
intertheoretical connections.    
 The intertheoretical connections between the forced compliance 
dissonance and the computational neuroscientific theory for neurons in the 
dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) can be formally characterized as 
follows: Since in this case, the computational neuroscientific theory is applied 
to explained the behavior of neurons in the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(dACC), I call the theory-element of CNT in this case “CNT on dACC.”  
 
1 with our technology today. In some simulations of dissonance reductions implementing 
artificial neural networks, the activation value of the artificial neurons is usually connected 
with the presence or absence of cognitions. 
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D V-1:  If T(DissF) = Mp(DissF), M(DissF), Mpp(DissF), I(DissF) and 
T(CNT on dACC) = Mp(CNT on dACC), M(CNT on dACC), Mpp(CNT on 
dACC), I(CNT on dACC) then there exist  as a set of determining links 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 between T(DissF) and T(CNT on dACC) iff there exist  x1, x2 
such that: 
(1) x1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
(Let x1 be a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
(Mp(DissF)) 
(2) x2 = N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause  Mp(CNT on dACC) 
(Let x2 be a potential model of the computational neuroscientific 
theory (Mp(CNT on dACC)) 
(3) Time  T  
(Let  be the first determining link, which connects the set Time in 
Mp(DissF) to the set T in Mp(CNT on dACC).  is bijective) 
(4) Cognition  (AV  CW)  
(Let  be the second determining link, which connects the set 
Cognition in Mp(DissF) to the relation between the set of activation 
value AV and the set of connection weight CW in Mp(CNT on dACC). 
The relation between AV and CW is defined according to DIII-17(2). 
It is also relevant for defining the 3) 
(5) Forcecom  (AV  CW), where 3  2  
(Let  be the third determining link, which connects the set Forcecom 
in Mp(DissF) to the relation between the set of activation value AV 
and the set of connection weight CW in Mp(CNT on dACC)) 
(6) Disscog  (CW  CW), where for all neurons in the network at a 
certain period of time i
m ||CW(ti) - CW(ti+1)|| is big.  
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(Let  be the fourth determining link, which connects the set Disscog 
in Mp(DissF) to the relation (difference) between connection weights 
CW at ti and connection weights CW at ti+1 in Mp(CNT). It is Disscog 
if for all neurons in the network at a certain period of time i
m ||CW(ti) 
- CW(ti+1)|| is big) 
(7) Conscog  (CW  CW), where for all neurons in the network at a 
certain period of time i
m ||CW(ti) - CW(ti+1)|| is small.  
(Let  be the fifth determining link, which connects the set Conscog 
in Mp(DissF) to the relation (difference) between connection weights 
CW at ti and connection weights CW at ti+1 in Mp(CNT on dACC). It 
is Conscog if for all neurons in the network at a certain period of time 
i
m ||CW(ti) - CW(ti+1)|| is small) 
(8)  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
(Let L is a set of determining links between T(DissF) and T(CNT on 
dACC)) 
 
 With the determining links defined above, the echelon partial 
substructure of both theory-elements, which represent the intertheoretically 
connected concepts between both theories, can be characterized. Both 
echelon partial substructures are connected by a kind of entailment links, 
which unite them. Therefore, we can define the entailment links as a set, 
which contains all previous determining links, as follows: 
D V-2: If T(DissF) = Mp(DissF), M(DissF), Mpp(DissF), I(DissF) and 
T(CNT on dACC) = Mp(CNT on dACC), M(CNT on dACC), Mpp(CNT on 
dACC), I(CNT on dACC) then there exist echelon subsets e1, e2 and the 
entailment links between them E iff there exist  x1, x2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5  
according to D V-8 such that: 
(1) x1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
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(Let x1 be a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
(Mp(DissF))) 
(2) x2 =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mp(CNT on dACC) 
(Let x2 be a potential model of the computational neuroscientific 
Theory (Mp(CNT on dACC))) 
(3)  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
(Let  be a set of determining links between x1 and x2) 
(4) e1 = Time, Cognition, Forcecom, Disscog, Conscog  an echelon 
subset of Mp(DissF) connected to Mp(CNT on dACC) with respect to 
  
(Therefore, e1 is an echelon partial substructure of Mp(DissF) 
concerning the intertheoretical connections between T(DissF) and 
T(CNT on dACC) with respect to ) 
(5) e2 = T, AV, CW  Mp(CNT on dACC) with respect to   
(Therefore, e2 is an echelon partial substructure of Mp(CNT on dACC) 
concerning the intertheoretical connections between T(DissF) and 
T(CNT on dACC) with respect to ) 
(6) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
(Therefore, E is a set of the entailment links between the echelon 
partial substructure e1(DissF) and the echelon partial substructure 
e2(CNT on dACC)) 
  
Determining the interpreting links for the intertheoretical reduction 
between DissF and CNT can be done by applying VIII-7 and D VIII-8 in 
BMS, p. 398–400 and the empirical claim of the interpreting links by applying 
DVIII-9, and D VIII-10 in BMS, p 402–404. Both are on the non-theoretical 
level and deal with local empirical claims of the intertheoretical reduction. By 
defining both, we can know which of the T-non-theoretical concepts of one 
or both theories are relevant for this intertheoretical reduction. This 
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dissertation will only focus on the local empirical claims of the Festinger 
theory of forced compliance dissonance as the reduced theory; we could do 
the same thing for the Hawkins-Kandel computational neuroscientific theory 
(CNT) by using the same procedure as well. The interpreting links and its 
local empirical claims on the theory of forced compliance dissonance can be 
defined as follows: 
DV-3 : E*(DissF) = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5} is a collection of interpretation links, 
where T(DissF) is interpreted by T(CNT on dACC) and f1 is the local 
empirical claims of the interpreting links for the reduction of DissF by CNT 
on dACC on the DissF, iff there exist x1, x2 , e1, e2, E, y1 such that: 
(1) x1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF) 
(Let x1 be a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
(Mp(DissF))) 
(2) x2 =  N, Act, T, IN, IR, AV, O, I, CW, Cause   Mp(CNT on dACC) 
(Let x2 be a potential model of the computational neuroscientific 
Theory (Mp(CNT on dACC))) 
(3) e1 = Time, Cognition, Forcecom, Disscog, Conscog  an echelon 
subset of Mp(DissF) connected to Mp(CNT on dACC)  
(Let e1 be an echelon subset of Mp(DissF) formed by 1–5 according 
to D V-2(4)) 
(4) e2 =  T, AV, CW   Mp(CNT on dACC)  
(Let e2 be an echelon subset of Mp(CNT on dACC) formed by 1–5 
according to D V-2(5)) 
(5) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  the set of entailment links  
(Let E be a set of entailment links between e1 and e2) 
(6) y1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairimp, 
Forcecom, attidiff, imp, reward  Mpp(DissF)  
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(Let y1 be a partial potential model of the forced compliance 
dissonance (Mp(DissF))) 
(7) l1 = {tj timei | T(tj)  Time(timei) → R(tj timei), where R(x,y) means 
x interpreting y and R is bijective.  
(l1 is an interpreting link that connects both concepts of Time from 
Mpp(DissF) as identical to T from Mp (CNT on dACC)) 
(8) l2 = {(cw, aw)j , cognitioni | (CW, AW)j  Cognition(cognitioni) → 
R((cw, aw)j , cognitioni)}, where the relation between CW and AV is 
according to nk,nl  N: AV(nk,t) = CW(nl,nk).O(nl) I(nk) AV(nk, t-1).  
(l2 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of cognition from 
Mpp(DissF) as a function of AV and CW from Mp (CNT on dACC)) 
(9) l3 = { (cw, aw)j, forcecomi  | (CW, AW)j  Forcecom(forcecomi) → 
R((cw, aw)j, forcecomi)}, where the relation between CW and AV is 
according to nk,nl  N: AV(nk,t) = CW(nl,nk).O(nl) I(nk) AV(nk, t-1). 
(l3 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of forcecom from 
Mpp(DissF) as a function of AV and CW from Mp (CNT on dACC)) 
(10) l4 = {(cw, cw)j, dci | (CW, CW)j  Disscog(dci) → R((cw, 
cw)j, dci)}, where (CW,CW) is according to the following function: 
when for all neurons in the network at a certain period of time i
m 
||CW(ti) - CW(ti+1)|| is big.  
(l4 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of Disscog from 
Mpp(DissF) as a function of CW and CW over time from Mp (CNT on 
dACC)) 
(11) l5 = {(cw, cw)j, cci | (CW, CW)j  Conscog(cci) → R((cw, 
cw)j, cci)}, where (CW,CW) is according to the following function: 
when for all neurons in the network at a certain period of time i
m 
||CW(ti) - CW(ti+1)|| is small. (l5 is an interpreting link that interprets 
the concept of Conscog from Mpp(DissF) as a function of the cross 
product of CW with itself over time from Mp (CNT on dACC)) 
110 
 
(12) f1 = Time, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, Forcecom  an 
echelon subset of Mpp(DissF) by applying function r*: e1 → f1, that 
maps E from  Mp(DissF) into Mpp(DissF).  
(f1 is a set of the empirical claims of the interpreting links for the 
reduction of DissF by CNT on dACC) 
 
 The local empirical claims of this intertheoretical reduction f1 show 
that on the side of the Festinger theory, all relevant cognitions and their 
interactions happening in time in DissF, as psychological phenomena, are 
interpreted as the interaction between the activation and the connections 
weight in the neurons of a specific part of the brain by the CNT. In the case 
of van Veen et al.’s research, through the interpreting links the phenomena of 
cognitive dissonance or cognitive consonance because of forced compliance 
are understood as the interaction between the neurons’ activation and the 
connection weight of neural networks in the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(dACC) according to the computational neuroscientific theory. The cognitive 
dissonances within the dissonance group can be associated with high activity 
of the neural network in the brain to adjust synaptic connections to restore 
consonance; this is measured by fMRI.   
 Theoretically, we could also generalize the intertheoretical reduction 
to the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance (DissB) by omitting the 
special rules that create DissF. The only element of the echelon partial 
substructure of Mp(DissF), which determines the intertheoretical 
specialization relation between DissF and DissB, is Forcecom. Since 
Forcecom is a subset of Cognition, the entailment links and the interpreting 
links can be generalized by omitting Forcecom. 
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A Summary of This Chapter and Some Reflections. This chapter 
presents a structuralist model to analyze the intertheoretical connections 
between a specialization of the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance 
(called forced compliance dissonance (DissF)) and the computational 
neuroscientific theory (CNT) in the case of the dorsal Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex (dACC) in Van Veen et. al.’s research program. This kind of 
intertheoretical relation is an intertheoretical reduction; in this case, only the 
echelon partial subset of Mp(DissF) is entirely connected to the echelon 
partial subset of Mp(CNT). 
 The modeling is done by taking the following steps: (1) We identify 
the set of determining links () between both theories, which connect several 
basic terms of both theories. (2) We characterize the echelon subsets (e) of 
Mp of both theories. Based on the second step, we can denote the set of 
determining links as the set of the entailment links between both echelon 
subsets (E). (3) Now, we can deal with the non-theoretical level of the 
intertheoretical connection. In this level, the empirical claims or intended 
applications of the intertheoretical connections are local on one of both 
theories according to the concept of theory-holon. Therefore, we have to 
choose which theory we consider as the local one according to our goal or 
focus. Supposed, we want to explain the dissonance and consonance 
according to the DissF in the term of activity of the neurons according to the 
CNT. Hence, we determined the forced compliance dissonance to be the local 
theory. We define the interpreting links between both theories, where DissF 
is interpreted by CNT. We determined the set of interpreting links that connect 
a part of Mpp(DissF) to the echelon subset of Mp(CNT on dACC) by this 
requirement: {li = y, x’| x’Mp(CNT on dACC), yMpp(DissF) and there 
is xMp(DissF) such that x,x'(DissF, CNT on dACC) and r*(DissF)=y} – 
The function r*(DissF)=y projects the echelon subset of Mp(DissF) to 
Mpp(DissF). And (4) the result of the projection is the class f that is the set of 
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the empirical claims of our intertheoretical connection. This class f is also the 
echelon subset of Mpp(DissF) as our interpreted theory concerning this 
intertheoretical reduction. The model can be graphically presented as follows: 
 
Figure 5.2. A structuralist modeling of the intertheoretical reduction between the 
theory of forced compliance dissonance (DissF) as the reduced theory and the 
computational neuroscientific theory (CNT) as the reducing theory; e(DissF) is the 
echelon subset of Mp(DissF) and e(CNT) is the echelon subset of Mp(CNT). Both 
are connected by a set of entailment links (E). The interpreting links with local 
intended applications at DissF (E*(DissF)) connect the set of the local empirical 
claims of this intertheoretical reduction f(DissF) to the echelon partial subset of 
Mp(CNT). f(DissF) is the echelon partial subset of Mpp(DissF). 
 
Through this modeling and analysis, a piece of confirmation of the 
notion that the psychological phenomena have connections with how the 
brain works is delivered by confirmation of intertheoretical reduction 
between the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance and the Hawkins-
Kandel computational neuroscientific theory put in the context of van Veen 
et al.’s research. The confirmation can be seen as an empirical confirmation 
as long as both sets of empirical claims of the interpreting links from both 
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directions (f(DissF) and f(CNT on dACC) – can be modeled in the similar 
ways similar to DV-3) are not empty sets. It means that interpretations of each 
theory by another theory have empirical elements. However, in this case, the 
confirmation is limited for several reasons: (1) both connected theories are 
only two of many existing theories in both fields. (2) The intertheoretical 
connections modeled are only one of many possible connections. (3) The 
experiments itself is not intended to deliver confirmation of intertheoretical 
connections in question. (4) The explanation power of these intertheoretical 
connections is limited to the concepts of the theories connected. We need to 
connect more theories to get better comprehensiveness and confirmations, but 
the range of phenomena explained will be more specific (limited).  
Although we cannot get a very good degree of confirmation – which 
is not the goal of this analysis – we still get an example that is representative 
in many scientific and philosophical practices. The structuralist metatheory 
of science can be applied for modeling, analyzing, and helping to measure the 
degree of confirmation of our theory combination or to develop measuring 
method – by specifying the interconnected parts of the connected theories.  
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Chapter 6 
The Structuralist Models of Intertheoretical Connections 
between the McCulloch-Pitts Neuron and the Rosenblatt 
Perceptron and between the Festinger Theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance and the Hopfield Network in the Consonance 
Model of Simulation 
 
 
 To understand brain processes during cognitive dissonance, cognitive 
scientists developed simulations of the process of dissonance reduction by 
implementing a branch of artificial intelligence inspired by the way how 
neurons in the brain work, namely artificial neural networks. In Chapters 6 
and 7, this dissertation will analyze the intertheoretical connections of some 
simulation of the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance. Chapter 6 will 
discuss the intertheoretical connections of a cognitive dissonance simulation 
called the consonance model, whereas Chapter 7 the connectionist model. 
Both simulations apply mathematical models of neurons that are connected 
in a specific network.   
The first model of a neuron, which is still relevant in neuroscience 
today, was developed by Warren S. McCulloch and Walter H. Pitts in 1943. 
In the computational neuroscientific theory, the neurons work as a logical 
switch – there are only two possibilities for the condition of the neurons, i.e., 
fire (excitatory) or not fire (inhibitory). This theory is based on the 
McCulloch-Pitts model of a neuron. However, to build a simulation by using 
an artificial neural network, we must move from the McCulloch-Pitts neuron 
to the Rosenblatt perceptron. Before starting with the consonance model, it 
will be interesting to model the intertheoretical connections between the 
neuron's model commonly used in neuroscience and the neuron's model 
 
115 
 
commonly used in the artificial intelligence, so that we can know how both 
models of neurons related each other. 
This chapter will consist of two parts. The first part will model the 
intertheoretical relation of both models of a neuron in order to explore 
similarities and differences of both models as a preparation for our discussion 
of the simulation of cognitive dissonance. It is a case of historical reduction, 
where the McCulloch-Pitts neuron is seen as one of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron's specializations. The second part will discuss a model of 
intertheoretical connections between the Festinger theory of cognitive 
dissonance and the Hopfield network according to the consonance model of 
simulation. 
 
6.1. The Intertheoretical Relation between the McCulloch-Pitts Neuron 
and the Rosenblatt Perceptron 
 Historically speaking, the intertheoretical relation between the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the Rosenblatt perceptron is a diachronic one: 
namely, an intertheoretical embedding. “In this kind of scientific change, the 
models of an older theory get embedded (approximately and perhaps not 
completely) into the models of a newer, more complex theory in such a way 
that all (or almost all) intended applications of the older theory, whether 
successful or unsuccessful, become successful intended applications of the 
newer one” (Moulines, 2014, p. 1509). The McCulloch-Pitts neuron (1943) is 
the first generation of a neuron's model, whereas the Rosenblatt perceptron 
(1958) is the second generation, into which the McCulloch-Pitts neuron gets 
embedded.  
However, his dissertation treats them as in a synchronic relationship 
because modeling the development of the theory of neuron is not relevant for 
this project. For this project, knowing the difference and similarity between 
them is more important because they provide a basis for building a justified 
and meaningful simulation. Therefore, a model of intertheoretical embedding 
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will not be built here, but a model of the intertheoretical reduction and 
specialization of both theories. The goal of this modeling is to illustrate two 
things formally: The first is similarities and dissimilarities between both 
theories. The second is the advantage(s) of the Rosenblatt perceptron over the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron by changing the possibility of input – to a varying 
degree – and its various options of the activation function(s) in mathematical 
models. With a learning rule, a perceptron can also behave as a digital 
automaton like the McCulloch-Pitts model, besides as a statistical automaton 
that combines all input data and builds a model representing characteristics 
of the data.  
 The similarities and differences between both models can be analyzed 
through how far the potential models of both theory-elements can be 
connected by reduction and specialization relations. Here is presented a 
mathematical model of how the Rosenblatt perceptron reduces to McCulloch-
Pitts neuron, which becomes its specialization. Not all elements of potential 
models of McCulloch-Pitts neuron (Mp(MCP-N)) (see D III-10 in Chapter 3 
above) are connected to the elements of potential models of the Rosenblatt 
Perceptron (Mp(RP)) (see D III-13 in Chapter 3 above). Therefore, modeling 
the intertheoretical reduction of both theories requires identification of 
determining links, which connects concepts to concepts in both theories' 
potential models. The determining links between the theory-element of 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron T(MCP-N) and the theory-element of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron T(RP) can be specified as follows: 
DVI-1: If T(MCP-N) = Mp(MCP-N), M(MCP-N), Mpp(MCP-N), I(MCP-
N) and T(RP) = Mp(RP), M(RP), Mpp(RP), I(RP), then there exist 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, L, e1, e2, E between T(MCP-N) and T(RP) iff 
there exist  x, x’ such that: 
(1) x =  N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(RP) 
(Let x be a potential model of the Rosenblatt Perceptron) 
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(2) x’ = N’, N0’, T, IR, IN, , C’, W’, Inp’, Outp’, fnet’, fact’, fout’   
Mp(MCP-N)  
(Let x’ be a potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts Neuron) 
(3) 1  N  N’, where a = b, for aN and bN’  
(λ1 is a determining link that connects the set of neurons (N) in the 
potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of neurons 
(N’) in the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ1 is 
bijective)  
(4) 2  N0  N0’, where a = b, for aN0 and bN0’  
(λ2 is a determining link that connects the set of input neurons (N0) in 
the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of 
input neurons (N0’) in the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts 
neuron (x’). λ2 is bijective) 
(5) 3  C  C’, where a = b, for aC and bC’  
(λ3 is a determining link that connects the set of connections between 
neurons (C) in the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) 
and the set of connections between neurons (C’) in the potential model 
of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ3 is bijective) 
(6) 4  W  W’, where a = b, for aW and bW’  
(λ4 is a determining link that connects the set of connection weights 
(W) in the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set 
of connection weights (W’) in the potential model of the McCulloch-
Pitts neuron (x’). λ4 is bijective) 
(7) 5  (B  W0)   , where ac  b, for aB, cW0, and b, where 
B, W0  IR and  is a constant.  
(λ5 is a determining link that connects the relation between the bias of 
the neurons (B) and its connection weight (W0) in the potential model 
of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) to the set of a threshold of each 
 
118 
 
neuron () in the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). 
λ5 is surjective) 
(8) 6  Inp  Inp’, where a  b, for aInp and bInp’, where Inp IR 
and Inp’{0,1}  
(λ6 is a determining link that connects the set of inputs (Inp) in the 
potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of inputs 
(Inp’) in the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ6 is 
surjective because Inp  Inp’) 
(9) 7  Outp  Outp’, where a  b, for aOutp and bOutp’, where 
OutpIR and Outp’{0,1}  
(λ7 is a determining link that connects the set of outputs (Outp) in the 
potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of outputs 
(Outp’) in the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ7 
is surjective because Outp  Outp’) 
(10) 8  fnet  fnet’, where a = b, for afnet and bfnet’  
(λ8 is a determining link that connects the network input function of 
neurons (fnet) in the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) 
and the network input function of neurons (fnet’) in the potential 
model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ8 is bijective) 
(11) 9  fact  fact’, where a  b, for afact, and bfact’, where 
factIR and fact’ {0,1}  
(λ9 is a determining link that connects the activation function of 
neurons (fact) in the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) 
and the activation function of neurons (fact’) in the potential model of 
the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ9 is surjective because fact  fact’) 
(12) 10  fout  fout’, where a  b, for afout, and bfout’, where 
foutIR and fout’ {0,1}  
(λ10 is a determining link that connects the output function of neurons 
(fout) in the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the 
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output function of neurons (fout’) in the potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron (x’). λ10 is surjective because fout  fout’) 
(13)  = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}  
( is a collection of determining links that connect the concepts of 
both theories) 
(14) e1 = N, N0, IR, IN, B C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   
an echelon partial subset of Mp(RP)  
(e1 is an echelon partial subset of the potential model of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron) 
(15) e2 = N’, N0’, IR, IN, , C’, W’, Inp’, Outp’, fnet’, fact’, fout’ 
  an echelon partial subset of Mp(MCP-N)  
(e2 is an echelon partial subset of the potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron) 
(16) E = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}  
(E is a set of entailment links that connect the echelon partial subset 
of the potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron and the echelon 
partial subset of the potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron) 
 
In this model, theoretical similarities and dissimilarities between the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the Rosenblatt perceptron can be identified by 
similarities and differences of terms or concepts of both theories connected 
by determining links connecting sets of the same terms. The theoretical 
similarities between the McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the Rosenblatt 
perceptron are determined through the following concepts: 
(1) The concepts of neurons (N), neuron input (N0), connections (C), and 
connection weight(W) and network input function (fnet) of both 
models are similar. 
 
120 
 
(2) The concept of the threshold of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron is a true 
subset of a multiplication of the bias (B) and its connection weight 
(W0) in the Rosenblatt perceptron. 
(3) The terms input (Inp), output (Outp), and output function (fout) are 
equivalent as long as these terms of the Rosenblatt perceptron cover 
only 0 and 1.  
(4) The concept of the activation function (fact) of both models is 
equivalent as long as they implement the same activation function, 
namely the linear function. 
The theoretical dissimilarities can be determined by the intertheoretical 
reduction of both models that can be identified by the two following 
conditions. The first condition is that there is a term with no determining link 
at all, namely the concept of time (T) in the McCulloch-Pitts neuron. It 
“reduces” applicability of the Rosenblatt perceptron. The second condition is 
that there exist some determining links that are not bijective but surjective. 
These links show not only how far their similarities but also reduce the 
applicability of the Rosenblatt perceptron. The concepts of Inp, Outp, fact, 
and fout of both models are not entirely similar, because these concepts of 
McCulloch-Pitts neurons are only true subsets of the respective concepts of 
the Rosenblatt perceptron.  
Modeling the empirical reduction between both models of the 
artificial neuron can be done by projecting the determining intertheoretical 
connections between both theories onto their T-non-theoretical level. It can 
be done by omitting the determining links that connect the T-theoretical 
elements of both potential models. As we see in Chapter 2, the T-theoretical 
elements in the potential models of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron are their fnet, 
fact, and fout, whereas the T-theoretical elements in the potential models of 
the Rosenblatt perceptron are also their fnet, fact, and fout. Here, we speak 
about theory-nets and not about theory-holon because both theories are in 
relatives. Therefore, defining local empirical claims of the intertheoretical 
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relation is not required. The determining links that represent the empirical 
similarities – and dissimilarities – of both theories are as follows: 
DVI-2: * is a collection of determining links that represents the empirical 
equivalence between the theory-element of McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the 
theory-element of the Rosenblatt perceptron and f1 is an echelon partial subset 
of the partial potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron iff there exists x, 
x’, , y, y’ such that: 
(1) x =  N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout   Mp(RP) 
(Let x be a potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron) 
(2) x’ = N’, N0’, T, IR, IN, , C’, W’, Inp’, Outp’, fnet’, fact’, fout’   
Mp(MCP-N)  
(Let x’ be a potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron) 
(3)  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}  
(Let  be a collection of the determining links between both potential 
models) 
(4) fnet, fact, fout are T-theoretic  
(The T-theoretical elements in the potential model of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron) 
(5) fnet’, fact’, fout’ are T-theoretic  
(The T-theoretical elements in the potential model of the McCulloch-
Pitts neuron) 
(6) y = N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp  Mpp(RP)  
(y is a partial potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron) 
(7) y’ = N’, N0’, T, IR, IN, , C’, W’, Inp’, Outp’  Mpp(MCP-N)  
(y’ is a partial potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron) 
(8) * = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}  
(* is be a collection of the determining links of both partial potential 
models) 
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(9) f1 = N, N0, IR, IN, B, C, W0, W, Inp, Outp  echelon partial subset 
of Mpp(RP)  
(f1 is an echelon partial subset of the partial potential model of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron) 
(10) f2 = N’, N0’, IR, IN, , C’, W’, Inp, Outp  echelon partial 
subset of Mpp(MCP-N)  
(f2 is an echelon partial subset of the partial potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts Neuron) 
 
Through this model, the intertheoretical reduction and specialization 
can be illustrated through the following figure: 
 
Figure 6.1. The reduction link reduces the theory-element of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron (T(RP)) to the theory-element of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron (T(MCP-
N)) and as its result T(MCP-N) becomes a specialization of T(RP) 
 
The relation of both theories also matches the requirements of 
specialization relation in DIV-1. 
(1) Mp(MCP-N)  Mp(RP), Mpp(MCP-N)  Mpp(RP) 
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(2) M(MCP-N)  M(RP), GL(MCP-N)  GL(RP), and I(MCP-N)  
I(RP). 
 
In the next part of this chapter and the next chapter, the structuralist 
metatheory of science is applied not for modeling empirical theories, but for 
modeling artificial neural networks for simulation. Some fellow structuralists 
may not agree with this research because the structuralist theory is 
particularly suitable for modeling empirical theories, whereas the artificial 
neural network is not an empirical model but a mathematical model. This 
dissertation sees that the application STS is not only limited to modeling 
empirical theories but also for modeling non-empirical scientific theories, 
such as artificial neural networks. This application is based on some 
considerations as follows: First, Mpp contains not only empirical or 
observational terms but also non-observational terms, i.e., terms from other 
theories. (2) Es is possible that terms x1,.., x10 in theory T are not empirical, 
but they are related or taken over analogically from the terms x1’,… x10’ from 
T’, which are empirical. It is precisely the case of Rosenblatt perceptron and 
the McCulloch-Pitts neuron. (3) For building the simulation, the T-theoretical 
terms of the theory element of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron T(MCP-N) such 
as fnet, fact, and fout can be taken over as the T-theoretical terms of the 
theory-element of the Rosenblatt perceptron T(RP) because both theory-
elements are in the same theory-net (see DVIII-3, BMS, p. 392). 
 
6.2. The Consonance Model  
 The consonance model is developed by Thomas R. Shultz and Mark 
R. Lepper. This model simulates the mind as a mechanism that maintains 
some equilibrium and the dissonance reduction as a solving of the constraint 
satisfaction problem among someone's beliefs and behaviors. “The model is 
based on the idea that dissonance reduction can be viewed as a constraint 
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satisfaction problem. … the motive to seek cognitive consistency postulated 
by dissonance theory and related models … can be seen as imposing 
constraints on the beliefs and attitudes that an individual holds 
simultaneously …. Such problems can be solved by the simultaneous 
satisfaction of many soft constraints that can vary in their relative importance. 
Soft, as opposed to hard, constraints are those that are desirable, but not 
essential, to satisfy” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 220).  In this model, the 
network is being used to simulate “the subject’s representation of the situation 
created, or psychological problem posed, by the experimental settings in the 
classic cognitive dissonance paradigms” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 220).  
Shultz and Lepper implemented the Hopfield network because it can be used 
to solve complex optimization problems, where network states with low 
energy levels represent optimal solutions.   
 The basic idea of this simulation is as follows: The units (or neurons) 
represent the cognition involved in arousal of dissonance and reduction of 
dissonance. The activation of units represents the direction and strength of an 
individual’s beliefs and attitudes. The units can differ in their resistance to 
change according to differences related to the fact that cognition may be 
supported by other cognition or anchored in reality. Connection weights 
represent psychologically causal implications among the individual’s beliefs 
and attitudes. Therefore, they can be either excitatory (+), inhibitory (-), or 
psychologically irrelevant (0). We can initially adapt unit activations and 
connection weights, depending on the paradigm, according to the different 
conditions of a single experiment (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 220).   
  In this simulation, increasing consonance corresponds to the process 
of reducing dissonance or striving for consistency among individual's beliefs 
and attitudes. Shultz and Lepper defined consonance as “the degree to which 
similarly active units are linked by excitatory (+) weights and differently 
active units or inactive units are linked by inhibitory (-) weights” (Shultz and 
Lepper, 2009, p. 238). In the consonance model of simulation, Shultz and 
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Lepper implement the Hopfield network with some modifications. “Hopfield 
worked out the mathematics for solving constraint satisfaction problems in 
parallel networks. Maximizing the consonance (or goodness) of any pair of 
connected units depends on the sign of the connection between them …. If 
connected by a positive weight, both units of the pair should be active to 
maximize consonance. With a negative weight, consonance is maximized 
when the two units are not both active; that is, when both are inactive, or only 
one is active. Activation will change over time cycles so as to satisfy the 
various constraints and increase consonance” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 
220).    
 This consonance model works according to the following 
computational rule (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, pp. 220–221, 2009, pp. 239–
241): The consonance contributed by a particular unit i can be defined as 
follows:  
 consonancei = j wij aiaj     (1) 
Where wij is the connection weight between units i and j, ai is the activation 
of receiving unit i, and aj is the activation of the sending unit j. The network's 
consonance is defined as a sum of consonance of all receiving units in the 
network:   
 consonancen = ij wij aiaj     (2) 
The Hopfield network is a recurrent neural network. Therefore, all units are 
both a receiving unit and a sending unit. Activation of all units is propagated 
over time in the network according to the following rules for updating the 
unit's activation:   
 ai(t+1) = ai(t) + neti[ceiling – ai(t)], when neti ≥ 0,  (3) 
 ai(t+1) = ai(t) + neti[ai(t) – floor], when neti < 0,  (4) 
where ai(t+1) is the activation of receiving unit i at time t+1, ai(t) is the 
activation of unit i at time t, ceiling is the maximal level of unit activation, 
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floor is the minimal level of unit activation, and neti is the scaled net input to 
unit i, which can be defined as:  
 neti = resisti j wij aj      (5) 
The parameter resisti indicates the resistance of receiving unit i to having its 
activation changed. Smaller values of this parameter indicate greater 
resistance because smaller values mean less impact of the network input. The 
network input of a unit is updated by the sum of the products of connection 
weight and activation of their sending unit over the time of the simulation.  
 The implementation of the consonance model for cognitive 
dissonance simulation requires six theoretical principles for mapping the 
consonance model onto the dissonance theory (Shultz and Lepper, 2009, p. 
245). These principles constrain the design of networks representing the 
(general) conditions of each experiment. “To varying degrees, these 
theoretical principles were specified in classical dissonance theory. 
Additional specifications, where necessary, are supplied by the consonance 
model. Each theoretical principle governs the design of all simulations with 
the consonance model” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 221). These principles 
are as follows:   
 Principle 1: Representation of cognition. Although cognitions are 
the basic elements of the theory of cognitive dissonance, they are not fully 
specified in this theory. “They can be both beliefs and evaluations (i.e., 
attitudes), such cognitions could be assumed to vary in both direction and 
strength. The positive direction could represent that something is either 
believed to be true or is favorably evaluated. …, the negative direction could 
represent that something is either believed to be false or is negatively 
evaluated. Strength is the degree to which something is believed to be true or 
false or evaluated positively or negatively” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 221). 
Therefore, in this network, each cognition is represented by the net activation 
of a pair of negatively connected units – one unit represents a positive 
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direction, and the other represents the negative direction. Respectively, a net 
activation for the cognition is the difference between the activation of the 
positive unit and the activation of the negative unit. The neurological and 
computational plausibility for this has been reviewed by Anderson (1995, pp. 
150–152), where the neurons can be found in two organized groups, which 
are inhibitory and excitatory at the same time related to some specific input. 
The activation range for the positive neurons is also higher than the one for 
the negative neuron. For mimicking this fact, Shultz and Lepper set ceiling 
activation parameter to 1 for units representing positive aspects of cognition, 
and to 0.5 for units representing the negative aspect of cognition. The floor 
parameter is set to 0 for both types. For undertaking the simulation, the initial 
activation is generally set by default to the value 0.5 for high – strongly 
believed – and 0.1 for low – weakly believed.   
  This representation allows some degree of ambivalence in cognition, 
such as something both liked and disliked. The inhibitory connections 
between the two poles tend to discourage such ambivalence. However, 
relatively persistent ambivalence can be produced if both the positive and 
negative units for a cognition receive strong support from other cognitions. 
Such ambivalence creates dissonance, as explained in the next principle. 
 Principle 2: Relationships among cognitions. In the consonance 
model, cognitions are connected to other cognitions based on their causal 
implications to form a network, which represents a person’s relevant beliefs 
and attitudes regarding a particular experimental situation. A negative 
implication is represented by an inhibitory (-) weight between two cognitions; 
a positive implication is represented by an excitatory (+) weight. Connection 
weights range from -1 to 1, with 0 representing a lack of causal relation. If 
two cognitions are positively related, their positive poles are connected to an 
excitatory weight; it is similar for their negative pole. Inhibitory (-) weights 
connect the positive pole of one cognition with the negative pole of another 
cognition and vice versa (Figure 4.3.A). If two cognitions are negatively 
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related, their positive poles are connected to the inhibitory weights; it will be 
similar for their negative poles. The excitatory weights connect the positive 
pole of one cognition with the negative pole of another cognition and vice 
versa (Figure 4.3.B). For both cases, each unit has an inhibitory self-
connection, and all connection weights are bidirectional. In this simulation, 
the initial connection weight is set by default to 0.5 for a strong connection, 
and for a weak connection to 0.1 by default.   
 
Figure 6.2. Any two cognitions can be connected positively (as shown in Figure A), 
negatively (as shown in Figure B), or can be unrelated. In this figure, positive 
connection weights are symbolized by the solid lines and negative connection 
weights by the dashed lines. Each connection is symbolized by an ellipse drawn 
around the positive and negative poles of the cognition. (Source: Shultz and 
Lepper, 1996, p. 222) 
 
 Principle 3: Magnitude of dissonance. According to cognitive 
dissonance theory, the total amount of dissonance is a function of the ratio of 
dissonance cognitions to all relevant cognitions (dissonant plus consonant 
cognition) with cognitions and relations weighted for their importance to a 
person. In the consonance model, the total consonance of the network is 
represented by Equation 2 above, which is defined by the triple products of 
sending activation, receiving activation, and connection weight summed. 
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Total dissonance is formally defined as the negative of total consonance 
divided by r, the number of non-zero inter-cognition relations in the network.  
 Dissonance = - ij wij aiaj / r     (6) 
Dividing by r has the goal of standardizing dissonance across networks of 
different size and connection density by controlling the number of relevant 
relations. The self-connection of units is excluded from this computation.   
 The following things are worth mentioning: (1) The definition of 
dissonance is analogous to the Hopfield network's definition of energy. (2) 
The total consonance is a triple product of sending activation, receiving 
activation, and connecting weight summed. In term of believability, the larger 
their numeric value, the larger is their impact on consonance. (3) Irrelevant 
cognition that is connected by a weight of 0 contributes nothing to consonance. 
(4) This definition of dissonance offers some advantages over the definition 
given by Festinger because it is mathematically formalized. Therefore, it 
provides: (a) an easy application to complex belief structures, (b) the 
possibility of measurement of the amount of dissonance in each inter-
cognition relation and of ambivalence within the cognition, and (c) variations 
according to all possible individual relations, whether consonance, 
dissonance, or mixed.    
 Principle 4: Dissonance reduction. According to the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, people have a strong tendency to reduce cognitive 
dissonance, although this is not always successful. In the consonance model, 
networks tend to settle into more stable, lower dissonance states by updating 
all unit activations according to equations 3–5 above. Shultz and Lepper set 
two parameters that affect the process of dissonance reduction, namely cap 
and rand%: “A cap parameter, with a default of -0.5, corresponds to the 
connection between each unit and itself, wii, and prevents activations from 
reaching the activation ceiling. … The rand% parameter provides a means of 
globally testing the robustness of the results obtained in simulations in the 
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face of variations in the specific numerical values used to instantiate key 
variables. At the start of each network run, connection weights, resistances, 
and initial activations all are randomized by adding or subtracting a random 
proportion of their initial amounts. The rand% parameter specifies the 
proportion range in which these additional and subtraction are selected under 
a random uniform distribution. Ordinarily, we use small (0.1), medium (0.5), 
and large (1.0) levels of rand%. The randomizing network values in this way 
increases psychological realism because not every person can be expected to 
share exactly the same parameter values” (Shultz and Lepper, 2009, p. 244). 
This rand% parameter randomizes these basic variables as follows:  
 y = x {random(absolute[x  rand%])}   (7) 
The randomization of weight values violates the symmetry of connection 
weights as assumed by Hopfield (1982, 1984), so that wij ≠ wji, and thus 
makes network solutions less stable, meaning that outcomes are more variable. 
Related to this randomization in the Hopfield network, Shultz and Lepper 
write, “that violations of the symmetry assumption increased memory errors 
and instability in network solutions to memory retrieval problems. Such 
results may also correspond to natural psychological variation” (Shultz and 
Lepper, 1996, p. 224). 
 Principle 5: Changes in Cognitions. According to Festinger (1957), 
dissonance can be reduced by decreasing the number or importance of 
dissonant relations, by increasing the number or importance of consonant 
relations, or by a combination of these factors. Changing the importance of 
dissonance can be done by changing evaluations, beliefs, and implications 
among them. In the theory of cognitive dissonance, there are different degrees 
of resistance to change among the cognitions; the cognitions most likely to 
change are the least resistant to change. For example, beliefs are more 
resistant to change than evaluations or attitudes. “Resistance stems from the 
possible creations of new dissonance because of relations with other 
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cognitions; from cognition that is anchored in reality, and from the difficulty 
of changing aspects of reality” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 224). According 
to dissonance experiments, dissonance is reduced by changes in evaluations, 
not by changes in belief about the salient event presented nor by changes in 
implications among cognitions (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 224). For 
simulating this fact, these connection weights in the consonance model are 
not allowed to change, but cognition unit activations change over time as 
dissonance is reduced. The resistance parameter (Resisti) simulates this 
phenomenon in equation five above. By default, this parameter is set to the 
values of 0.5 for low resistance and of 0.1 for high resistance.   
 Principle 6: Importance of Dissonance. In their model, Shultz and 
Lepper implement the idea of the importance of dissonance by multiplying 
all connection weights and unit activations with a certain number at the 
beginning of every simulation. “An importance parameter multiplies all 
connection weights and unit activation at the start of each run, before the 
initial randomizations described under Principle 4. Typically, we use values 
of 1.0 in control conditions, 0.5 for conditions that lessen the importance of a 
dissonance situation, and 1.5 for conditions that enhance the importance of a 
dissonance situation. … The precise values used are somewhat arbitrary, but 
it is important, that they differ substantially to generate different results” 
(Shultz and Lepper, 2009, p. 245). 
  The simulation, according to this consonance model, is done by using 
a generic consonance model. In this model, cognitions are categorized into 
three categories: behaviors, justifications, and evaluations. In several 
simulations that implement this model, “the consonance model enables 
specification of each of the relevant cognitions, including their type and their 
initial activations, and of the relations among cognitions. Different 
dissonance experiments require different instantiations of this generic 
network because they involve different particular types of cognition, with 
differing particular initial activation values, and particular implications 
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among cognitions. … evaluation cognition is given low resistance, whereas 
other cognitions types (about behavior and justifications) are given high 
resistance” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 224).    
 
6.3. The Structuralist Model of the Intertheoretical Connections between 
Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and the Hopfield Network 
for the Consonance Model 
 The consonance model is a simulation of dissonance reduction 
through an artificial recurrent neural network, namely the Hopfield network. 
The motivation of this simulation is to simulate how neural activities in the 
brain can produce such psychological processes, namely reducing the 
dissonance at hand.   
 Building a model of intertheoretical connections of the consonant 
model requires some modifications of the Hopfield network. The first 
modification is related to the first principle in the consonant model, namely 
representation of cognition: “They can be both beliefs and evaluations (i.e., 
attitudes), such cognition could be assumed to vary in both direction and 
strength. The positive direction could represent that something is either 
believed to be true or is favorably evaluated. …, the negative direction could 
represent that something is either believed to be false or is negatively 
evaluated. Strength is the degree to which something is believed to be true or 
false or evaluated positively or negatively” (Shultz and Lepper, 1996, p. 221).  
It requires to modify the Hopfield network by adding a differentiation 
between neurons and the relation between those neurons. The first 
modification is eliminating differentiation among input neurons, hidden 
neurons, output neurons, pred(n), and succ(n), and creating differentiation 
between neurons (+) and neurons (-) to represent positive and negative 
valuations.   
(1) N+ is a finite non-empty set of neurons (+). 
(2) N- is a finite non-empty set of neurons (-). 
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(3) N+  N 
(4) N-  N 
 The second modification is a differentiation among the connections 
between neurons, which differentiates between pairs of neurons (Pairs) 
representing a cognition, and relations between members of Pairs (Conpairs) 
that represent the relation between cognitions. In the consonance model, the 
cognition is represented by a pair of neurons; the set of Pairs represent a set 
of cognitions. Therefore, the connection between cognitions will be 
represented by connections between elements of Pairs. The set of Conpairs 
will represent these connections between cognitions. 
(1) Pairs  N+' N-, all members of Pairs are bijective relations. 
(2) Pairs  C 
(3) Conpairs  Pairs  Pairs 
(4) C = Pairs  Conpairs  
 For the simulation, extn and outn, are not required anymore; all 
required is the activation of the pairs of neurons, that represent the valuations 
of the cognition. Therefore, they are put aside. Because the simulation does 
not have input and output, the network input netn will be modified. Defining 
netn needs another new parameter that behaves like a learning parameter. 
Shultz and Lepper call it as resisti “that indicates the resistance of receiving 
unit i to having its activation changed. Smaller values of this parameter 
indicate greater resistance because smaller values mean less impact of the net 
input” (Shultz and Lepper, 1999, p. 240). The law statement to determine neti 
will be neti = resisti j wij aj.  
 We also need a variable for time t to capture the update of the 
activation of receiving unit over time. The updating rules are as follows: 
 ai(t+1) = ai(t) + neti[ceiling – ai(t)], when neti ≥ 0,    
 ai(t+1) = ai(t) + neti[ai(t) – floor], when neti < 0,    
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Therefore, we also need two additional terms, ceiling and floor. Shultz and 
Lepper set ceiling activation parameter to 1 for units representing positive 
aspects of cognitions, and to 0.5 for units representing negative aspect of 
cognitions. The floor parameter is set to 0 for both types. 
 The next modification is related to the definition of consonance and 
dissonance. The term consonance replaces the term of state from the old 
Mp(HN) (see D III-20 of Chapter 3 above), whereas the term dissonance 
replaces the term energy E from the old Mp(HN). The consonance contributed 
by a particular unit i can be defined as follows: 
  consonancei = j wij aiaj      
where wij is the connection weight between units i and j, ai is the activation 
of receiving unit i, and aj is the activation of the sending unit j. The 
consonance of the network is defined as a sum of the consonances of all 
receiving units in the network: 
  consonancen = ij wij aiaj    
The total dissonance is formally defined as the negative of total consonance 
divided by r, the number of non-zero inter-cognition relations in the network.  
  Dissonance = - ij wij aiaj / r 
The last modification is the addition of two parameters that affect the process 
of dissonance reduction, i.e. cap and rand%: “A cap parameter, with a default 
of -0.5, corresponds to the connection between each unit and itself, wii, and 
prevents activations from reaching the activation ceiling.… The rand% 
parameter provides a means of globally testing the robustness of the results 
obtained in simulations in the face of variations in the specific numerical 
values used to instantiate key variables. At the start of each network run, 
connection weights, resistances, and initial activations are all randomized by 
adding or subtracting a random proportion of their initial amounts. The rand% 
parameter specifies the proportion range in which these additional and 
subtraction are selected under a random uniform distribution. Ordinarily, we 
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use small (0.1), medium (0.5), and large (1.0) levels of rand%. Randomizing 
network values in this way increases psychological realism, because not every 
person can be expected to share exactly the same parameter values” (Shultz 
and Lepper, 2009, p. 244). Therefore, the potential models and the actual 
models of the Hopfield network (D III-20 & DIII-21) in Chapter 3 are 
modified into DVI-2 and DVI-3 as follows:   
DVI-3: x is a potential model of the architecture of the Hopfield network for 
the consonance model (x  Mp(HN for Consonance)) iff there exist N, T, N+, 
N-, C, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, netn, State, E so that: 
(1) X = N, T, IR, N+, N-, C, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, Imp, cap, 
rand%, netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance  Mp(HN for 
Consonance) (let x be a potential model of the adapted Hopfield 
network for the consonance model) 
(2) N      (Let N is a non-empty set of neurons) 
(3) T       
(T is a finite non-empty set of discrete points of time) 
(4) N+  N  
(N+ as a subset of N is a finite non-empty set of neurons, that represent 
positive valuations of cognition) 
(5) N-  N  
(N- as a subset of N is a finite non-empty set of neurons, that represent 
negative valuations of cognitions) 
(6) C  NN  
(C is a finite non-empty set of directed connections between neurons) 
(7) Pairs  N+N-   
(Pairs is a relation between two neurons with two opposite valuations 
that represent a certain cognition. Pairs is bijective)    
(8) Conpairs  PairsPairs   
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(Conpairs is a set of connections between Pairs, which represents the 
relationships between cognitions)  
(9) W := C → {-1, 0, 1}      
(W is a function that maps every connection into an element of the set 
{-1, 0, 1}. This number represents the weight of connections, which 
represent the characteristics of the relation between the neurons in 
pairs)   
(10) Resisti := N → IR   
(Resist is a function that maps each neuron to a real number that 
represents the resistance of the neuron i to having its activation 
changed) 
(11) A := N→ IR    
(A is a function that maps each neuron to a real number that represents 
the activation of the unit/neuron) 
(12) Imp := IR → IR   
(Imp is a function that represents the importance parameter. It is 
implemented on A and W)    
(13) cap := C → IR   
(cap is a function that maps each neuron to a real number, which 
represents the synaptic weight of units with itself. By default, this 
synaptic weight is set to -0.5) 
(14) rand% := IR → IR   
(Rand% is a function of random parameters)    
(15) netn  resist  actn  W → IR   
(netn is a function that calculates the network input of each neuron)  
(16) ceiling := N → IR   
(ceiling is a function that maps each neuron to a real number as a 
parameter representing the maximal level of unit activation: This is 
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set to 1 for units representing positive aspects of cognition, and to 0.5 
for units representing the negative aspect of cognition) 
(17) floor := N → IR   
(floor is a function that maps each neuron to a real number as a 
parameter representing the minimal level of unit activation set to 0 for 
both types) 
(18) Consonance  actn  W  actn 
(Consonance is a relation that represents the state of the Hopfield net) 
(19) Dissonance := State → IR   
(Dissonance is a function that represents the magnitude of dissonance) 
 
DVI-3: x is an actual model of the architecture of the Hopfield network for 
the consonance model (x  M(HN for Consonance)) iff there exist N, C, T, 
N+, N-, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, cap, rand%, netn, ceiling, floor, 
consonance, Dissonance such that: 
(1) x = N, T, IR, N+, N-, C, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, Imp, cap, rand%, 
netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance  Mp(HN for 
Consonance)  
(let x be a potential model of the Hopfield network for the consonance 
model.) 
(2) N = N+  N-  
(The set of neurons in the network consists only of neurons with 
positive valuation and neurons with negative valuation) 
(3) N+  N- =   
(The intersection of the sets of neurons with positive valuation and the 
set with negative valuation is an empty set. Therefore, there exist no 
neuron with both and no valuation(s)) 
(4) C = NN – {(n1, n2)| n1N n2N → n1=n2}  
(C is a set of the connections between a neuron and other neurons) 
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(5) ni, nj  N, ni  nj: wij = [-1, 1], where wij = 0 means a lack of causal 
relation.  
(The synaptic weight (wW) has a value between -1 and 1, where wij 
= 0 means a lack of causal relation.) 
(6) For all ni, nj  N+: wij = ]0, 1] and for all ni,nj N- : wij = ]0,1].  
(The synaptic weight (wW) between two neurons with the same 
valuation is between 0 and 1. Zero is not included) 
(7) For all ni  N+, nj  N- : wij = [-1, 0[.  
(The synaptic weight (wW) between two neurons with the different 
valuation is between -1 and 0. Zero is not included) 
(8) For all ni, nj  N, ni = nj: capij = capji = -0.5  
(The connection weight for intra-neural connections is set -0.5) 
(9) For all x  A, W: x* = Imp (x). 
for control condition: x* = 1.0x 
for lessened importance: x* = 0.5x  
for enhanced importance: x* =1.5x  
 (“The importance parameter Imp multiplies all connection weights 
 and the unit activations at the start of each run, before the initial 
 randomization under [D VI-3 (10)]” (Shultz and Lepper, 1999, p. 
 245)) 
(10) For initial x  A, W, Resist: xinitial = x {random(absolute[x  
 rand%])}  
(A, W, Resist are initialized in the beginning of simulation by using a 
random number according to y = x {random(absolute[x  rand%])}) 
(11) For ni, nj  N, resisti  Resist, wij  W, i,j = 1, …, k: neti = 
 resisti 1
k wij aj.  
(Impact of parameter Resist on the net. Smaller values of Resist 
indicate greater resistance because smaller values mean less impact of 
the net input) 
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(12) For all niN, tjT, j = 0, 1, …, k: 
(a) for t = t0:   
  ai(tj+1) = ainitial i (tj) + neti[ceiling – aiinitial i(tj)], when neti ≥ 0, 
  ai(tj+1) = ainitial i(tj) + neti[aiinitial i(tj) – floor], when neti < 0,  
  (b) for t = tj, j = 1, …, k:  
  ai(tj+1) = ai(tj) + neti[ceiling – ai(tj)], when neti ≥ 0,  
  ai(tj+1) = ai(tj) + neti[ai(tj) – floor], when neti < 0,  
  (The activation function during the time considered.)  
(13) for all ni,nj N:   
  (a) consonancei = j wij aiaj 
  (b) consonancen = ij wij aiaj   
  (The consonance function of the network) 
(14) Dissonance = - ij wij aiaj / r   
(The dissonance function of the network) 
 
 The partial potential models of the Hopfield Network for the 
consonance model Mpp(HN for Consonance) can be modeled by omitting the 
T-theoretical elements of the potential models of the Hopfield network, i.e., 
Resist, A, imp cap, rand%, netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance. These 
concepts are T-theoretical because they are defined without any empirical 
observation or any other theories. They are determined so that the system 
behaves naturally. The partial potential models of the Hopfield network for 
the consonant model can be defined as follows: 
DVI-4: y is a partial potential model of the Hopfield Network for the 
consonance model (y = Mpp(HN for Consonance)) iff there exist x such that: 
(1) x = N, C, T, N+, N-, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, imp, cap, rand%, 
netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance  Mp(HN for 
Consonance) 
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(2) Resist, A, imp cap, rand%, netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, 
Dissonance are T-theoretical elements. 
(3) y = N, C, T, N+, N-, Pairs, Conpairs, W, netn  Mpp(HN for 
Consonant) 
 
 This modified version of the Hopfield network is a kind of 
specialization of the Hopfield network by adding those additional 
requirements above. Now modeling the intertheoretical connections between 
the Hopfield Network for consonance model T(HN for Consonance) and the 
Festinger Theory of Cognitive Dissonance T(DissB) can be done as follows. 
(1) The first step is defining the determining links, which describe the 
intertheoretical connections between the terms of both theories that are 
connected. (2) The second step is determining an echelon partial subset of the 
potential models of the theory of cognitive dissonance Mp(DissB), whose 
elements are connected to the elements of the potential model of the Hopfield 
network for the consonance model. This echelon partial subset of Mp(DissB) 
describes which parts of the dissonance theory can be reduced and simulated 
by the Hopfield network for the consonance model. The echelon partial subset 
of Mp(HN for Consonance) will describe which parts of the Hopfield network 
for the consonance model reduce the dissonance theory (D VI-5). (3) We can 
determine the entailment link between the echelon partial subsets of both 
theories' potential models. (4) The last step will be projecting the 
intertheoretical determining links to the partial potential model of one of both 
theories to characterize the class of local empirical claims and the class of 
intended applications. The first three steps will be executed as follows:  
DVI-5:  is a collection of determining links between T(DissB) and T(HN 
for Consonance), e1 is an echelon partial subset of the potential models of the 
dissonance theory (Mp(DissB)) and e2 is an echelon partial subset of the 
potential models of the Hopfield network for the consonance model (Mp(HN 
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for Consonance)), and E is a set of entailment links connecting both echelon 
partial subsets, e1 and e2, iff there exist x1, x2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 7 such 
that: 
(1) x1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress  Mp(DissB)  
(Let x1 be a potential model of the cognitive dissonance (Mp(DissB)).) 
(2) x2 = N, C, T, N+, N-, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, imp, cap, rand%, 
netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance  Mp(HN for 
Consonance)  
(Let x2 be a potential model of the Hopfield network for the 
consonance model (Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
(3) 1  Cognition  Pairs  
(1 is the determining link that connects the set Cognition to the set 
Pairs and 1 is bijective)   
(4) 2  Disscog  Conpairs  
(2 is the determining link that connects the set Disscog to the set 
Conspairs and 2 is bijective)   
(5) 3  Conscog  Conpairs  
(3 is the determining link that connects the set Conscog to the set 
Conspairs and 3 is bijective) 
(6) 4  pairdiss  W  
(4 is the determining link that connects the set pairdiss to the set of 
connection weight W and 4 is bijective) 
(7) 5  paircons  W  
(5 is the determining link that connects the set paircons to the set of 
connection weight W and 5 is bijective)  
(8) 6  Pairimp  imp  
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(6 is the determining link that connects the set Pairimp to the set imp 
and 6 is bijective) 
(9) 7  diss  Dissonance  
(7 is the determining link that connects the set diss to the set 
Dissonance and 7 is bijective) 
(10)  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}  
( is a collection of the determining links between (Mp(DissB)) and 
(Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
(11) e1 = Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, 
diss  echelon partial subset of Mp(DissB)  
(e1 is an echelon subset of (Mp(DissB))) 
(12) e2 = Pairs, Conpairs, W, Dissonance   echelon partial subset 
of Mp(HN for Consonance)  
(e2 is an echelon subset of (Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
(13) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}  
(E is the entailment link between the echelon subset of (Mp(DissB)) 
and the echelon subset of (Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
 
 The last step, which is to characterize the interpreting links on the 
partial potential models, aims to determine local empirical claims and the 
empirical contents of the intertheoretical reduction of cognitive dissonance 
theory by the Hopfield network according to the consonance model. Based 
on D VIII-7 and VIII-8 in BMS, pp. 398–400 the interpreting links for the 
reduction of the theory of cognitive dissonance T(DissB) by the Hopfield 
network for the consonance model T(HN for Consonance) can be determined 
as follows: 
DVI-6: E*(DissB) = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 l6, l7 } is a collection of interpreting links, 
where T(DissB) is interpreted by T(HN for Consonance) in the consonance 
model and f1 is the set of empirical claims of the interpreting links of the 
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reduction of DissB by HN for Consonance, iff there exist x1, x2 , e1, e2, E, y1 
such that: 
(1) x1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, 
pairimp, diss, redpress  Mp(DissB)  
(x1 is the potential model of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Mp 
(DissB))) 
(2) x2 = N, C, T, N+, N-, Pairs, Conpairs, W, Resist, A, imp, cap, rand%, 
netn, ceiling, floor, consonance, Dissonance  Mp(HN for 
Consonance)  
(x2 is the potential model of the Hopfield network for consonance 
(Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
(3) e1 = Cognition, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss 
 echelon set of Mp(DissB) connected to Mp(HN for Consonance)  
(e1 is an echelon subset of (Mp(DissB))) 
(4) e2 =  Pairs, Conpairs, W, imp, Dissonance   echelon set of Mp(HN 
for Consonance) connected to Mp(DissB)  
(e2 is an echelon subset of (Mp(HN for Consonance))) 
(5) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}  the set of entailment link between e1 
and e2.  
(E is the set of entailment links between DissB and HN for 
Consonance) 
(6) y1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, Disscog, Conscog  Mpp(DissB)  
(y1 is a partial potential model of the theory of cognitive dissonance 
(Mpp (DissB))) 
(7) E*(DissB) = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 l6, l7}  the set of interpreting links, where 
{li = x’, y| x’Mp(T’), yMpp*(T) and there is xMp(T) such that 
x',x(T', T) and r*(x)=y}.  
(E*(DissB) is a collection of interpreting links) 
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(8) l1 = {pairj , cogi| Pair(pairj)  Cognition (cogi) → R(pairj , cogi)}, 
where R(x,y) = x interprets y.  
(l1 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of cognition 
represented by a pair of neurons. The set Cognition here is an element 
of Mpp(DissF), whereas the set Pairs is an element of Mp(HN for 
Consonance)) 
(9) l2 := {cpj , dci| Conpair(cpj)  Disscog(dci) → R (cpj, dci)}  
(l2 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of dissonant 
cognitions being represented by some connection between a pair of 
neurons. The set Disscog here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas 
the set Conpair is an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(10) l3 = {cpj, cci| Conpair(cpj)  Conscog(cci) → R (cpj , cci)}  
(l3 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of consonant 
cognitions being represented by some connection between a pair of 
neurons. The set Conscog here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas 
the set Conpair is an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(11) l4 = {wj, pdi| wj  [-1, 0[  pairdiss(pdi) → R( wj, pdi)}  
(l4 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of the dissonance 
within pairs of cognitions being represented by the synaptic weight. 
The set pairdiss here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas the set W 
is an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(12) l5 = {wj, pci| wj  ]0, 1]  paircons(pci) → R( wj, pci)}  
(l5 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of the consonance 
within pairs of cognitions being represented by the synaptic weight. 
The set paircons here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas the set W 
is an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(13) l6 = {impj, pii| impj  {0.5, 1, 1.5}  pairimp(pii) → R(impj, 
pii)}  
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(l6 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of the importance 
within pairs of cognitions being represented by the synaptic weight. 
The set Pairimp here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas the set 
Imp is an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(14) l7 = {dissonancej, dissi| dissonance(dissonancej)  diss(dissi) 
→ R (dissonancej, dissi)}  
(l7 is an interpreting link that interprets the concept of the magnitude 
of dissonance being represented by the concept of dissonance. The set 
diss here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas the set dissonance is 
an element of Mp(HN for Consonance)) 
(15) f1 = Cognition, Disscog, Conscog  an echelon subset of 
Mpp(DissB) by applying function r*: e1 → f1, that mapping E* from  
Mp (DissB) to Mpp(DissB)  
(f1 is the echelon subset of Mpp(DissB) representing the local 
empirical claims of the intertheoretical reduction on the side of the 
reduced theory of cognitive dissonance (DissB)) 
 
 Based on DVIII-9 and DVIII-10 in BMS, f1 can be determined as the 
set of empirical claims of the intertheoretical reduction of the theory of 
cognitive dissonance to the Hopfield network for the consonance model. The 
empirical claims of this intertheoretical reduction refer to a set of the actual 
cognitions and the relations between these cognitions, either consonant or 
dissonant. The actual cognitions simulated are ‘inputs’ of the network, given 
by examples such as toy, punishment, playing or not playing, happy or not 
happy, etc. Every cognition is interpreted as a pair of neurons, that represent 
two poles of valuation. The pairs of cognitions, either dissonant or consonant, 
are interpreted as connected pairs of neurons in the Hopfield network for the 
consonance model.   
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A Summary of This Part. We have built a structuralist model to 
model and analyze the intertheoretical connections between the Festinger 
theory of cognitive dissonance (DissB) and the Hopfield network for the 
consonance model (HN for consonance). In this case only part of Mp(DissB), 
namely the echelon partial subset c1(DissB), is connected to part of Mp(HN 
for consonance), i.e. the echelon partial subset c2(HN for consonance). 
Besides modeling the intertheoretical connections on the theoretical level, the 
structuralist metatheory of science provides us also with the tools for 
modeling and analyzing the intertheoretical connections on the non-
theoretical level i.e., the local empirical claims of the intertheoretical relation. 
Our model can be graphically represented as follows: 
 
Figure 6.3. A structuralist modeling of intertheoretical reduction between the theory 
of cognitive dissonance (DissB) and the Hopfield network for the consonance 
model (HN for Consonance). e(DissB) is an echelon subset of Mp(DissB) and 
e(HN for Consonance) is an echelon subset of Mp(HN for Consonance). Both are 
connected by a set of entailment links (E). The interpreting links with local at 
DissB (E*(DissB)) connect the set of empirical claims of this intertheoretical 
reduction at DissB to the echelon subset of Mp(HN for Consonant) as the reducing 
theory. 
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Chapter 7 
The Structuralist Model of Intertheoretical Connections 
between the Festinger Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and 
the Two Layers Feed-Forward Neural Network in the 
Connectionist Model of Simulation 
 
 
 Another simulation of cognitive dissonance, whose intertheoretical 
connections will be modeled and analyzed here, is the connectionist model. 
This simulation implements the Rosenblatt perceptron with the two-layers 
feed-forward neural network and the delta rule as its learning rule. To model 
intertheoretical relations for this simulation that involves more than two 
theories for this simulation, the following strategy will be implemented: The 
first step is to model the intertheoretical connections that unify the 
Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the 
delta rule. The result will be simplified by building a new theory-element 
that unifies the theory-elements of these three theories to make the modeling 
and analysis of intertheoretical connections for the simulation easier. The 
last step will be modeling and analysis of the intertheoretical connections of 
the simulation itself by using the unifying theory-element, instead of using 
the original theory-elements.  
 
7.1. The Intertheoretical Connections Between the Two-Layers Feed-
Forward Neural Network, the Rosenblatt Perceptron, and the Delta 
Rule 
 For building a model of the intertheoretical relation between these 
three theories, this dissertation will use the approach to model 
intertheoretical relations between two theory-elements. In the connectionist 
model, several perceptrons are placed in a two-layers feed-forward network, 
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and this network of neurons is trained by applying the delta rule. Based on 
this schema, two intertheoretical connections of two theory-elements will 
take part in modeling the intertheoretical connection between them, i.e., 
between the neurons and their network and between the network of neurons 
and the learning rule. In this intertheoretical relation, neither the potential 
models of the Rosenblatt perceptron (Mp(RP)) are fully connected to the 
potential models of the two layers feed-forward neural networks (Mp(2L-
FFNN)) nor the potential models of the two layers feed-forward neural 
networks (Mp(2L-FFNN)) to the potential models of the delta rule 
(Mp(DR)). Hence, we should apply the definition of determining links to 
model and analyze them.  
 To reduce the complexity in discussing the idea behind this 
combination, let us first focus on the intertheoretical relation between the 
Rosenblatt perceptron and the two-layers feed-forward neural network. By 
placing several neurons in two-layers feed-forward architecture, the 
following concepts of both theory-elements are connected. The concept of 
neuron (N) in Mp(RP) is connected with the concept of neuron (N) in 
Mp(2L-FFNN). The concept of input neuron (N0) in Mp(RP) is also 
connected with the concept of input neuron (Nin) in Mp(2L-FFNN). The 
concept of connections (C) in Mp(RP) and the concept of connections (C) in 
Mp(2L-FFNN) are connected. Moreover, the concept of synaptic weight (W) 
in the Mp(RP) and the concept of synaptic weight (W) in the Mp(2L-FFNN) 
are also connected. Finally, all three T-theoretical concepts of both Mp(2L-
FFNN) and Mp(RP) are connected: fnet is connected with netn, fact with 
actn, and fout with outn.  
 After placing those neurons in the network, the delta rule is applied 
as a learning rule for the network. The second step is to connect the 
concepts from the delta rule to the concepts of the network. The concept of 
neuron (N) from Mp(DR) cannot be connected to the concept of neuron in 
the network because the delta rule is not applied to the input neurons. 
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Therefore, the concept of neuron from Mp(DR) is not connected with all 
neurons in the input neurons (N0 or Nin). In the case of the two layers feed-
forward neural network, which does not have the hidden layer (Nhidden = ), 
the concept of neuron from Mp(DR) is only connected to the concept of 
output neuron from the network (Nout and N/N0). However, the concept of 
connection C from Mp(DR) can safely be connected to the concept of 
connection in the network. The concept of bias (B) from Mp(DR) can also 
be connected to the concept of bias (B) in the network. The concept of 
connection weight (W) from Mp(DR) is connected not only with the concept 
of connection weight of the network but also with (W0) from Mp(RP). 
Weight (W) from Mp(DR) combines both of them. The concept of input 
from Mp(DR) is identical to the input of the network, especially because the 
network is a two-layers feed-forward neural network. The concept of actual 
output (OUTn) from Mp(DR) can also be seen as identical with the concept 
of output in the network (outn and outp). However, the concept of desired 
output (Out) cannot be connected to the term output of the network 
(directly) because it is the label of the training-sample. Now, the 
intertheoretical relations connecting the potential models of these theories 
can be defined as follows: 
D VII-1 :If T(RP) = Mp(RP), M(RP), Mpp(RP), I(RP) and T(2L-FFNN) = 
Mp(2L-FFNN), M(2L-FFNN), Mpp(2L-FFNN), I(2L-FFNN) and T(DR) = 
Mp(DR), M(DR), Mpp(DR), I(DR) then there exist determining links 
between T(RP) and T(ArchNN) and T(DR) iff there exist x1 and x2 and x3 
such that: 
(1) x1 = N, N0, IR, IN, C, W, B, W0, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout  
Mp(RP) (x1 is a potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron 
(Mp(RP))) 
(2) x2 = N’, Nin, Nout, Nhidden, IR, C’, pred(n), succ(n), W’, extn, netn, 
actn, outn  Mp(2L-FFNN)  
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(x2 is a potential model of the two-layers feed-forward neural 
network (Mp(2L-FFNN))) 
(3) x3 = N*, IR, Inp*, Out*, C*, L, B*, W*, OUTn, , 
Error  Mp(DR)  
(x3 is a potential model of the delta-rule (Mp(DR))) 
(4) N  N’  
(The concept of neuron (N) in the Mp(RP) is connected with the 
concept of neuron (N’) in the Mp(2L-FFNN), because both refer to 
all neurons in the networks)  
(5) Nout  N*  N/N0  
(The concept of neuron (N*) in the Mp(DR) is connected with the 
concept of neuron (N) in Mp(RP) without referring to the input 
neurons (N0) and the concept of output neuron (Nout) in Mp(2L-
FFNN)) 
(6) N0  Nin   
(The concepts of input neuron (N0) in Mp(RP) and (Nin) Mp(2L-
FFNN) are connected. The case would be different in the multi-layer 
feed-forward neural network) 
(7) C  C’  C*  
(The concepts of connection (C, C’, C*) between neurons in all 
potential models are connected) 
(8) B  B*  
(The concepts of bias in both Mp(RP) and Mp(DR) are connected) 
(9) W  W’  
(The concepts of connection weight in the potential models of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron and two-layers feed-forward neural networks 
are connected) 
(10) W*  W  W0   
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(The concept of connection weight (W*) in Mp(DR) is connected 
with both the concept of connection weight (W) and the concept of 
connection weight of the bias (W0) in Mp(RP)) 
(11) Inp  Inp*  extn  
(The concept of input (Inp) in Mp(RP) is connected with both the 
concept of external input (extn) in Mp(2L-FFNN) and the concept of 
input (Inp*) in Mp(DR)) 
(12) Outp  outn  OUTn  
(The concept of Output (Outp) in Mp(RP) is connected with the 
concept of output (outn) in Mp(2L-FFNN) and the concept of actual 
output (OUTn) in Mp(DR)) 
(13) fnet  netn  
(The concept of fnet in Mp(RP) is connected with the concept of netn 
in Mp(2L-FFNN)) 
(14) fact  actn  
(The concept of fact in Mp(RP) is connected with the concept of actn 
in Mp(2L-FFNN)) 
 
 Based on these connections, the intertheoretical connection 
connecting the actual models of these theories can be specified as follows: 
D VII-2: If T(RP) = Mp(RP), M(RP), Mpp(RP), I(RP) and T(2L-FFNN) = 
Mp(2L-FFNN), M(2L-FFNN), Mpp(2L-FFNN), I(2L-FFNN) and T(DR) = 
Mp(DR), M(DR), Mpp(DR), I(DR) then there exist determining links 
among T(RP) and T(ArchNN) and T(DR) iff there exist x1 and x2 and x3 
such that: 
(1) x1 = N, N0, IR, IN, C, W, B, W0, Inp, Outp, fnet, fact, fout  
Mp(RP)  
(x1 is a potential model of the Rosenblatt Perceptron (Mp(RP))) 
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(2) x2 = N’, IR, Nin, Nout, C’, pred(n), succ(n), W’, extn, netn, actn, 
outn  Mp(2L-FFNN)  
(x2 is a potential model of the two-layers feed-forward neural 
network (Mp(2L-FFNN))) 
(3) x3 = N*, IR, Inp*, Out*, C*, L, B*, W*, OUTn, , 
Error  Mp(DR)  
(x3 is a potential model of the delta rule (Mp(DR))) 
(4) N = N’  
(The concept of neuron (N) of the Rosenblatt perceptron is identical 
to the concept of neuron (N’) of the two-layers feed-forward neural 
network) 
(5) Nout = N* = N/N0  
(The concept of neuron (N*) of the delta rule refers to the set of 
neurons (N) in the perceptron without referring to the set of neurons 
input (N0). Moreover, in the two-layers feed-forward neural network 
this only refers to the neuron output (Nout)) 
(6) N0 = Nin → Inp   
(The concept of neuron input (N0) of the Rosenblatt perceptron is 
identical to the concept of neuron in the input layer (Nin) of the two-
layers feed-forward neural network. In applying the delta rule, real 
numbers are attached to these neurons as the input training for the 
network) 
(7) C = C’ = C*  
(The concept of connection in all theory-elements is identical) 
(8) B = B*  
(The concept of bias in the Rosenblatt perceptron and the concept of 
bias in the delta rule are identical) 
(9) W = W’  
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(The concept of synaptic weight in the Rosenblatt perceptron and the 
concept of the two layers feed-forward neural network are identical) 
(10) W* := W0  W  
(The concept of synaptic weight W* in the delta rule refers to 
unification between W0 and W in the Rosenblatt perceptron) 
(11) Inp = Inp*= extn  
(The concept of input from the delta rule is identical to the concept 
of input of the Rosenblatt perceptron) 
(12) Outp = Outn = OUTn  
(The actual output of the Rosenblatt perceptron is identical with the 
concept of actual output of the delta rule) 
There is n  N/N0, ci C for iIN, bB and let netn, actn, outn so 
that: 
(13) netn = fnet (Inp, W) = i=1n Inpi (n, ci,)W(ci)  
(For each output neuron: its network input (netn) is the result of the 
network input function of the neuron. The neurons receive input 
according to netn = fnet (Inp, W) = i=1
n Inpi (ni, ci)W(ci)) 
(14) actn = fact (netn, b, w0) according to linear regression: fact 
(netn, b, w0) = netn + bw0  
(For each output neuron: Its activation (actn) is the result of the 
activation function of the neuron, and its network output is the result 
of the output function of the neurons. The neurons are activated (in 
an excitatory state) according to the linear regression: fact(netn, b, 
w0) = netn + bw0) 
(15) outn = fout (actn) = Outp  
(For each output neuron: it sends its output signal according to 
fout(fact), which is identical to the output (outn) in the two layers 
feed-forward neural network and the actual output (Outp) in the 
delta rule) 
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 From the formulation of the intertheoretical connections above, there 
are several concepts in the three theories that are identical, especially in the 
case of the two-layers feed-forward neural network. Therefore, the model’s 
simplification in a unifying model can be done by omitting the models’ 
redundant concepts as follows:  
(1) Because the set N in the Mp(RP) and N' in the Mp(2L-FFNN) are 
identical, we will use just N for our new unifying models. 
(2) Because the set N0 in the Mp(RP) and Nin in the Mp(2L-FFNN) are 
identical, we will use just Nin for our new unifying models. 
(3) Because the set N* in the Mp(DR) and N/N0 in the Mp(RP) refer to 
the same set of Nout in Mp(2L-FFNN) in the new unifying model, we 
will use just Nout. 
(4) We will use only the set C because all the connected terms come 
from the three theories.   
(5) We will use just the set of bias B from the Rosenblatt Perceptron 
because this set is identical with the set of bias B* in the delta rule.    
(6) We will use the sets W and W0 in our new unifying models because 
both terms can cover both sets W’ and W*.   
(7) In the case of the two layers feed-forward neural networks, all input 
neurons are connected to every output neuron. Therefore, all sets of 
inputs (Inp, extn, Inp*) from all models refer to the same inputs. 
Therefore, we use only the term Inp for our new models.  
(8) In the case of the two layers feed-forward neural networks, the 
outputs of every neuron besides the input neuron (Outp) in the 
Rosenblatt perceptron are the outputs (outn) of the neural networks 
and are also seen as the actual output (OUTn) according to the delta 
rule. Therefore, we will use just the set outn in our new unifying 
models.  
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(9) We will also take over pred(n), succ(n), netn, actn from the two 
layers feed-forward neural networks. From the Rosenblatt 
Perceptron, we need three functions, namely fnet, fact, and fout. 
Moreover, from the delta rule, we need the set of desired outputs 
(Out), The set of the training-sample (L), the learning rate () and 
the set Error from the delta rule. 
(10) We will still need to add the set of natural numbers and the 
set of rational numbers.  
 
  With these considerations, the standard form of the unifying 
potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two layers feed-forward 
neural network, and the delta rule (Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR)) can be 
defined as follows: 
D VII-3: x is a unifying potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the 
two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule (Mp(RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR)) iff there exist N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, 
W0, Inp, Out, L, , fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  such that: 
(1) x = N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR) 
(2) N = a finite non-empty set of neurons. 
(3) Nin = non-empty set of input neurons.     
(4) Nout is a finite non-empty set of output-neurons 
(5) C  NN     
(a finite non-empty set of connection between neurons)  
(6) pred(n) = {n1N| (n1, n2)C}   (presynaptic neurons) 
(7) succ(n) = {n2  N| (n1, n2)C}   (postsynaptic neurons) 
(8) W := C → IR      
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(Synaptic Weight W assigns to each pair of neurons a real number as 
synaptic weight.) 
(9) B =  → IR    
(Bias B assigns to every neuron a real number as its bias. Bias is 
normally set = 1)  
(10) W0 := BN → IR  (synaptic weight from bias) 
(11) Inp := NoutC → IR    
(Input Inp assigns to each neuron several real numbers as its input, 
that is sent by its Input-units (N0) in the network)     
(12) fnet:= W Inp → IR   
(Network Input function (fnet) assigns to Neuron (except for input 
unit) a real number as network input) 
(13) fact:= fnet  b → IR    (activation function)  
(14) fout:= fact → Outp   (output function) 
(15) extn:= Nin → IR    (external input) 
(16) netn:= Nout → IR   (network-input) 
(17) actn:= Nout → IR    (activation) 
(18) outn := Nout → IR    (output) 
(19) Inp  IR     
(input – Inp→ is a set of the input-vector, whose elements are 
identical with Inp) 
(20) Out  IR     
(desired output – Out→ is a set of an output-vector, whose elements 
are identical with Out) 
(21) L  Inp  Out   
(a finite non-empty set of training examples) 
(22) Outn  IR      
(actual output, if the neural network is fed with input Inp. Outn
→ is a 
set of an output-vector, whose elements are identical with Outn) 
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(23)   IR     (learning rate) 
(24) Error := Out  Outn → IR2  
(The network’s error mapping in a two-dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system)  
 
  The unifying actual models of the new (synthetized) theory can be 
characterized as follows: 
D VII-4 :x is a unifying actual model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two 
layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule (M(RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR)) iff there exists N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, 
Out, L, , fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error   Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR) 
(2) N = Nin  Nout 
(3) for all n  N it holds: 
(3.1) Nin(n) ↔ pred(n) 
(3.2) Nout(n) ↔ succ(n) 
(4) Nin  Nout =  
(5) C  Nin Nout 
(6)  There is nNout, ciC for iIN, bB and let netn, actn, outn 
so that: 
(6.1) netn = fnet (Inp, W) = i=1
n  Inpi (n, ci,).W(ci)  
(6.2) actn = fact(netn, b, w0) according to Linear Regression: 
fact(netn, b, w0)= netn + b.w0 
(6.3) outn = fout (actn). 
(7) i{1,...,n}: Error= ½ i (Outn – Out)2  and the derivation for each 
neuron's activation: (Outn – Out) 
(8) bi i=1,...,n: bi(new) = bi(old) + bi with bi = – (Outn – Out). 
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(9) wiW, i=1,...,n: wi(new) = wi(old) + wi with wi = – (Outn – Out) 
Inpi  
(10) Convergence-statement:  
Suppose L={(Inp1
→ , Out1),..., (Inpm
→ , Outm)} is a set of training-
sample with  
L0 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =0} and L1 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =1}. 
If L0 and L1 are linearly separable, viz. if w
→IRn and =IR exist, so 
that: 
 (Inp→, 0) L0 : w
→ Inp→ <  and 
 (Inp→, 1) L1 : w
→ Inp→   
 
  From the unifying potential models, the unifying partial potential 
models can be defined by omitting the T-theoretical elements (see Chapter 
3) as follows: 
D VII-5: y is a unifying partial potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, 
the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule (Mpp(RP + 
2L-FFNN + DR)) iff there exist x such that: 
(1) x = N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR) 
(2) fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn,  Error are T-theoretical. 
(3) y = N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, 
L  Mpp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR) 
 
 The relation between the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers feed-
forward neural network, and the delta rule is a relationship between three 
theories at the same time, even if the links being used always exist only 
between two theories. This “tripartite” relation occurs if we combine two (or 
maybe more) theory-elements (T1, ..., Tn) into another theory-element T0, 
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which serves as the mainboard theory – because of its form I call this 
relation the “V-pattern of intertheoretical relations.” The notion of the V-
pattern and the unifying theory-element will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8. This relation can be described in a directed acyclic graph – like 
the letter “V” – as follows:  
 
 
Figure 7.1. The directed acyclic graph of the V-pattern of intertheoretical relation. 
In our case, the mainboard theory is the two-layers feed-forward neural network, a 
specialization of the architecture of the neural network. The connected theories are 
the perceptron and the delta-rule. The word “mainboard theory" are used by 
referring to the fact that the other combined theories are connected to this theory 
and the local intended applications of intertheoretical connections of this 
combination of theories lay on it. 
 
7.2. The Connectionist Model 
 The connectionist model was created by Frank van Overwalle and 
Karen Jordens, as a further advance in modeling cognitive dissonance. This 
model deals with some aspects that are not covered by the consonance 
model. “In this [consonance] model cognitions about discrepant behavior, 
justification, and evaluation are represented in separate nodes, and 
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connection weights denote the causal implications between cognitions, 
much like in automatic spreading activation models. Shultz and Lepper’s 
novel contribution is that the consonance model can reach consistency 
automatically through the simultaneous satisfaction of the multiple 
constraints imposed by the connections. However, an important limitation is 
that the connections themselves are not dynamically learned, but handset by 
the authors based on available evidence. The aim of this article is to further 
advance the connectionist modeling of cognitive dissonance by presenting 
an alternative connectionist model in which the connections between 
cognitions are automatically developed, without intervention from the 
experimenter” (Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 204). The connectionist 
model's aims are very different from the consonance model, and its set of 
basic assumptions on how the mind works are very different as well. “... our 
connectionist approach reflects a view of the mind as an adaptive learning 
mechanism, where cognitive dissonance is seen as a relatively rational 
process in which people seek causal answers for why they think, feel or 
behave inconsistently” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 205).  
 The basic idea of this simulation is inspired by the attributional 
reformulation of the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance advocated by 
Cooper and Fazio (1984): “Cognitive dissonance reduction is driven by a 
rational process in which the causal understanding of thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors plays a major role” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 205). 
This idea agrees with Cooper and Fazio’s notion that people’s attempt to 
understand and justify their dissonant behavior and emotions causally is at 
the root of the creation and reduction of dissonance (van Overwalle and 
Jordens, 2002, p. 205). However, there are also several differences between 
both as follows. (1) In Cooper and Fazio’s notion one’s responsibility takes 
a central role in changing one’s attitudes to justify their discrepant behavior 
in the dissonance situation, whereas in the connectionist model, it is the 
attitude object that takes the central role. “We view the attributions to the 
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attitude object as central rather than attributions of the one’s responsibility, 
we emphasize the role of affect during dissonance and neglect arousal, and 
we focus on unexpected outcomes rather than unwanted outcomes” (van 
Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 205). To specify their attitude objects, 
Overwalle and Jordens follow the three components view on attitude from 
Rosenberg and Hovland (1960): cognitions, behaviors, and emotions. They 
define “an attitude as manifesting itself through its causal connections in 
memory between the cognitive representation or belief about the attitude 
object and feelings about this interaction. The intensity of an attitude is 
defined by the strength of these connections” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 
2002, p. 205). (2) In this connectionist model, the dissonance is an 
emotional state of discomfort rather than physiological arousal. This kind of 
emotion serves as a source of information in making judgments and 
inferences in a dissonance situation. Moreover, affection experience itself is 
subjected to an attributional analysis. Also, in Cooper and Fazio’s model, 
dissonance creates arousal, which serves as the instigator of an attributional 
interpretation (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 206).   
 This model implements the two-layers feed-forward neural networks 
and the delta rule as its training algorithm (van Overwalle and Jordens, 
2002, pp. 206–207) to simulate a specific example of cognition experiment 
called the first insufficient justification paradigm by Freedman (1965).1 This 
 
1 The experiment is conducted as follows: “School children were forbidden to play with an 
attractive toy (a robot) under either mild or severe threat of punishment, and the 
experimenter either stayed in the room while the child played (surveillance condition), or 
went away (this surveillance variable was not included in the introductory example). Actual 
play with the previously forbidden toy about 40 days later in the absence of the 
experimenter or any threat, revealed greater derogation of the forbidden toy in the mild than 
in the severe threat condition when there had been no surveillance. When there had been 
surveillance, the effect of severity of threat was negligible. … The attributional explanation 
for these results was that mild threat alone provided insufficient justification for the counter 
attitudinal behavior of not playing with the attractive toy and thus created high dissonance 
that was reduced by lowering the attraction for the toy. In contrast, either the high threat or 
the exper imenter's surveillance provided sufficient justification for not playing with the toy 
and thus created little dissonance and little attitude change” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 
2002, p. 216). 
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neural network links the causes with the outcomes in its connections. In the 
connectionist model, an attitude object (such as attractive toys) and several 
additional external pressures (such as the mild or severe threat of 
punishment) are the causes, whereas a behavior (such as play) and a current 
emotion (such as happy) are the outcomes. The nodes representing causes 
and outcomes are located in two different layers that are connected via 
adjustable connections. The first layer contains the input nodes representing 
the possible causes, and the second layer contains the output nodes 
representing the outcome. The connections between both layers represent 
causal explanations. The adjustable connection weights represent the quality 
or strength of the causal influence, and for attitude-object nodes, they 
represent the intensity of the attitude. Activation in the network spreads 
from the input nodes to the output nodes through these connections. We take 
the example given by the authors to make it clear (Figure 2):  
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   A. Feed-forward Network (initials weights) 
 
  B. Feed-forward Network (after prior history) 
 
Figure 7.2. Specification of the feed-forward network model  
(Source: Van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 207) 
 
  The delta rule strives to reduce the error between what the network 
expects from prior information and the current information. In the 
beginning, all connection weights are set at zero and eventually reach 
 
164 
 
excitatory, inhibitory, or zero weight depending on the person’s learning 
history. In general, the delta rule predicts that the more a cause and an 
outcome co-occur, the stronger their connections will become until they 
reach the asymptote (typically -1 and +1). This learning process can be 
explained as follows (by using Figure 7.2): Initially, all weights are set to 
zero values (see Figure 7.2 A). Now we set a causal factor, such as a toy +1 
(means present). This input will spread in proportion to the connection 
weight to all output nodes. It is because, in this initial condition, all 
connection weights are zero, and the activation weight of all output nodes is 
zero. The network here uses linear activations. “The activations received at 
the output nodes are linearly summed to determine their activation. This 
output activation can be understood as representing the magnitude of the 
outcome anticipated by the network” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, pp. 
207–208).  
 The observed outcome is represented by an external teaching signal, 
which has activation of +1 when the outcome is present (e.g., play or 
happy), zero when absent (e.g., not play, or moderate affect), and -1 when 
the opposite outcome is present (e.g., unhappy). The predicted outcome 
(output activation) is then compared with the actual occurrence of the 
outcomes (external teaching signal). In the beginning, output activation is 
zero, whereas now the actual output is +1, represented by playing with a toy 
and being happy. Thus, there is an error +1 for each output node. It means 
“the network at this point seriously underestimates the magnitude of the 
behavioral and emotional reactions” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 
208).    
 The delta rule plays an important role here to make this simulation 
realistic. By implementing the delta rule, the network’s connection weights 
are adjusted to minimize the discrepancy between predicted and actual 
output in proportion to the magnitude of the error. In this case, the 
connection between the toy and the outcomes will be adjusted upward. How 
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the delta rule works has already been explained in Chapter 3. We now 
introduce the threat, either +1 for severe threat or +0.5 for mild threat. The 
same process will happen, namely: (1) The neural network gets a new 
predicted outcome. (2) This predicted outcome will be compared with the 
new observed outcome, and the network gets a new discrepancy between 
both outcomes. (3) The delta rule will adjust the connection weights of the 
network according to the new situation. The condition of the network after 
certain trials is described in Figure 7.2 B.   
 How fast a person’s mental representation of a dissonant situation is 
brought into correspondence with reality is represented by a learning rate 
parameter in the delta rule. This learning rate usually is between zero and 
+1. “A high learning rate indicates that new information has strong priority 
over old information and leads to radical adjustments in the connection 
weights, whereas a low learning rate suggests conservative adjustments that 
preserve much of the knowledge in the weights acquired by the old 
information” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 208). 
 This model reflects the dissonance reduction as follows: “… the 
discrepancy in the expected and actual outcomes (actions and affect) reflects 
cognitive dissonance, while the adjustments in the connection weights 
(determined by the delta algorithm) reflect dissonance reduction through 
attitude change” (van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 208). This simulation 
refers to Festinger’s idea that “behavior is guided by accurate information 
about the environment and the self, and that dissonance can arise when this 
information disconfirms cognitions or expectations …. Therefore, any 
discrepancy between one’s predictions (based on relevant input) and one’s 
behavior or emotion would be disturbing to the person and will be avoided” 
(van Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 209). The connectionist model 
captures dissonance by the fact that activation of the causal nodes will 
always create an error at the output without attitude adjustments. The 
magnitude of this error represents the magnitude of dissonance.    
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 The simulation is conducted in two phases. In the first phase, called 
the pre-experimental phase, the connection weights are set in such a way as 
to simulate the set of beliefs and evaluations that the participants have. In 
the second phase, the experimental manipulation was closely replicated. 
“We first describe, how often the attitude object and external factors in the 
simulations occurred and under which experimental conditions, next the 
nature and direction of the behavioral and affective outcomes, how all these 
cognitions were coded in a distributed manner, and we end with some 
general features of the simulation. Although some of the specifications 
detailed next may seem arbitrary, they are in fact irrelevant with respect to 
the basic mechanism at work, and many of them can be relaxed without 
affecting the simulation result much (robustness section at the end of the 
simulations). We aim to demonstrate that some plausible assumptions about 
learning histories can explain human dissonance data, not that the 
specifications are necessarily correct nor that they are the only possible ones 
that make the simulation work” (Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 213).   
 
7.3. Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and the Feed-Forward 
Neural Network for the Connectionist Model 
  The last intertheoretical relation that will be examined in this 
dissertation is the relation between the theory of cognitive dissonance and 
the implementation of the two-layers feed-forward neural network to build 
the connectionist model or simulation of dissonance reduction. For analysis 
the intertheoretical connections between the theory of cognitive dissonance 
and the feed-forward neural network according to the connectionist model, 
several preparatory steps are needed. The first step is adaptation of the 
unifying model of the perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural 
network, and the delta rule above to meet the requirements of the 
connectionist model. The second is the modification of the structuralist 
model of the theory of forced compliance dissonance (T(DissF)) from 
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Chapter 3 to fit the simulation’s goal. (3) The last step is modeling the 
intertheoretical relation between both theories according to the connectionist 
model. 
 
7.3.1. Adapting the Unified Model of the Feed-forward Neural Network 
to the Requirements of the Connectionist Model 
 From the description of the connectionist model above, the 
requirements can be summarized as follows: (1) The connectionist model 
uses the two-layers feed-forward neural network with the delta rule as its 
learning-rule. The neural networks consist of four neurons divided into two 
layers; each layer consists of two neurons. Two neurons in the input layer 
represent, for example, cognition of toy and cognition of threat, whereas the 
two neurons in the output layer represent cognition of play and cognition of 
happy. (2) The connectionist model implements the linear activations for the 
output neurons in the neural network. (3) The activation of an input-neuron 
is set 1 or 0 for a toy, which represents “present” or “not present.” For the 
threat, an input neuron will be set 0, +0.5, or +1 to represent “not present,” 
“mild threat,” or “severe threat.” (4) The expected activation of output 
neurons will be set at +1 when the outcome is present (e.g., play or happy), 
zero when absent (e.g., not play, or moderate affect), and -1 when the 
opposite outcome is present (e.g., unhappy). (5) And the learning rate for 
this simulation is set between 0 and 1. Based on these requirements, the 
unified theory element T(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) should be 
adjusted by the following steps: First, we specialize the unifying potential 
models by adding or adjusting the specific required conditions as follows:  
DVII-6: x is a unifying potential model of the Rosenblatt Perceptron, the 
two layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule for the 
connectionist model (Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) iff there 
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exist N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, , fnet, 
fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  such that: 
(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error   Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR) 
(2) N = a finite non-empty set of neurons 
(3) Nin = non-empty set of input neuron    
(4) Nout is a finite non-empty set of output neurons 
(5) C  NN   
(a finite non-empty set of connection between neurons)  
(6) pred(n) = {n1N| (n1, n2)C}   (presynaptic neurons) 
(7) succ(n) = {n2N| (n1, n2)C}   (postsynaptic neurons) 
(8) W := C→IR     
(synaptic weight W assigns to each pair of neurons a real number as 
synaptic weight.) 
(9) B =  → IR  
(bias – assigns to every neuron a real number as its bias. Bias is 
normally set = 1)  
(10) W0 := BN → IR  (synaptic weight from bias) 
(11) Inp := NoutC → IR    
(input – assigns to each neuron several real numbers as its input, that 
is sent by its input neurons N0 in the network)     
(12) fnet := WInp → IR   
(network input function – assigns to Neuron except for input neurons 
a real number as network input) 
(13) fact := fnet  b → IR   
(activation function – there are various activation function) 
(14) fout := fact → Outp  
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(output function – assigns every neuron a real number as its output 
according to Outp) 
(15) extn := Nin → IR     (external input) 
(15.1) netn:= Nout → IR    (network-input) 
(15.2) actn:= Nout → IR    (activation) 
(15.3) outn:= Nout → IR    (output) 
(16) Inp  {0, 0.5, 1}   
(input – Inp→ is a set of the input-vector, whose elements are 
identical with Inp) 
(17) Out  {-1, 0, 1}  
(desired output – Out→ is a set of an output-vector, whose elements 
are identical with Out) 
(18) L  Inp  Out    (a finite non-empty set of Training example) 
(19) Outn  IR   
(actual output, if the neural network is fed with input Inp. Outn
→ is a 
set of an output-vector, whose elements are identical with Outn) 
(20)   ]0, 1[    (learning rate) 
(21) Error := Out OUTn → IR2  
(The Network’s Error mapping in a two-dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system) 
 
  The unifying actual models can be adjusted as follows: 
D VII-7: x is a unifying actual model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two 
layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule for the connectionist 
model (M(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) iff there exist N, Nin, 
Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, , fnet, fact, fout, 
netn, actn, outn, Error such that: 
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(1) x =  N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error   Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + Dr 
for Connectionist)  
(Let x be a potential model of the theory unifying the Rosenblatt 
perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the 
delta rule) 
(2) N = Nin  Nout  
(All neurons are categorized in input neurons or output neurons) 
(3) for all n  N it holds: 
(3.1) Nin(n) ↔ pred(n)  
(input neurons are neurons followed by other neurons in the 
network. They send their output to other neurons) 
(3.2) Nout(n) ↔ succ(n)  
(output neurons are neurons following other neurons in the network. 
They receive their input from other neurons) 
(4) Nin  Nout =   
(There are no neuron playing both roles. There are only either input 
neurons or output neurons) 
(5) C  Nin Nout  
(All network connections are between input neurons and output 
neurons) 
(6) For all njNout, every niNin, cijC for i,jIN, bB so that: 
(6.1) netn = fnet (Inp, W) = i=1
n Inpi (ni, ci,)W(ci)   
(network input of output neurons) 
(6.2) actn = fact (netn, b, w0) according to fact(netn, b, w0)= netn + 
bw0  
(activation function of output neurons) 
(6.3) outn = fout (actn)  
(output of the output neurons)  
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(7) i{1,...,n}: Error= ½ i (Outn – Out)2  and the derivation for each 
neuron's activation: (Outn – Out)    (network error) 
(8) biB, i=1,...,n: bi(new) = bi(old) + bi with bi = – (Outn – Out) 
(updating bias) 
(9) wiW, i=1,...,n: wi(new) = wi(old) + wi with wi = (Outn – Out) 
Inpi      (updating connection weights) 
(10) Convergence-statement:  
Suppose L={(Inp1
→ , Out1),..., (Inpm
→ , Outm)} is a set of training-
sample with  
L0 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =0} and L1 = {(Inp
→, Out)  L| Out =1}. 
If L0 and L1 are linearly separable, viz. if w
→IRn and IR exist so 
that 
 (Inp→, 0) L0:  w
→ Inp→ <  and 
 (Inp→, 1) L1:   w
→ Inp→   
 
 In the final step, the united partial potential models are characterized 
by omitting the T-theoretical elements (see Chapter 3) from the unifying 
potential models as follows: 
DVII-8: y is a unified partial potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron, 
the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule for the 
connectionist model (Mpp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) iff there 
exist x such that: 
(1) x = N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist) 
(2) fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn,  Error are T-theoretical. 
(3) y = N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, 
L  Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) 
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7.3.2. Modification of the Theory-Element of Forced Compliance 
Dissonance for the Connectionist Model 
 The connectionist model attempts to simulate a single case; namely, 
the dissonance arouses by a given punishment if there is a toy to play. This 
case is a case of forced compliance dissonance (DissF), where the 
compliance is given in the form of punishment. We need to make some 
small modifications to the theory-element of the forced compliance 
dissonance (DissF) regarding attitude-object attributions. The first 
modification is that we must differentiate the elements of the set Cognition 
into three subsets, namely, thought, behavior, and emotion, because van 
Overwalle and Jordens follow the view of three components on attitudes 
from Rosenberg and Hovland (1960): cognitions, behaviors, and emotions. 
Instead of using “cognition,” this dissertation uses “thought” in order to 
avoid confusion with its super-set Cognition. The set thought contains 
(cognitions of) objects (such as toy, punishment, etc.), the set behavior 
contains (cognitions of) behaviors (such as play, read, etc.) and the set 
emotion contains (cognition of) emotions (such as happy, sad, etc.). The 
relation between these three new subsets and the set Cognition in the 
Mp(DissF) can be described as follows: 
 thought  Cognition 
 behavior  Cognition 
 emotion  Cognition 
 Forcecom  thought 
 The second modification of Mp(DissF) is defining the set attitude, 
which characterizes the relation between cognition of object and emotion or 
between cognition of object and behavior.  
 attitude  (thought' behavior)  (thought emotion) 
The set of attitudes contains dissonant and consonant relations between 
cognitions.    
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 attitude  Disscog  Conscog 
In the theory-element of the forced compliance dissonance T(DissF) the set 
Forcecom, as a subset of thought, also plays a role in defining the set 
subattitude as a subset of attitude. 
 subattitude  (Forcecom  behavior)  (Forcecom  emotion) 
Through these modifications, the Mp(DissF for Connectionist) can be 
characterized as follows: 
DVII-9: x is a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
(xMp(DissF for Connectionist)) iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, 
thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, 
paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, 
imp, reward such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF 
for Connectionist)  
(Let x be a potential model of the theory of forced compliance 
dissonance for the connectionist model) 
(2) Time is a finite, non-empty set of points of time 
(3) Rawcog is a finite, non-empty set of raw elements of cognition 
(4) Cognition  Rawcog time   (actual elements of cognition) 
(5) thought  Cognition    (cognitions of an object)  
(6) behavior  Cognition   (cognitions of behavior)  
(7) emotion  Cognition   (cognitions of emotion)  
(8) attitude  (thought  behavior)  (thought  emotion)   
(attitudes to object consist of the relation between object and 
behavior or emotion)   
(9) attint: attitude → IR0    (the intensity of attitude) 
(10) Disscog  Cognition  Cognition  
 
174 
 
(dissonant cognitions such that Disscog  attitude) 
(11) Conscog  Cognition  Cognition  
(consonant cognitions such that Conscogattitude) 
(12) Disscog  Conscog =  
(13) pairdiss := Disscog → IR0+    
(dissonance within pairs) 
(14) paircons := Conscog → IR0+    
(consonance within pairs) 
(15) pairimp := (Disscog  Conscog) → IR0+   
(importance of pairs) 
(16) diss := Cognition → IR0+              
(magnitude of dissonance) 
(17) redpress := Cognition → IR0+ 
(dissonance reduction pressure) 
(18) confl(cit) := (cit, ckt)Disscog pairimp(cit, ckt)  
(degree of conflict) 
(19) suppo(cit) := (cit, ckt)Conscog pairimp(cit, ckt)  
(degree of support) 
(20) Forcecom  thought    
(cognitions on counter-attitudinal behavior)  
(21) subattitude  (Forcecom  behavior)  (Forcecom 
 emotion)  (attitude to cognition on counter-attitudinal behavior)  
(22) subattint := subattitude → IR0  
(intensity of attitude to cognition on counter-attitudinal behavior)  
(23) attidiff := Forcecom → IR   (attitudinal difference) 
(24) imp := Cognition → IR0+  (importance of cognition) 
(25) reward := Forcecom → IR0+   
(magnitude of reward or punishment) 
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 With this modification of the potential models of the forced 
compliance dissonance (Mp(DissF)), we also should modify the actual 
models of the forced compliance dissonance M(DissF). 
DVII-10: x is an actual model of the forced compliance dissonance (x  
M(DissF for Connectionist)) iff there exist Time, Rawcog, Cognition, 
thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, 
paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, 
imp, reward such that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF 
for Connectionist) (Let x be a potential model of the theory of forced 
compliance dissonance for the connectionist model) 
(2) attitude = {(cit,cjt)| (citthought  cjtbehavior)  (citthought 
 cjtemotion)} 
(attitude objects are pairs between the thought of objects and the 
behavior to objects or pairs between the thought of objects and the 
emotion to objects) 
(3) Disscog  Conscog  attitude 
(According to the connectionist model: the cognitive dissonance or 
cognitive consonance are about attitude objects) 
(4) For all (cit,cjt), (cku, clu) Disscog: if pairimp (cit,cjt) < 
pairimp(cku,clu), then pairdiss(cit,cjt)<pairdiss(cku, clu)   
(If the importance of the pair cku and clu is greater than the 
importance of the pair cit and cjt, then the dissonance of the pair cku 
and clu is greater than the dissonance of the pair cit and cjt)  
(5) For all (cit, cjt), (cku, clu) Conscog: if pairimp (cit,cjt) < 
pairimp(cku,clu), then paircons(cit,cjt)<paircons(cku, clu) 
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(If the importance of the pair cku and clu is greater than the 
importance of the pair cit and cjt, then the consonance of the pair cku 
and clu is greater than the consonance of the pair cit and cjt)  
(6) For all cit, cju Cognition: if confl(cit)/(confl(cit) + suppo (cit)) < 
confl(cju)/(confl(cju) + suppo (cju)), then diss(cit) < diss(cju). 
(If the proportion between the degree of conflict of cju and the sum 
of the importance of cju is greater than the proportion between the 
degree of conflict of cit and the sum of the importance of cit, then the 
dissonance of cju is greater than the dissonance of cit) 
(7) For all cit, cju  Cognition: If diss(cit) < diss(cju), then 
redpress(cit)<redpress(cju). 
(If the dissonance of cju is greater than the dissonance of cit, then the 
attempt to reduce cju will be greater than the attempt to reduce cit) 
(8) Subattitude := {(cit, cjt)| (cit  Forcecom  cjt  behavior)   (cit 
 Forcecom  cjt  emotion)} 
(According to the connectionist model: the subattitude objects are 
pairs of Forcecom and behavior towards the object or pairs of 
Forcecom and emotion towards the object) 
(9) For all cit , cju  Forcecom: 
ifcp imp(cit)<imp(cju) or reward(cit)>reward(cju),  
thenp diss(cit)< diss(cju).  
(the more important the opinions or the behavior involved and the 
smaller the promised reward or threatened punishment, the greater is 
the magnitude of dissonance created) 
(10) For all cit, cju, cit+, cju+  Forcecom with t<t+, u<u+: 
ifcp 0 < redpress(cit) < redpress(cju) 
thenp 0 > imp(cit+) - imp(cit) > imp(cju+) - imp(cju) 
or 0 < reward(cit+) - reward(cit) < reward(cju+) - reward(cju) 
or 0 > attidiff(cit+) - attidiff(cit) > attidiff(cju+) - attidiff(cju).  
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(Pressure to reduce dissonance may be manifested in reducing the 
importance or value of the behavior and opinion involved, enhancing 
the subjective magnitude of the promised reward or threatened 
punishment, and a change of private opinion following public 
behavior) 
 
 The modification of the potential models of the forced compliance 
dissonance (Mp(DissF)) leads to a modification of the partial potential 
models of the forced compliance dissonance (Mpp(DissF)). The partial 
potential model of the forced compliance dissonance can be defined by 
omitting attint, pairdiss, paircons, diss, redpress, subattint because they are 
the T-theoretical elements (see also Chapter 3) as follows:   
DVII-11: y is a partial potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
for connectionist (y  Mpp(DissF for Connectionist)) iff there exists x such 
that: 
(1) x = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, imp, rewardMp(DissF 
for Connectionist)  
(2) attint, pairdiss, paircons, diss, redpress, subattint are T-theoretical. 
(3) y = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
Disscog, Conscog, pairimp, Forcecom, subattitude, attidiff, imp, 
rewardMpp(DissF for connectionist) 
 
 This T(DissF for Connectionist) can be seen as a kind of 
specialization of both original theories – T(DissB) and T(DissF) – because 
of the additional requirements. Now we can continue with the modeling and 
analysis of intertheoretical relations between the theory-element of the 
forced compliance dissonance (T(DissF for Connectionist)) and the unified 
 
178 
 
theory-element of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward 
neural network, and the delta rule (T(RP+2L-FFNN+DR for Connectionist)) 
on the connectionist model. 
 
7.3.3. Modeling the Intertheoretical Connections between both Theory-
Elements for the Connectionist Model  
  The connectionist simulation uses only four neurons, which are 
divided into two layers. They represent the cognitions considered at the time 
of the simulation. The input neurons represent the thought of a toy and the 
thought of a threat. The presence and importance of a toy are represented by 
an input: no toy = 0 and the presence of toy = 1. The presence and the 
degree of a threat are represented by an input: no threat = 0, mild threat = 
0.5, severe threat =1. The output neurons represent behavior and emotion. 
The first output neuron represents the existence and the kind of behavior: 0 
for not play, 1 for play. The second output neuron represents the emotion: -1 
for unhappy, 0 for no emotion, +1 for happy. The connections between input 
neuron and output neuron represent attitude to the toy (attitude) or attitude 
to threat (subattitude). The connection weight represents the intensity of 
attitude to the toy (attint) or the intensity of attitude to threat (subattint). The 
dissonance is represented by Error in this simulation, which will be reduced 
by applying the delta rule. 
 However, in building the structuralist model of intertheoretical 
relations between the forced compliance dissonance (DissF) and the neural 
network in the connectionist model, more ‘general’ models of such 
intertheoretical connections will be built because this specific case can be 
expanded for a larger number of cognitions. Let us begin with the 
intertheoretical connections between the potential models of the forced 
compliance dissonance for the consonance model (Mp(DissF for 
connectionist)) and the unifying potential models of the Rosenblatt 
perceptron, the two layers feed-forward neural network and the delta rule 
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for the consonance model (Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)), 
which can be defined as follows:  
DVII-12:  is a collection of determining links between Mp(DissF for 
connectionist) and Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist), e1 is an 
echelon set of Mp(DissF for connectionist) and e2 is an echelon set of 
Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist), and E is a set of entailment 
links connecting both echelons sets iff there exists x1, x2 , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 such that: 
(1) x1= Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF 
for Connectionist)  
(Let x1 be a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance 
(Mp(DissF))) 
(2) x2=  N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error   Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist)  
(Let x2 be a potential model of the unified model of the two-layers 
feed-forward neural network, the Rosenblatt's Perceptron, and the 
delta rule for the connectionist model (Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist))) 
(3) 1  Cognition  N  
(1 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set Cognition from Mp(DissF) to the set of neurons (N) 
from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a bijective 
relation) 
(4) 2  thought  Nin  
(2 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set thought from Mp(DissF) to the set of Input Neurons 
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(Nin) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a 
bijective relation) 
(5) 3  Forcecom  Nin  
(3 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set Forcecom from Mp(DissF) to the set of Input 
Neurons (Nin) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and 
a bijective relation) 
(6) 4  behavior  Nout  
(4 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set behavior from Mp(DissF) to the set of Output 
Neurons (Nout) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) 
and a bijective relation) 
(7) 5  emotion  Nout  
(5 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set emotion from Mp(DissF) to the set of Output 
Neurons (Nout) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) 
and a bijective relation) 
(8) 6  attitude  C  
(6 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set attitude from Mp(DissF) to the set of connections 
(C) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a 
bijective relation) 
(9) 7  subattitude  C  
(7 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set subattitude from Mp(DissF) to the set of 
connections (C) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) 
and a bijective relation) 
(10) 8  attint  W  
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(8 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set attint from Mp(DissF) to the set of connection 
weights (W) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a 
bijective relation) 
(11) 9  subattint  W  
(9 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set subattint from Mp(DissF) to the set of connection 
weights (W) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a 
bijective relation) 
(12) 10  imp  Inp  
(10 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set of important of cognition (imp) from Mp(DissF) to 
the set of inputs (Inp) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist) and a bijective relation) 
(13) 11  reward  Inp  
(11 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set Reward from Mp(DissF) to the set of inputs (Inp) 
from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a bijective 
relation)  
(14) 12  behavior  Out  
(12 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set behavior from Mp(DissF) to the set of desired 
outputs (Out) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and 
a bijective relation) 
(15) 13  emotion  Out  
(13 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set emotion from Mp(DissF) to the set of desired 
outputs (Out) from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and 
a bijective relation) 
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(16) 14  diss  Error  
(14 is a determining link – x is (seen to be) identical with y – that 
connects the set of dissonance (diss) from Mp(DissF) to the set Error 
from Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) and a bijective 
relation) 
(17)  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14} 
(Then  is a collection of determining links between T(DissF for 
connectionist) and T(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(18) e1 =  Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, attint, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, diss, imp, reward  echelon set of 
Mp(DissF for Connectionist)  
(e1 is an echelon set of Mp(DissF for connectionist)) 
(19) e2 =  N, Nin, Nout, C, W, Inp, Out, Error   echelon set of 
Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)  
(e2 is an echelon set of Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist))  
(20) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14}  
(E is a set of entailment links between e1 and e2) 
 
The interpreting links in the level of the partial potential models are 
characterized in order to determine the local empirical claims and the 
intended applications. Based on D VIII-7 and VIII-8 in BMS, pp. 398–400 
the interpreting links for the reduction of DissF for connectionist by RP + 
2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist can be determined as follows: 
DVII-13: E*(DissF) = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 l6, l7, l8, l9, l10, l11, l12, l13, l14} is a 
collection of interpreting links, where T(DissF for Connectionist) is 
interpreted by T(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) in the 
connectionist model iff there exist x1, x2, e1, e2, y1, f1 such that: 
(1) x1= Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
attint, Disscog, Conscog, pairdiss, paircons, pairimp, diss, redpress, 
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Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, attidiff, imp, reward  Mp(DissF 
for Connectionist)  
(x1 is a potential model of the forced compliance dissonance for the 
connectionist (Mp(DissF for Connectionist))) 
(2) x2= N, Nin, Nout, IN, IR, C, pred(n), succ(n), W, B, W0, Inp, Out, L, 
, fnet, fact, fout, netn, actn, outn, Error  Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist)  
(x2 is a potential model of the unified Perceptron, 2-layers feed 
forward neural network, and delta-rule (Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist))) 
(3) e1 = Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, attint, 
Forcecom, subattitude, subattint, diss, imp, reward  echelon set of 
Mp(DissF for Connectionist)  
(e1 is an echelon set of Mp(DissF for Connectionist)) 
(4) e2 = N, Nin, Nout, C, W, Inp, Out, Error  echelon set of Mp(RP + 
2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)  
(e2 is an echelon set of Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist))  
(5) E = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14}  
(E is a set of entailment links between e1 and e2) 
(6) y1 = Time, Rawcog, Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
Disscog, Conscog, pairimp, Forcecom, subattitude, attidiff, imp, 
reward  Mpp(DissF for connectionist)  
(y1 is the partial potential model of the forced compliance 
dissonance for connectionist (Mpp(DissF for Connectionist))) 
(7) E*(DissF) = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5 l6, l7, l8, l9, l10, l11, l12, l13, l14}  the set of 
interpreting links,where {li = x’,y| x’Mp(T’), yMpp*(T) and 
there is xMp(T) such that x’,x(T’, T) and r*(x)=y}  
(E*(DissF for Connectionist) is the collection of interpreting links) 
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(8) l1 = {nj, cognitioni| N(nj)  Cognition (cognitioni) → R(nj, 
cognitioni)} (R(x,y) = x interprets y, and R is bijective)  
(l1 is the interpreting link, that interprets each cognition in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by a neuron in RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR for Connectionist. In the simulation there are 4 neurons – 2 input 
neurons and 2 output neurons – represent toy, threat, play and happy. 
The Cognition here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas N is an 
element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(9) l2 = {nin(j), thoui| Nin(nin(j))  thought(thoui) → R(nin(j), thoui)} 
(l2 is the interpreting link, that interprets each thought in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by an input neuron in RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist. In the simulation nin(1) = toy. The 
thought here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas Nin is an element 
of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(10) l3 = {nin(j), forcecomi| Nin (nin(j))  Forcecom(forcecomi) → 
R(nin(j), forcecomi)}  
(l3 is the interpreting link, that interprets each forcecom in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by an input neuron in RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist. In the simulation nin(2) = threat. The 
Forcecom here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas Nin is an 
element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(11) l4 ={nout(j), behavi| Nout(nout(j))  behavior(behavi) → R(nout(j), 
behavi)}  
(l4 is the interpreting link, that interprets each behavior in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by output neurons in RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist. In the simulation nout(1) = play. The 
behavior here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas Nout is an 
element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
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(12) l5 = {nout(j), emoi| Nout (nout(j))  emotion(emoi) → R(nout(j), 
emoi)}  
(l5 is the interpreting link, that interprets each emotion in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by output neurons in RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist. In the simulation nout(2) = happy. The 
emotion here is an element of Mpp(DissF), whereas Nout is an 
element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(13) l6 = {cj, atti| C(cj)  attitude(atti) → R( cj, atti)}  
(l6 is the interpreting link, that interprets attitude in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by an inter-neuronal connection in 
RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist. The attitude here is an 
element of Mpp(DissF), whereas C is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(14) l7 = {cj, subatti| C(cj)  subattitude(subatti) → R( cj, subatti)} 
(l7 is the interpreting link, that interprets subattitude in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by an inter-neuronal connection in 
RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist. The subattitude here is an 
element of Mpp(DissF), whereas C is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(15) l8 = {wj, attii| W(wj)  attint(attii) → R(wj, attii)}  
(l8 is the interpreting link, that interprets attint in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by connection weights in RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist. The attint here is an element of 
Mpp(DissF), whereas W is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist)) 
(16) l9 = {wj, subattii| W(wj)  subattint(subattii) → R(wj, 
subattii)}  
(l9 is the interpreting link, that interprets subattint in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by connection weights in RP + 2L-
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FFNN + DR for Connectionist. The subattint here is an element of 
Mpp(DissF), whereas W is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR 
for Connectionist)) 
(17) l10 = {inpj, impi| Inp(inpj)  imp(impi) → R(inpj, impi)}  
(l10 is the interpreting link, that interprets imp in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by the input in RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR for Connectionist. In the simulation the possibilities are {(not 
present, 0), (present, 1)}. The imp here is an element of Mpp(DissF), 
whereas Inp is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist)) 
(18) l11 = {inpj, rewi| Inp(inpj)  reward(rewi) → R(inpj, rewi)} 
(l11 is the interpreting link, that interprets reward in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by the input in RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR for Connectionist. In the simulation the possibilities are {(not 
present, 0), (mild, 0.5), (severe, 1)}. The Reward here is an element 
of Mpp(DissF), whereas Inp is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR for Connectionist)) 
(19) l12 = {outj, behavi| Out (outj)  behavior(behavi) → R(outj, 
behavi)}  
(l12 is the interpreting link, that interprets behavior in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by the output in RP + 2L-FFNN + 
DR for Connectionist.  In the simulation, the possibilities are {(not 
play, 0), (play, 1)}. The behavior here is an element of Mpp(DissF), 
whereas Out is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist)) 
(20) l13 = {outj, emoi| Out(outj)  emotion(emoi) → R(outj, 
emoi)}  
(l13 is the interpreting link, that interprets emotion in DissF for 
Connectionist being represented by the output in RP + 2L-FFNN + 
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DR for Connectionist.  In the simulation the possibilities are 
{(unhappy, -1), (neutral, 0), (happy, 1)}. The emotion here is an 
element of Mpp(DissF), whereas Out is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist)) 
(21) l14 = {errori, dissi| Error(errorj)  diss(dissi) → R (errorj, 
dissi)}  
(l14 is the interpreting link, that interprets dissonance in DissF for 
Connectionist represented by the Error in RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist. The dissonance here is an element of Mpp(DissF), 
whereas Error is an element of Mp( RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist)) 
(22) f1 = Cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, 
Forcecom, subattitude, imp, reward  an echelon subset of 
Mpp(DissF) by applying function r*: e1 → f1, that mapping 
E*(DIssF) from  Mp (DissF) to Mpp(DissF)  
(f1 is an echelon subset of Mpp(DissF) with respect to E*(DissF)) 
 
 Based on D VIII-9 and DVIII-10 in BMS the f1 can be determined as 
the set of empirical claims of the intertheoretical reduction of the theory of 
forced compliance dissonance by RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist. 
The empirical claims of this intertheoretical reduction refer to the sets 
cognition, thought, behavior, emotion, attitude, attint, Forcecom, 
subattitude, imp, Reward in the partial potential models of the forced 
compliance dissonance for connectionist. They are the specialization of the 
original forced compliance dissonance by adding new categories in the 
concept of cognition and the relation between them. The interpreting links 
E*(DissF for Connectionist) interpret these concepts being represented by 
some concepts from RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist.  
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A Summary of this Chapter. A structuralist model of the 
intertheoretical connections between the adapted forced compliance 
dissonance (DissF for connectionist) and the adapted two-layers feed-
forward perceptrons with the delta rule for the connectionist model (RP + 
2L-FFNN + DR for Connectionist) was built. In this intertheoretical 
reduction, only the echelon partial subset of Mp(DissF for connectionist) is 
connected to the echelon partial subset of Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist). Our model can be presented in Figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3. A structuralist modeling of intertheoretical reduction between the 
adapted forced compliance dissonance (DissF for connectionist) and the adapted 
two-layers feed-forward neural network for the connectionist model (RP + 2L-
FFNN + DR for Connectionist). e(DissF for connectionist) is the echelon partial 
subset of Mp(DissF for Connectionist) and e(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist) is the echelon partial subset of Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist). Both are connected by a set of entailment Links (E). The 
interpreting links with local at DissF for connectionist (E*(DissF for 
Connectionist)) connect the set of empirical claim of this intertheoretical reduction 
at DissB and the echelon partial subset of Mp(RP + 2L-FFNN + DR for 
Connectionist) as the reducing theory. 
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In the first part of this chapter it has been discussed about the so-
called V-pattern. Now, having discussed the intertheoretical connections, we 
want to look back to the notion of V-pattern and how it works in the 
interdisciplinary context – especially if the relations between theories in the 
disciplines involved are very complex or contain the V-pattern too. The case 
of the connectionist model is interesting because both combined theories 
have a kind of V-pattern. In this model, both V-patterns are connected by a 
link with one of them serving as the mainboard theory. We are dealing with 
a multi-level V-pattern, which can be depicted in graph theory as follows: 
 
Figure 7.4. The pattern of intertheoretical relations between the adapted theory of 
forced compliance dissonance and the adapted unifying theory of the perceptron, 
the two-layers feed-forward neural network and the delta-rule for connectionist  
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Chapter 8 
The Contribution of This Research for Philosophy of Science, 
Cognitive Science, and Interdisciplinary Practices 
 
 
 This chapter will discuss the significance of this research for the 
relevant scientific fields, namely the philosophy of science, cognitive 
science, and interdisciplinary practices. In the philosophy of science, this 
research contributes with further development of the structuralist theory of 
science not only as a first implementation of this theory in modeling the 
intertheoretical connections in interdisciplinary fields, and not only in the 
adjustment of the definition of specialization provided in Chapter 4 but also 
in the formulation of a new specialization of the notion of a theory-holon 
related to the combination of theories in scientific practices that will be the 
first topic in this chapter. The second topic in this chapter will be a 
comparison between the results of modeling intertheoretical reduction as 
having been done in the last three chapters with the generalized Nagel-
Schaffner approach. This chapter will also discuss the idea of the unity of 
science and show how a program for the unity of science is possible. For 
cognitive science and other interdisciplinary practices, this dissertation is 
the first attempt at modeling and analyzing intertheoretical connections 
between theories from various disciplines by implementing formal methods 
to show how a successful intertheoretical combination works logically.  
 
8.1. A Further Development in the Structuralist Theory of Science 
 The modeling of intertheoretical connections in the last three 
chapters shows the usefulness of the structuralist theory of science in 
mapping the intertheoretical connections between two or more theories 
within one single discipline or between various disciplines. The structuralist 
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theory of science cannot only be used to model the intertheoretical relations 
between the concepts of the theories but also the modifications needed such 
that the connected theories work as expected (planned). By these models, 
we can discover a new pattern of connections, a strategy to connect or 
combine several theories, and a recipe to build a more complex model or 
theory, and new association links.   
 
8.1.1. The V-Pattern of Intertheoretical Connections and A Strategy to 
Build A More Complex Model by Unifying Several Theories 
 Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed have discussed several types of 
intertheoretical connections and formulated their formal definitions. This 
dissertation is an attempt to implement those definitions to build and 
analyze several real cases of intertheoretical connections in interdisciplinary 
fields, especially in cognitive science. This attempt provides a chance to 
learn more about the intertheoretical connections – and admittedly, there 
will be more to learn in the future. In Chapter 5, an intertheoretical relation 
between the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance and the computational 
neuroscientific theory has been modeled and analyzed concerning the 
interdisciplinary research on the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
conducted by van Veen et al. (2009). This modeling and analysis specify in a 
formal way how the concepts of both theories connect and how to formulate 
the local intended applications or empirical claims of the connections, which 
shows how far the connected theories can explain their intended 
phenomena. However, this modeling is the simplest of our models.   
In Chapters 6 and 7 author attempts to model and analyze more 
detailed and more complicated intertheoretical connections, namely 
intertheoretical connections between two or more theories in a simulation. A 
simulation is not as simple as an explanation because a simulation must add 
several additional requirements to mimic the simulated phenomena. It is a 
fact that the original form of the theories involved is not (always) ready for 
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such an intended application. In Chapter 6, the Hopfield model of the 
recurrent neural network is not ready for cognitive dissonance simulation. It 
needs some modifications or adjustments to build a simulation according to 
the consonance model. The result of such change is seen as a specialization 
of the original theory. The connectionist simulation gives the same or even a 
more complicated situation in Chapter 7. Not only some adjustments are 
needed, but also a combination of several theory-elements at once, namely 
the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and 
the delta rule, to build a new theoretical unity.  
Before continuing the discussion about the combination of the three 
theories, it is necessary to explain why the presentation is made complicated 
by seeing them as three theories. The Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers 
feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule usually are applied together 
in data science and machine learning. Some readers may think that they can 
be seen simply as one model, and it is not necessary to discuss a 
combination of theories and their intertheoretical connections. However, 
such an opinion oversimplifies the real conceptual and methodological 
situation. Such oversimplification makes some interesting and important 
points stayed unclear. In this work, they are seen as three independent 
theories, and three theory-elements are modeled for several reasons. First, 
these theories are indeed three conceptually and methodologically different 
theories. In machine learning or data science, people often replace one of 
these theories with another model or theory. A very common example is that 
people replace the two-layers feed-forward neural network with a multi-
layers feed-forward neural network, but still use the perceptron and the delta 
rule as its learning rule. They place perceptrons in some additional layers 
between the input layer and the output layer, and they use the delta rule to 
train the multi-layers perceptrons (MLP). Second, it leads to the importance 
of research on intertheoretical connections in general. Notably, this topic is 
relatively rarely discussed in comparison to the topic of reduction or unity 
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of science, although there are many types of intertheoretical connections 
that can be explored and used in scientific practice. Third, it points out the 
importance of modeling and analyzing intertheoretical connections for 
modeling complex phenomena. Modeling and analyzing intertheoretical 
connection can be beneficial not only to evaluate our steps in combining and 
adjusting the theories implemented but also to formulate a general strategy 
to build a more complex theory or model to explain complex phenomena, 
especially in our interdisciplinary age.   
 Inspired by the idea of the local empirical claim of the theory-holon 
to interpret the model of intertheoretical connections in Chapter 5, a special 
pattern for combining scientific theories, called “V-pattern,” has been 
discovered. This name is used because of its graphic representation when 
determining the local empirical claims or intended applications. And this 
section will characterize the definition of the V-pattern and explain a 
strategy to implement it. The V-pattern has the following main features: (1) 
There exists a theory-element T0 that serves as the mainboard theory of the 
V-pattern of intertheoretical relations. The mainboard theory is a theory to 
which all other theories are being connected in this pattern. The mainboard 
theory represents a basic model of phenomena that we want to explain 
through our set of theories in a holon. (2) T1, ..., Tn are the connected 
theories that can be connected one by one to the T0 with an intertheoretical 
connection. These connected theories enrich the basic model represented by 
the T0 to deliver a more holistic explanation or application. These features 
can be formally defined as follows:  
D VIII-1: v is a V-pattern of an intertheoretical relation iff there exist T0, H, 
and  such that: 
(1) v = T0, H,    V 
(2) T0 is the main board theory-element. 
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(3) H is a set of connected theory-elements to T0, where H has at least 
one element.   
(4)  is a non-empty set of intertheoretical connections (links).  
(5) For T0 there are T1, T2, …, Tn H such that: (T1 1 T0)  (T2 2 T0) 
… (Tn n T0), where i  . 
Besides the two main features above, other features can also be described as 
follows: First, the intertheoretical connections on the class of the potential 
models can be modeled as the dyadic relations between concepts of the 
mainboard theory and concepts of additional theory(es) by using the 
determining links that represent a relation “x is identical with y” unless a 
certain specific relation defined. The type of intertheoretical connection 
used here is exclusively the determining link because in combining theories, 
it is about connections between concepts. Second, the intended application 
of the V-pattern of intertheoretical relations is local on the mainboard theory 
T0. Since the V-pattern is a pattern for theory-holon, the intended 
applications are local. In the V-pattern the local intended applications are 
placed on the mainboard theory T0, whose T0-non-theoretical concepts are 
being interpreted by other concepts of other connected theories T1, T2, …, 
Tn through interpreting links. This relation can be described in a directed 
acyclic graph as follows:  
 
Figure 8.1. The directed acyclic graph of the V-pattern of intertheoretical relation 
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 This V-pattern is a kind of specialization of the general pattern of 
connected theory-holon as characterized in BMS as D VIII-1. The V-
pattern, as a specialization of theory-holon, can be defined as follows: 
D VIII-2: H is a V-pattern in a theory-holon iff there exist N0, N, and 
 such that H = N0 N,  and: 
(1) N0 and N are non-empty sets of theory-elements. N0 is the theory-net 
that contains the mainboard theory (T0N0), and N is the set of 
theory-nets that contain theory-elements connected to the mainboard 
theory.  
(2) : N0N → {Po(Mp(T0)  Mp(T))/T0N0 ,TN} is a partial 
function.  
(3) For all T, there exists T0: Let T0, TDom(), then (T0, T) 
Mp(T0)Mp(T).  
(4) If N contains more than one element, then there is T0N0, and there 
is TN, such that T0, TDom() or T, T0Dom ().  
(5) For all T0N0, T1, T2 N: Let T0, T1Dom () and T0, T2Dom 
(), then T1, T2Dom (). 
 
 The V-pattern serves as a tool for helping to build a (more) complex 
combined theory for explaining and modeling a complex phenomenon or for 
creating a complex implementation or application. This tool is formulated 
because scientific theories typically have two features that make it difficult 
to make a comprehensive application. One of the features of scientific 
theories is that a theory must be general enough – a scientific theory does 
not model a specific or single phenomenon, but general phenomena. For 
example, the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance explains not only 
dissonance reduction of one person but also similar processes of many (if 
not all) persons. Because of this kind of generalization, a scientific theory 
explains certain phenomena only as far as some aspects are concerned. 
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Because of these two features, building a comprehensive explanation, 
model, application, or implementation of a theory of a particularly complex 
phenomenon needs some modification and combination of some given 
scientific theories. Chapters 6 and 7 show that building a simulation requires 
some adjustments to the theories from both disciplines.   
 For such purposes, the V-pattern can be implemented through the 
following strategy: (1) We choose a theory about complex phenomena as a 
mainboard theory. Some considerations for choosing the mainboard theory 
are as follows: (a) Choose a theory from a discipline explaining the 
phenomena on which the research focuses. In Chapter 7, the connectionist 
model focus on the simulation of dissonance reduction. Therefore, the 
mainboard theory for this combination is the Festinger theory. (b) It would 
be better if the chosen theory contains most of the concepts we need. The 
local intended application will be focused on the mainboard theory. (2) We 
connect other theory-elements to the mainboard theory-element. Through 
both steps, we will get a schema similar to Figure 8.1. (3) We unite the 
theories into one single new theory by the following procedure. (a) By 
combining all the potential models of all theories to be the single unified 
potential models. (b) By reducing the elements of the unifying potential 
models by omitting the superfluous or redundant concepts and by 
transferring all the relations and functions of the omitted elements to the rest 
identical concepts. (4) There is also the possibility of combining several V-
patterns to building a more complex model by following the steps one 
through three and placing the mainboard theory containing fewer concepts 
in level one and connecting it to the mainboard theory-element containing 
more concepts. The pattern can be described as follows:  
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Figure 8.2. The Directed Acyclic Graph of the Combined V-Patterns of 
Intertheoretical Relation; T2 Is the Other Main Board Theory-Element, to Which 
the T'1, T'2, …, T'n Are Connected. T0 Is More General than T2. Therefore, We 
Have to Put T0 in the Level 0 and T2 in the Level 1 Connected to some Term(s) of 
T0. 
 
8.1.2. The Unifying Theory-Element 
 In Chapter 7, a new kind of theory-element is introduced, a 
combination of several theory-elements into one single theory-element. This 
model simplifies the model of intertheoretical connections and unifies 
several connected theories or models to build a more complex theory or 
model. This new kind of theory-element will be called as unifying theory-
element.   
 A unifying theory-element is essentially a unification of several 
combined theories, where some or all concepts are connected through a 
bijective relation “x is identical with y.” For unifying those theories, the 
dyadic intertheoretical connections are sufficient by implementing of the V-
pattern and following the strategy laid out in section 8.1.1 above. The 
unifying theory-element can be characterized as follows:  
D VIII-3 : TU = MpU, MU, MppU, U, E*u is the unifying theory-element 
between T0, T1, …, Tn iff there exist T0 = Mp0, M0, Mpp0, E*0, T1 = Mp1, 
M1, Mpp1, …, Tn = Mpn, Mn, Mppn 1 2  n , l1, l2, …, ln such that: 
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(1) MpU := Mp0  Mp1  …  Mpn  
(MpU is the set of potential models of the new unifying theory-
element (TU)) 
(2) MU := M0  M1  …  Mn  
(MU is the set of actual models of the new unifying theory-element 
(TU)) 
(3) MppU := r°(MpU), where r° is a function that project MpU to MppU  
(MppU is the partial potential models of the new unifying theory-
element (TU)) 
(4) U := 1  2  …  n, where: 
1) 1  Mp0' Mp1 
2) 2  Mp0' Mp2 
…) ... 
n) n  Mp0  Mpn  
(U is the set of the unifying intertheoretical connections (links) that 
connect Mp0 to Mpi, and i = 1, 2, ... n, where: 
1)  is the set of unifying intertheoretical connections (links) that 
connect Mp0 to Mp1 
2) 2 is the set of unifying intertheoretical connections (links) that 
connect Mp0 to Mp2 
… 
n) n is the set of unifying intertheoretical connections (links) that 
connect Mp0 to Mpn) 
(5) E*U = E*0 :=  l1  l2  …  ln, where: 
1) l1 = {x1, y0 | x1Mp
1  y0Mpp
0  x0Mp
0 → x1,x0(T1, T0) 
and r*(x0)=y0 } 
2) l2 = {x2, y0 | x2Mp
2  y0Mpp
0  x0Mp
0 → x2,x0(T2, T0) 
and r*(x0)=y0 } 
…) … 
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n) ln = {xn, y0 | xnMp
n  y0Mpp
0  x0Mp
0 → xn,x0(Tn, T0) 
and r*(x0)=y0 } 
(E*U is the set of interpreting links that connect Mpp0 to Mpi, such 
that Mpi is interpreting Mpp0, and i = 1, 2, ... n, where:  
1) l1 is the set of interpreting links that connect Mp1 to Mpp0, where 
T1 interprets T0. 
2) l2 is the set of interpreting links that connect Mp2 to Mpp0, where 
T2 interprets T0. 
… 
n) ln is the set of interpreting links that connect Mpn to Mpp0, where 
Tn interprets T0) 
 
 The intuitive idea behind this definition is as follows: Suppose there 
are several theory-elements to combine. The unifying intertheoretical 
connections implemented here between them are dyadic relations that 
connect the mainboard theory element (T0) and the other theory-elements 
(T1, …, Tn). Because the theory-elements we want to combine are different, 
the potential models of each theory-element are also different. Because of 
this fact, the unifying intertheoretical connections between two theory-
elements are a set of determining links. Like the other kinds of 
intertheoretical connections in the structuralist theory of science, the 
unifying intertheoretical connections are also the relations between the 
potential models of both combined theories. Based on these considerations, 
the MpU can be built by unifying the Mp of the combined theory-elements. 
This new unifying theory-element will also contain all law-statements of the 
combined theory-elements. Therefore, the actual models for the unifying 
theory-element (MU(TU)) are defined as the unification of the actual models 
(M) of the connected theory-elements. The set of unifying intertheoretical 
connections () connects the elements of all Mp of the connected theory-
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elements. The partial potential models of the unifying theory-element 
(MppU(TU)) can also be characterized by implementing the function r° that 
maps the MpU to MppU by omitting the T-theoretical elements of MpU.  
 
8.2. Philosophy of Science in General  
 There are two major issues in the philosophy of science in general to 
which our modeling has relevance. The first one is the issue of 
intertheoretical reduction, which dominates the discussion about the relation 
between theories in the philosophy of science today. Another issue in the 
philosophy of science that is relevant to the results of this work is the issue 
of the unity of science.   
 
8.2.1. Intertheoretical Reduction 
One of the most influential theories of intertheoretical reduction is 
the generalized Nagel-Schaffner (GNF) theory of intertheoretical reduction. 
This theory is an improvement on the original version of Nagel’s theory of 
reduction. The basic idea of Nagel’s original account of reduction is 
relatively simple. A theory TP reduces to another theory TF iff the laws of TP 
can be deduced from the laws of TF and some auxiliary assumptions. The 
auxiliary assumptions are typically idealizations and boundary conditions. 
Nagel considers two formal conditions for reduction concerning the formal 
nature of theories. The two conditions for successful reduction are 
connectability and derivability. The condition of connectability requires that 
for every theoretical term in TP there is a theoretical term in TF 
corresponding to it. The condition of derivability says that if connectability 
is satisfied, the laws of TP can be derived from the laws of TF plus auxiliary 
assumptions. For Nagel, there are also two kinds of reduction, namely 
homogeneous reduction and heterogeneous reduction. In the homogeneous 
reduction, both theories share the same relevant predicates. Therefore, the 
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connectability requirement is trivially satisfied. Whereas in heterogeneous 
reduction, the relevant terms of both theories are not the same.  
The case of intertheoretical reduction in interdisciplinary fields is the 
heterogeneous reduction and is rarely a homogeneous one. Firstly, it is 
obvious in our cases because we model the intertheoretical reduction, which 
connects some psychological concepts to some biological entities or 
mathematical entities. The theories do not share the same relevant terms. 
Secondly, although our theories sometimes use the same words, they have 
different basic concepts or relations defined according to their disciplines. 
For example, let’s examine the word “neuron” being used in both 
neuroscience and artificial neural networks. The meaning of neurons in both 
fields is very different. In neuroscience, the term ‘neuron’ refers to cells in 
the brain and the nervous system of living creatures, whereas the term 
‘neuron’ in artificial neural network refers to an abstract mathematical 
model of a neuron written in a computer program.  
Because of the heterogeneous reduction, the relevant terms of 
connected theories are not the same. It is impossible to derive the laws of TP 
from TF directly. For making the reduction possible, bridge laws are needed 
to connect the vocabulary of TP and TF by providing ‘rules of translation.’ 
The obvious difficulty for this original model is the exact derivability, 
because it is impossible to derive the exact laws of TP from TF. To solve this 
problem, Kenneth F. Schaffner makes a revision that is called Generalized 
Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model of reduction. The Schaffner proposal can be 
briefly formulated as follows: “TF reduces TP iff there is a corrected version 
TP* of TP such that, (a) TP* is derivable from TF given that the terms of TP* 
are associated via bridge laws with terms of TF, and (b) the relation between 
TP* and TP is one of, at least, strong analogy (sometimes also ‘approximate 
equality’, ‘close agreement’, or ‘good approximation’)” (Dizadji-Bahmani, 
F., Frigg, R., and Hartmann S., 2011, p. 398). The abbreviation DFH in this 
dissertation stands for Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R., and Hartmann S. The 
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derivation of TP* can be done in two steps, namely: (a) deriving a special 
version of TF, called TF*, by introducing auxiliary assumptions, and (b) 
replacing the relevant terms by their 'correspondents' using bridge laws to 
produce TP* (DFH, 2011, p. 398). In this revised version bridge laws are 
crucial to this picture of reduction because “reduction is the deductive 
subsumption of a corrected version of TP under TF, where the deduction 
involves first deriving a restricted version, TF*, of the reducing theory by 
introducing boundary conditions and auxiliary assumptions and then using 
bridge laws to obtain TP* from TF*”. (DFH, S. 2011, p. 399) Also, this 
model can be represented as follows:  
 
Figure 8.3. The generalized Nagel-Schaffner model of reduction (Source: DFH, S. 
2011, p. 399) 
 
 DFH proposes several other improvements in their paper Who’s 
afraid of Nagelian Reduction? as follows: (a) The first revision is about the 
status of bridge laws. According to DFH, p. 404, bridge laws cannot just be 
a mere convention but must be factual claims. There are two different kinds 
of bridge laws: The first kind is bridge laws that associate basic entities of 
TP and TF with each other. This kind is called entity association laws. The 
second kind is called property association laws. “They assert that the TP-
properties of a system stand in a relevant relation to the TF-properties of that 
system, and the magnitudes of these properties stand in a relevant functional 
relationship” (DFH, p. 404). (b) The second revision is about the meaning or 
interest of reduction in the discussion about multiple realizations, which is a 
hot topic in the interdisciplinary context. Multiple realizations, it is said, 
undercut the explanatory power of reductions. Reductions are desirable for 
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two reasons: consistency and confirmation. Establishing a reductive relation 
between TF and TP ensures the consistency and co-tenability of both 
accounts. If we have two theories whose target domains are identical (or 
have significant overlap), we would expect evidence confirming one theory 
would also confirm the other theory. It can only happen if the two theories 
are connected, for example, in the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics. (c) The third revision is about two additional requirements for 
auxiliary assumptions: The first is the condition of non-redundancy, i.e., TF 
must be used in the deduction of TP*; that is, TP* must not follow from the 
auxiliary assumptions alone.  The second is the condition of immanence. 
The auxiliary assumptions must belong to the paradigm of TF; i.e., auxiliary 
assumptions cannot be foreign to TF’s conceptual apparatus. (d) The fourth 
revision is an additional condition for TP* beside the five conditions 
formulated in Schaffner, 1967, p. 144: DFH, 2011 requires that TP* must 
share with TP all essential terms. 
 On the other hand, Van Riel proposed another revision of the current 
interpretation of Nagel’s model of reduction, the official Nagelian model. 
According to Van Riel, the official Nagelian model has a tendency1 to have 
less to do with observations. This tendency leads to some formal worries: “if 
reduction is a derivation plus (sometimes) bridge laws, then any theory 
would reduce to itself …; moreover, any theory would reduce to any 
inconsistent theory, and contrary to what one might expect, reduction is not 
an asymmetric relation” (van Riel, 2011, p. 354). In his reinterpretation, van 
Riel emphasizes ontological aspects of reduction – not only epistemological 
aspects. There are five points regarded as the main features of the “real 
 
1 I employ here the word “tendency,” because I do not think that all current thinkers 
despise the ontological or observational aspects of Nagel's model of reduction. For 
example, that DFH do not despise the observational aspects of Nagelian reduction. In 
the 2011 paper, their concern is to answer epistemologically the objections against 
especially Nagel's model of reduction and generally the idea of reduction, and they also 
attempt to correlate the phenomena explained by TF and TP to constructed TF* and TP* 
via Bayes’ theorem.   
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Nagel model” in his reinterpretation, namely: “(1) Reduction is a relation 
holding among a great variety of scientific representational devices, among 
which theories play an important epistemological role. (2) Interesting 
reductions are explanations that consist in deductions that are carried out 
with the help of bridge laws, and they have to obey (some of) the relevant 
non-formal criteria (unification, appropriateness of reducing theory and 
bridge laws, and, if possible, correction should be involved in reduction). (3) 
Bridge laws are to be regarded as stating ontological links (identities or 
relations among extensions) in a posteriori. (4) The reduction is not direct 
(in the sense that it is not a case of theory explanation) – it goes together 
with explanations of the phenomena of the reduced theory by the reducing 
theory. (5) The Nagel’s model is not a [mere] epistemological model of 
reduction” (van Riel, 2011, p. 371-2).   
 This GNS model of intertheoretical reduction with these 
improvements is very different from the structuralist model used here. 
However, we can still discuss how both models explain the phenomena of 
intertheoretical reduction in their own ways. Here I will discuss three points 
regarding this topic: The first point is the main differences between the 
structuralist theory of science and the GNS model. The second point is the 
difference in building the model of intertheoretical reduction. This point is 
related to the main GNS model of intertheoretical reduction. The third point 
is about the difference between the structuralist models and the GNS model 
related to the claim that the model must capture how the intertheoretical 
reduction should be related to observations. This last point is the main topic 
of all revisions of the GNS model above.  
 
8.2.1.1. The Main Differences Between the GNS Model and the 
Structuralist Model 
 The main difference lies in the structuralist requirement that the 
scientific theories in question must be modeled in set theory to model their 
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inner logical structure. To build the model of a theory, we form the class of 
potential models Mp of the theories on the T-theoretical level and the class 
of partial potential model (Mpp) on the T-non-theoretical level. An 
intertheoretical connection as a bridge between theories is a relationship 
between terms in Mp of the connected theories. This approach requires more 
complicated modeling than the GNS model but, at the same time, provides a 
more detailed and precise analysis. The differentiation between the T-
theoretical level and the T-non-theoretical level in the structuralist model 
points out the form of the empirical claims (and intended applications) of 
the connected theories. It enables us to characterize the scope of the 
intertheoretical connections precisely, which represents the empirical objects 
or the concepts from other theory-elements. By characterizing the actual 
models of related theories, we can also characterize what kind of 
intertheoretical connections are there and how they connect the law or law-
like statements of both theories. The second main difference is that, 
according to the structuralists, the intertheoretical reduction is more 
epistemological than ontological, although it should have some empirical 
basis – characterized by the partial potential models. It is related more to the 
structure of theories, rather than to reality itself. Finally, the third main 
difference is that, in the structuralist theory of science, the intertheoretical 
reduction is just one among several other intertheoretical connections 
(links), and the structuralists have already characterized some of them 
formally.  
 
8.2.1.2. There Is No Generalized Structuralist Model of the 
Intertheoretical Reduction as Such 
 Whereas the main differences between the structuralist model and 
the GNS model can be found just by theoretically comparing both 
approaches, this dissertation exposes further differences by implementing 
the structuralist theory of science to model some intertheoretical 
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connections in some real areas of research in cognitive science. By 
modeling some of them, this dissertation uncovers a further difference 
between the structuralist model of intertheoretical reduction and the GNS 
model; namely, there is no such generalized model of intertheoretical 
reduction for the structuralists. Structuralists have characterized a formal 
definition of how a scientific theory can be reduced to another theory, but 
the structuralists have no intention of formalizing a general pattern of 
reduction for scientific practices. It is so because as we have seen in the 
previous chapters, the patterns of intertheoretical reduction can differ 
depending on the purposes and levels of explanation scientists have set for 
their research. In Chapters 5–7, three patterns of an intertheoretical 
reduction have been laid out – there could exist more. Chapter 5 lays out a 
model of intertheoretical reduction without modifications. A model of 
intertheoretical reduction with some modifications has been discussed in 
Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents a model of reduction with a combination of 
several theories and modifications of previous theories.   
 A Reduction Model Without Modifications. The reduction model 
without modifications in Chapter 5 is exemplified by the intertheoretical 
reduction between the theory of forced compliance dissonance (DissF) as 
the reduced theory and the computational neuroscientific theory (CNT) as 
the reducing theory placed in the context of van Veen et al. 's research. In 
this case, CNT can immediately reduce DissF based on the assumption of 
the connection itself that on the brain’s level the reducing dissonance 
between cognitions is in the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) 
represented by the communication network of neurons, which involve the 
neurons’ activation and the connection’s weight. We do not need to modify 
either CNT or DissF to any other theories before we build an intertheoretical 
reduction bridge/link between the concepts of both theories. The connected 
concepts of both theories as being modeled in the theory-elements T(DissF) 
and T(CNT) can be seen in Table 8.1.  
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In this case, the intertheoretical reduction brings us relatively little 
explanatory power about the cognitive (dissonance) processes and their 
relationship with the neural network in the human brain based on such 
common assumptions. The reduction delivers nothing more than a 
confirmation that cognitive dissonance processes are connected to neurons' 
activities in the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) of the brain; that 
is, there is high activity of neurons in the dissonance case and low activity 
of neurons in the non-dissonance cases. However, we cannot know, which 
neurons from the set of neurons of dACC can be connected to which 
cognition or cognition processes that have been observed. From the 
empirical result of the observation done by van Veen et al. by fMRI we can 
just confirm that such a dissonance reduction process happens and the 
intertheoretical reduction works.  
 A Reduction Model with Modifications. The second case and the 
third case are cases of reduction of the psychological theory to the artificial 
neural network in some simulations. By such simulations, cognitive 
scientists hope to understand how the neural network in our brains can 
perform a (computational) process such that the phenomena of cognition 
emerge. For that purpose, they use artificial neural networks, which are 
inspired by how neurons work. In this second and third cases, some 
modifications are needed such that the theories can be connected reasonably.  
 In this second case of reduction, Shultz and Lepper use the Hopfield 
network to simulate dissonance reduction. This simulation shows that the 
values of specific cognitions are changing in the process of dissonance 
reduction. To build this simulation, Shultz and Lepper implement the 
Hopfield Network with some modifications. The modifications include not 
only several additional conditions or assumptions but also adding some 
constants. They can be seen in Table 8.2:  
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No. T(HN) Modifications T(HN for Consonant) 
M1 N The first modification is creating two new 
subsets of N, namely N+ and N- 
N+  N  
N-  N  
M2 C The second modification is creating two 
new subsets of C, namely Pairs and 
Conpairs. Pairs is the relation between 
sets N+ and N-. Conpairs is a relation 
between Pairs. 
Pairs  N+ N-, Pairs is a 
bijective relation. 
Pairs  C 
Conpairs  Pairs' Pairs 
C = Pairs  Conpairs  
M3 extn Removed  
M4 outn Removed  
M5  Adding a learning parameter called 
“resisti.”  
resisti 
M6 netn Modifying the law-statement.  neti = resisti j wij aj 
M7  Adding a new set of points of time (T) T 
M8  Adding a new set called ceiling, which is 
set to 1 for N+ and is set to 0.5 for N- 
ceiling 
M9  Adding a new set called floor, which is set 
to 0 for all N. 
floor 
M10 , actn Modification of the updating rule of 
activation of the neurons. Here the neurons 
are assumed just excitatory or inhibitory. 
Both concepts are reduced to A, where 
aA. 
1) ai(t+1) = ai(t) + 
neti[ceiling – ai(t)], when 
neti ≥ 0,  
  
2) ai(t+1) = ai(t) + 
neti[ai(t) – floor], when 
neti < 0, 
M11 state The term state is replaced by the term 
consonance 
consonance 
M12 E The term E is replaced by the term 
dissonance 
dissonance 
M13  Addition of the cap parameter cap 
M14  Addition of the rand% parameter rand% 
 
Table 8.2. Modifications of the Hopfield Network for the Consonance Model 
  
With these modifications to the Hopfield network’s theory-element, 
we defined a new theory-element of the Hopfield Network that is built 
especially for the Consonant model of simulation (T(HN for Consonant)). 
Therefore, the intertheoretical reduction is actually between T(DissB) as the 
reduced theory and T(HN for consonant) as the reducing theory. The 
determining links for this intertheoretical reduction can be shown in Table 
8.3:  
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Determining 
links 
T(DissB) T(HN for 
Consonant) 
Explanation 
1 Cognitions Pairs 1 connects the set Cognition to the 
set Pairs and 1 is bijective. 
2 Disscog Conpairs 2 connects the set Disscog to the 
set Conspairs and 2 is bijective. 
3 Conscog Conpairs 3 connects the set Conscog to the 
set Conspairs and 3 is bijective. 
4 Pairdiss W 4 connects the set pairdiss to the 
set of connection weight W, and 4 
is bijective. 
5 Paircons W 5 connects the set paircons to the 
set of connection weight W, and 5 
is bijective. 
6 Pairimp imp 6 connects the set Pairimp to the 
set imp and 6 is bijective. 
7 Diss Dissonance 7 connects the set diss to the set 
Dissonance and 7 is bijective. 
 
Table 8.3. The Determining Links that Connect Concepts of T(DissB) and T(HN for 
Consonance) 
 
 A Reduction Model with a Combination of Several Theories and 
Modifications. In the third case, the connectionist model uses the two-
layers feed-forward neural network with the Rosenblatt perceptron and the 
delta rule as a learning rule for this network. In this case, we see that for 
specific intertheoretical reduction the successfully reducing theory is not 
one single original theory-element, but a combination (and even with 
modification) of several theory-elements connected by determining links. 
The structuralist metatheory requires us to model this combination to 
analyze the intertheoretical reduction accurately. The combination of these 
theories can be modeled by implementing the V-pattern and the strategy 
above. The combination of these theory-elements is done by the determining 
links, which help us to build the unifying model as presented in Table 8.4:  
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No. T(RP) T(2L-
FFNN) 
T(DL) Explanations of Determining links T(RP+2L-
FFN+DL) 
1 N N’  The first link determines that N be 
identical with N' because both are the 
set of all neurons in the networks. It 
can be simplified by eliminating the 
redundant set N' in the unifying 
model.  
N 
2 N/N0 Nout N* The second link determines that all N 
besides N0 be identical with Nout and 
N*. Therefore, for the reason of 
simplification, we include only the 
Nout in the unifying model. 
Nout 
3 N0 Nin    The third determining link equates N0 
and Nin because both sets are the sets 
of input-neurons. The unifying model 
includes only Nin. 
Nin 
4 C C’ C* The fourth determining link connects 
all sets of connections in the three 
theory-elements because they refer to 
the same object in the application. 
Therefore, we can use just C.  
C 
5 B  B* The fifth determining link identifies 
the set B from T(RP) as identical 
with B* from T(DR). Hence, the 
unifying model needs just B.  
B 
6 W W’  The sixth determining links equate W 
and W'. Thus, we need just W in the 
new unifying model.  
W 
7 W, W0  W* The seventh determining link defines 
that the connection weight W* of 
T(DR) is a unification of both W and 
W0 of T(RP). Hence, we still need 
W0. 
W0 
8 Inp extn Inp* The eighth determining link equates 
Inp, extn, Inp* as the network-inputs 
for the unifying model. Therefore, we 
need only one of them.  
Inp 
9 Outp outn OUTn The ninth determining link equates 
Outp, outn, and OUTn because all of 
them is the set of the actual output of 
the network. We use only Outn 
outn 
10 fnet netn  The tenth determining link connects 
netn to fnet as its result. 
fnet, netn 
11 fact actn  The eleventh determining link 
connects actn to fact as its result. 
fact, actn 
12 fout outn  The twelfth determining link 
connects outn to fout as its result. 
fout 
 
Table 8.4. The Determining Links that Connect Concepts of T(RP), T(2L-FFNN), and 
T(DL) 
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 We can use this unifying model to simulate several phenomena of 
dissonance reduction according to the connectionist model. However, van 
Overwalle and Jordens used it in their research for a specific case, namely, 
forced compliance dissonance among children when they are exposed to a 
toy and punishment. To build this simulation, the unifying theory-element is 
adjusted as follows: (1) The unifying model consists of 4 neurons in two 
layers. (2) The connectionist model implements the linear activations for the 
output perceptron(s) in the neural network. (3) The activation of an input-
neuron will be set 1 or 0 for a toy, representing “present” or “not present.” 
Moreover, for the threat, an input neuron will be set 0, +0.5, or +1 to 
represent “not present,” “mild threat,” or “severe threat.” (4) The expected 
activation of output-neurons will be set of +1 when the outcome is present 
(e.g., play or happy), zero when absent (e.g., not play, or moderate affect), 
and -1 when the opposite outcome is present (e.g., unhappy). (5) Also, the 
learning rate for this simulation is set between 0 and 1.   
 The connectionist simulation requires not only the combination and 
modification of the several theory-elements in the artificial neural networks 
but also some modifications of the theory-element of forced compliance 
dissonance T(DissF) itself. The modifications are listed in Table 8.5:  
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No. T(DissF) Modifications T(DissF for 
Connectionist) 
M1 Cognition We build a subset of Cognition that is 
called thought. 
thought  Cognition 
M2 Cognition We build another subset of Cognition that 
is called behavior. 
behavior  Cognition 
M3 Cognition We build another subset of Cognition that 
is called emotion.  
emotion  Cognition 
M4  We build a new set called attitude, which 
expresses the relation between thought and 
behavior or between thought and emotion.   
 
This new set also should be the superset of 
Disscog and Conscog  
attitude  thought 
'behavior  thought 
'emotion.   
 
Disscog  attitude 
Conscog  attitude 
Disscog  Conscog  
attitude 
M5  We add a new magnitude of the intensity 
of attitude (attint), which expresses a 
function that maps every element of 
attitude to a rational number to express the 
strength of the attitude.  
attint: attitude → IR0  
M6 Forcecom We set the set Forcecom as a subset of 
thought 
Forcecom  thought 
M7  We add a new subset of attitude, called 
subattitude, which consists of the relation 
between Forcecom and behavior or 
between Forcecom and emotion. 
subattitude  
Forcecombehavior  
Forcecomemotion 
 
subattitude  attitude 
M8  We add a new subclass of the intensity of 
attitude, called subattint, which expresses 
a function that maps every element of 
subattitude to a rational number to express 
their strength.  
subattint: subattitude → 
IR0  
 
subattint  attint 
 
Table 8.5. Modifications of the Theory Forced Compliance Dissonance for the 
Connectionist Model 
 
 These modifications in DissF are needed because the simulation is intended 
to reflect “a view of the mind as an adaptive learning mechanism, where 
cognitive dissonance is seen as a relatively rational process in which people 
seek causal answers for why they think, feel or behave inconsistently” (van 
Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 205). To make the simulation works several 
concepts in both modified theories have to be connected by the following 
determining links in Table 8.6: 
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A Reduction Model of Two Theories where the Newcomer 
Becomes a Generalization the Old One. The model of intertheoretical 
connection of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the Rosenblatt perceptron is a 
model of such intertheoretical reduction. This model shows how two 
theories developed in two different disciplines can relate to each other 
because one of them generalize the other. In this case, the Rosenblatt 
perceptron, which came later and was developed in artificial intelligence, is 
a further development of the McCulloch-Pitts neuron, which came first and 
was developed in neuroscience. Synchronically, the intertheoretical 
connection of both theories is an intertheoretical reduction where the 
Rosenblatt perceptron reduces the McCulloch-Pitts neuron. The determining 
links which play a decisive role in the intertheoretical reduction, or 
respectively the intertheoretical specialization are listed in Table 8.7: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
Determining 
links 
Set in 
T(RP) 
Set in 
T(MCP-N) 
Note 
5 B × W0  a determining link that connects the relation 
between the bias of the neurons (B) and its 
connection weight (W0) in the potential 
model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) to the 
set of a threshold of each neuron () in the 
potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts 
Neuron (x’). λ5 is surjective. 
6 Inp Inp’ a determining link that connects the set of 
inputs (Inp) in the potential model of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of 
inputs (Inp’) in the potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts Neuron (x’). λ6 is surjective 
because Inp  Inp’. 
7 Outp Outp’ a determining link that connects the set of 
outputs (Outp) in the potential model of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and the set of 
outputs (Outp’) in the potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts Neuron (x’). λ7 is surjective 
because Outp  Outp’. 
9 fact fact’ a determining link that connects the 
activation function of neurons (fact) in the 
potential model of the Rosenblatt perceptron 
(x) and the activation function of neurons 
(fact’) in the potential model of the 
McCulloch-Pitts Neuron (x’). λ9 is surjective 
because fact  fact’. 
10 fout fout’ a determining link that connects the output 
function of neurons (fout) in the potential 
model of the Rosenblatt perceptron (x) and 
the output function of neurons (fout’) in the 
potential model of the McCulloch-Pitts 
Neuron (x’). λ10 is surjective because fout  
fout’. 
 
Table 8.7. The Determining Links that Connect Concepts of T(RP) and T(MCP-N) 
 
8.2.1.3. The Empirical Status of the Intertheoretical Reduction 
 The third point to mention concerns the epistemological and 
ontological status of the intertheoretical connections, especially 
intertheoretical reduction. These issues are connected to some revisions 
made by DFH and by van Riel for the GNS model above. In the structuralist 
model, we can explain the epistemological status of an intertheoretical 
connection in general by the links connecting the potential models of both 
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connected theories. The structuralist model uses the interpreting links to 
show that the intertheoretical reduction has something to do with the 
explained phenomena. The interpreting links connect the potential models of 
one theory-element to the partial potential model of the other theory-
element. 
To understand how this works, we should remember what kinds of 
elements of the potential models and the partial potential models of a 
theory-element. A potential model consists of the sets that represent all basic 
concepts of the theory and all the basic relations among those concepts. 
Most of these concepts and relations are T-non-theoretical, but some of 
them are T-theoretical. By defining the partial potential models Mpp(T), we 
omit the T-theoretical elements from the potential models Mp(T) of a 
theory-element T by using a function r: Mp(T) → Mpp(T). Now we have the 
partial potential models of T that only consist of T-non-theoretical elements. 
Suppose we have a reducing theory T* that is connected partially through 
the intertheoretical reduction to T as the reduced theory. The intertheoretical 
reduction is a set that consists of several determining links, which connect 
several concepts or relations from the Mp of both theories. We can define 
the echelon subsets e of the Mp of both theories, consisting of only and all 
the connected concepts or relations related by the intertheoretical reduction. 
The intertheoretical reduction is now in the form of entailment links that 
connect both echelon subsets. To determine the empirical claim of the 
intertheoretical reduction, we can project e1(T) to the field of partial 
potential models Mpp(T) by using a function r*: e1(T) → f1(T) and get f1(T) 
as an echelon subset of Mpp(T). f1(T) is the set of local empirical claims of 
the intertheoretical reduction on the side of T. The interpreting links 
connecting the Mpp(T) and the Mp(T*) show us, which non-theoretical 
concepts of T, which come from other theories, are related by this 
intertheoretical reduction to T*; they are defined by f1(T).   
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 The T-non-theoretical elements that can be defined through defining 
f1(T) – where T consists of the reduced theory-element – in the models 
defined in Chapters 5–7 can be shown as follows: In the first case of 
Chapter 5, the forced compliance dissonance is reduced by the 
computational neuroscientific theory. The structuralist model of 
intertheoretical reduction leads to characterize the T-non-theoretical terms 
of the forced compliance dissonance in Table 8.8: 
 
no. The T-non-theoretical 
Terms (Concepts) 
Category: Observational 
term or concept of other 
theories 
Explanation 
1 Time an observational term a set of points of time. 
2 Cognition an observational term a set of cognitions. 
3 Disscog an observational term a set of pairs of 
cognitions, which are 
dissonant each other. 
4 Conscog an observational term a set of pairs of 
cognitions, which are 
consonant with each 
other.  
5 Forcecom an observational term a set of forced 
compliance, which is a 
subset of Cognition. 
 
Table 8.8. The Local Empirical Claims of the Intertheoretical Reduction between T(DissF) 
and T(CNT) 
 
 In the second case in Chapter 6, namely consonance simulation, the 
theory of cognitive dissonance is reduced by the Hopfield network. The 
structuralist model of intertheoretical reduction characterizes the T-non-
theoretical terms of the theory of cognitive dissonance in Table 8.9:  
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no. The T-non-theoretical 
Terms (Concepts) 
Category: Observational term 
or concept of other theories 
Explanation 
1 Cognition An observational term The set of cognitions 
2 Disscog An observational term The set of pairs of 
cognitions, which are 
dissonant each other  
3 Conscog An observational term The set of pairs of 
cognitions, which are 
consonant with each 
other  
 
Table 8.9. The Local Empirical Claims of the Intertheoretical Reduction between T(DissB) 
and T(HN for Consonance) 
 
 In the third case in Chapter 7, the connectionist simulation, the 
modified theory of forced compliance dissonance is reduced to the two-
layer neural network, which consists of three theories, i.e., the Rosenblatt 
perceptron, the two-layer architecture of the feed-forward neural network, 
and the delta rule as its learning rule. The T-non-theoretical terms of the 
modified forced compliance dissonance characterized by the modeling in 
Chapter 7 are in Table 8.10:  
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no. The T-non- 
theoretical Terms 
(Concepts) 
Observational term or 
concept of other 
theories 
Explanation 
1 Cognition An observational term The set of cognitions 
2 thought An observational term, 
but also a concept from 
another theory  
The set thought is a subset of the set 
Cognition concerning the 
attributional reformulation 
advocated by Cooper and Fazio 
(1984)  
3 behavior An observational term, 
but also a concept from 
another theory  
The set behavior is a subset of the 
set Cognition concerning the 
attributional reformulation 
advocated by Cooper and Fazio 
(1984)  
4 emotion An observational term, 
but also a concept from 
another theory  
The set emotion is a subset of the set 
Cognition concerning the 
attributional reformulation 
advocated by Cooper and Fazio 
(1984)  
5 attitude An observational term, 
but also a concept from 
another theory  
The set attitude, as a superset, unites 
both the set of cognitive dissonance 
(Disscog) and the set of cognitive 
consonance (Conscog), which are 
understood as attitude to objects 
6 Forcecom Observational term The set of forced compliance, which 
is a subset of Cognition. 
7 subattitude An observational term, 
but also a concept from 
another theory  
The subset subattitude is a subset of 
the set attitude concerning the set 
Forcecom   
8 imp Observational term The set of importance of cognition 
9 reward Observational term The set of magnitude of reward or 
punishment 
 
Table 8.10. The Local Empirical Claims of the Intertheoretical Reduction between T(DissF 
for Connectionist) and T(RP+2L-FFN+DL for Connectionist) 
 
  In the third case, we can see the reasons for the distinction between 
T-theoretical and T-non-theoretical concepts, namely that the observational 
terms are characterized not merely by a pure observation alone, but also by 
involving other theories. It is not decided whether the terms, which we 
categorize as “observational terms,” are purely observational terms or 
employ concepts from other theories. The limitations of this dissertation do 
not allow me to be more explicit about this issue. 
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 The fourth case, namely the intertheoretical reduction of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron to the McCulloch-Pitts neuron, is not a case of the 
global intertheoretical relation but a case of the local intertheoretical 
connection since both theories are close together though from two different 
disciplines. The McCulloch-Pitts neuron becomes a special case of the 
Rosenblatt perceptron. Therefore, we do not need to discuss a local intended 
application. The Rosenblatt perceptron’s empirical claims become smaller in 
its specialization, the McCulloch-Pitts neuron because of an additional set T 
and the restrictions applied to the sets , Inp, and Outp.  
 After discussing four cases above, some conclusions about the 
structuralist model’s distinctive characteristics in comparison with the GNF 
model of intertheoretical reduction can be drawn: (1) The structuralist is 
required to model the theories and the intertheoretical reduction in set theory 
or model theory. This requirement allows for a higher degree of distinctness 
and sharpness of analysis. (2) The structuralist model does not build a 
general model of intertheoretical reduction like the GNS model. The 
structuralist equips us with definitions of theory-element and various 
intertheoretical connections and relations – and reduction is just one of them 
– to model and analyze those relationships case by case with great detail and 
accuracy. (3) By implementing the r* function, the structuralist can also 
specify how its model of intertheoretical reduction refers to the 
observational fields. It means that the intertheoretical reduction is not 
merely epistemological, and it does have a certain relation with the observed 
phenomena. In the structuralist theory of science, there are various types of 
intertheoretical connections that work together to produce a successful 
intertheoretical reduction. These primary intertheoretical connections are 
determining links and entailment links that operate at the T-theoretical level. 
Both determine whether the relation being constructed – not only reduction 
– is full or partial. Another type of connection is the interpreting links, 
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which operate at the T-non-theoretical level and define the reduction’s 
empirical claims. 
 
8.2.2. Unity of Science 
 In the discussion about the unity of science, there are two opposite 
positions. The first one is the position of philosophers who believe in the 
notion of the unity of science. They have a long history of how they try to 
find a basis for such a notion. If most of the history of philosophy – since 
antiquity until modern philosophy – the unity of science or knowledge had a 
speculative or metaphysical basis, the first time the idea of the unity of 
science got a more empirical basis, was when some philosophers in the 
Vienna Circle began their movement following Mach and pursuing the 
following goals: “1. To create new foundations for physics with strong 
consideration of the results of sense physiology; one could even speak of the 
attempt to give the concepts and principles of physics a psychophysiological 
basis. 2. Restore the unity of all empirical sciences. 3. To finally ‘eradicate’ 
the metaphysical speculations from the field of science.” (Moulines, 2008, 
p. 26). This current is still being developed and refined until now. The other 
position is that of the Stanford philosophers, who do not believe in the idea 
of the unity of science. They are John Dupré, Ian Hacking, Peter Galison, 
Patrick Suppes, and Nancy Cartwright. They assume the notion of the 
disunity of science and plurality based not only on the methodological point 
of view toward science and scientific practice but also on a metaphysical 
point of view. (Cat, 2017) Dupré has characterized this position by three 
pluralistic theses as follows: “(1) against essentialism, there is always a 
plurality of classifications of reality into kinds; (2) against reductionism, 
there exists equal reality and causal efficacy of systems at different levels of 
description, that is, the micro level is not causally complete, leaving room 
for downward causation; and (3) against epistemological monism, there is 
no single methodology that supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a 
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universal domain of its applicability, only a plurality of epistemic and non-
epistemic virtues” (Cat, 2017).  
 Between both positions, this dissertation takes a unique position. On 
the one hand, it takes a view similar to the disunity of science. The 
structuralist metatheory of science starts with an assumption that scientific 
theories are already there, created through various assumptions, approaches, 
goals, etc., without supporting the agendas of essentialism, reductionism, 
and epistemological monism. In the modeling, in Chapters 3, 5–7, we can 
see that our models do not make any claims about those three notions, 
which are generally the basis of the unity of science. However, it does not 
mean that the structuralist theory of science abandons the notion of the unity 
of science. It also supports a certain notion of the unity of science, but not in 
the fashion above. This position has a great similarity with the integrative 
pluralism (Mitchell, 2003).2  
 The structuralist metatheory of science sees that being in connection 
with other scientific theories is one of the essential features of a scientific 
theory. In Chapter 2, many kinds of intertheoretical connections have been 
laid out to describe how scientific theories stay connected with each other in 
a synchronic relationship. In Intertheoretical Relations and the Dynamic of 
Science (2014), Moulines explicates several other intertheoretical 
connections in diachronic perspective. According to the structuralist 
metatheory of science all these intertheoretical connections build theory-
nets and theory-holons as their results both in synchronic and diachronic 
perspectives. According to the structuralist theory of science, the unity of 
science, at least tendentially, is based on intertheoretical connections that 
connect the classes or concepts of the connected theories (for some practical 
reasons). Let us see how our investigation has provided some ground for 
ascertaining this tendency toward a unification of science, at least partially.  
 
2 A comparison and a relation between the structuralist theory of science and the integrative 
pluralism will not be discussed here because they are not the focus of this dissertation.  
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 First, in Chapters 5–7, theories from the same or various disciplines 
are connected and build (fragments of) a theory-holon. These connections 
can be modeled and precisely characterized by implementing model theory. 
In this way, certain concepts between two or more theories can be connected 
precisely. This strategy works very well to identify the intertheoretical 
connections within a discipline and an interdisciplinary setting.   
 Second, in Chapters 5–7, the intertheoretical relations modeled are 
based on several real cases. The scientific theories are not automatically 
connected by themselves but are connected through the scientists' activities 
for specific practical purposes or goals, which have been predetermined 
before. Connecting two concepts from two theories, mainly from different 
disciplines, is not a simple task. There are some cases where the connections 
can be identified clearly, such as in the Festinger theory of cognitive 
dissonance and its specializations or the relation between the McCulloch-
Pitts Neuron and the Rosenblatt perceptron. However, sometimes the 
connections are not as clear as in the case of the forced compliance 
dissonance and the computational neuroscientific theory. There are cases 
where we need to combine several theories in order to be clear enough about 
the existing connections, such as in the intertheoretical connections between 
the forced compliance dissonance and the unified theory coming from the 
Rosenblatt Perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the 
delta rule. Sometimes we also need to determine several constants and 
modify the theory so that the connections ‘work’ well, such as in the relation 
between the theory of cognitive dissonance and the Hopfield network. This 
dissertation demonstrates that the complexity of the problem of 
intertheoretical connections increases when we deal with interdisciplinary 
relations. 
 Third, in the simulation case, we see that a simulation must have a 
more specific goal than an explanation because it must cover additional 
aspects of the phenomena simulated. To model intertheoretical connections 
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between a theory of specific phenomena and the computational theories for 
simulation, we have several things to do, namely (1) modification of the 
simulated theory to make it suitable to the simulation's goal. the 
modification can be seen as a specialization of the original theory-element. 
(2) Building a simulation combination and modification of several 
simulating theories – normally computational theories – are needed by 
determining certain constants or constraints, such that the simulation 
becomes realistic enough. (3) A complete model of intertheoretical 
connections for a simulation can only be modeled after finishing both steps 
above.   
In connection to the idea of the unity of science, this research shows 
that the structuralist theory of science is powerful enough to model various 
intertheoretical connections in real science, not only within one single 
discipline but also between several disciplines. By modeling and analyzing 
those intertheoretical connections, my dissertation shows that the unity of 
science without essentialism, reductionism, and epistemological monism is 
possible. The prospect of the unity of science responds to the possibility of 
different kinds of intertheoretical connections connecting various scientific 
theories from different fields, thereby forming (fragments of) theory-holon. 
It corresponds to the contention that being connected with other theories is 
one of the essential characteristics of real scientific theories. 
 
8.3. Interdisciplinary Research and Cognitive Science 
 As discussed in Chapter 1 the new epoch of interdisciplinarity began 
with uneasiness about the loss of the unity of science. Since it is a recent 
trend in science, people still are worried about how to understand 
interdisciplinarity precisely. It is not an easy task, because there are many 
similar-sounding terms around. The differences between them were 
explained in Chapter 1. For understanding and practicing interdisciplinarity 
on the level of theoretical integration, it is not enough to characterize the 
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meaning of those terms precisely but also the connections between them that 
produce realistic and fruitful interdisciplinary researches. In Chapters 5–7, 
this dissertation discussed three models of intertheoretical relations of three 
distinctive interdisciplinary researches from the field of cognitive science. 
These cases show how the structuralist theory of science lets us map the 
intertheoretical connections between theories from various disciplines 
within real research programs.  
  The first is the intertheoretical reduction between Festinger's theory 
of cognitive dissonance from psychology and the Hawkins-Kandel 
Computational Neuroscientific Theory (CNT). This case is an example of 
the case of the mind-body problem: How our psychological phenomena are 
related to how the human brain works. In this case, the research examined a 
relation between the phenomena of cognitive dissonance and the activity of 
neurons in the brain. In this modeling, the theory of forced compliance 
dissonance, which underlies the van Veen et al. psychological experiment, is 
connected to the Hawkins-Kandel computational neuroscientific theory 
which can be applied to explain the activity of neurons of the dorsal 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) during the moments of dissonance. The 
structuralist modeling of the intertheoretical relation serves as tools to 
specify the relations among terms from both theories according to this 
research.    
 The second case is a case of analogy between mind and computer, 
especially artificial intelligence. Shultz and Lepper built a simulation of the 
Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance by using the Hopfield network. 
This simulation is called the consonance model. This simulation aims to 
represent the mind as a mechanism that maintains some equilibrium and the 
dissonance reduction as a solving of the constraint satisfaction problem 
between someone's beliefs and behaviors. The structuralist modeling of the 
intertheoretical connections is applied to map not only the connection 
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among the terms of both theories but also the modifications of the Hopfield 
Network to meet the requirements and the goal of the simulations.   
 Finally, the third case, the case of connectionist simulation, is also a 
case of simulation of cognitive dissonance by using artificial intelligence. 
Nevertheless, the goal of the simulation and the type of artificial neural 
network are different. The purpose of the connectionist model is to simulate 
“a view of the mind as an adaptive learning mechanism, where cognitive 
dissonance is seen as a relatively rational process in which people seek 
causal answers for why they think, feel or behave inconsistently” (van 
Overwalle and Jordens, 2002, p. 205). The connectionist model implements 
a combination of the Rosenblatt perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward 
neural network, and the delta rule. This combination of the three and the 
forced compliance dissonance theory itself still need to be adjusted 
according the purpose of the simulation, before they can be combined. The 
detailed steps for building the structuralist model for this simulation are 
explained in Chapter 7.   
Both cases in Chapters 6 and 7 show that to simulate certain 
phenomena, just applying some theories is not enough. A particular goal of 
simulation has to be set for determining the combination and adjustments to 
the theories. It leads to an interesting result, that about specific phenomena 
it is possible to build various simulations by setting different goal, 
emphasizing and focusing on different aspects, applying and combining 
different theories. Various simulations made our understanding of the 
phenomena more diverse in perspective. However, it brings us a new 
challenge to integrating them, such that diverse knowledge of certain 
phenomena does bring to comprehensiveness and not to contradiction. For 
answering this challenge, the author believes that the structuralist theory of 
science can be applied as follows: (1) The first step is characterizing the 
unifying theory-element for each simulation by implementing V-pattern and 
strategy. (2) The second step is adjusting and combining the unifying 
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theory-elements to build a unifying theory-element for unifying simulation. 
Of course, we still need to make further research to test how it works.  
 As we have discussed in Chapter 1, Ezrquerro and Manrique 
categorized the intertheoretical relations in cognitive science in the 
following: (1) classical view, (2) connectionist revision, (3) pragmatist 
approach, and (4) the reductionist approach. Different from the structuralist 
model of intertheoretical relation, this categorization is based on different 
positions regarding the notion of a privileged level. In connection with these 
kinds of intertheoretical relation in cognitive science, the structuralist model 
does not belong to one of them and does not serve their agendas. However, 
the structuralist model of intertheoretical connection can be implemented by 
them to build their model formally. The structuralist modeling offers 
detailed modeling and precise analysis in return. This offer can also be seen 
in the work of John Bickle, who applied the structuralist model for the 
reductionist approach, and in this dissertation, which applies to 
connectionist and other reductionist approaches.  
229 
 
Chapter 9 
Some Concluding Remarks and Prospects for Future 
Research 
 
 
The structuralist theory of science is a fruitful theory to model single 
scientific theories so that we can understand their inner structure and model 
the intertheoretical connections between some theories within one and the 
same discipline and between theories from various disciplines.  
For modeling intertheoretical connections, the structuralist theory of 
science uses two most basic intertheoretical connections, namely 
determining links and entailment links. From these basic intertheoretical 
connections, we can model the various kinds of intertheoretical relations, 
either diachronically or synchronically. As for the results of intertheoretical 
connections, the structuralist theory of science differentiates them into two 
types, namely theory-net and theory-holon. Theory-nets are results of 
intertheoretical connections between theories in a close relationship, 
whereas theory-holons are results of intertheoretical connections between 
theories in global science. They can be either from one discipline or various 
disciplines. However, the paradoxical result from the analysis of empirical 
claims of theory-holons is that their empirical claims are not global, but 
local.  
In this dissertation, the structuralist theory of science is applied to 
model and analyze intertheoretical connections between the theories from a 
single discipline and from various disciplines – interdisciplinary cases – in 
real scientific practice. There are four models of intertheoretical relations 
between theories from a single discipline presented here. They are (1) the 
model of intertheoretical specialization between the forced compliance 
dissonance and the general theory of cognitive dissonance made by 
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Westermann, (2) the model of intertheoretical specialization of architectures 
of neural networks, and (3) the unifying relation between the Rosenblatt 
perceptron, the two-layers feed-forward neural network, and the delta rule. 
The model of intertheoretical relations for interdisciplinary cases presented 
here are (1) The Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance as related to the 
Hawkins-Kandel computational neuroscientific theory (CNT), (2) the model 
of intertheoretical reduction and intertheoretical specialization between the 
McCulloch-Pitts neuron model and the Rosenblatt perceptron – It is a 
unique relationship because both theories are from two different fields, but 
they are very closely related, (3) the Festinger theory of cognitive 
dissonance as related to the Hopfield network for the consonance model of 
simulation, and (4) the Festinger theory of cognitive dissonance as 
associated with the unified theory between the Rosenblatt perceptron, the 
two-layers feed-forward neural network and the delta rule for the 
connectionist model of simulation.  
Based on all models that have been built in this dissertation, some 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the intertheoretical relations in 
interdisciplinary fields can be modeled formally like other intertheoretical 
relations by connecting the theories’ potential models. The main difference 
lies in the basic sets of the respective potential models, whose elements 
depend on the discipline, to which the theories belong. Second, the most (if 
not all) models of intertheoretical connections in interdisciplinary research 
will not fulfill the definition of entailment links concerning the respective 
potential model. The determining links play crucial roles in building their 
models. In most (if not all) cases, entailment links connect only the echelon 
partial subset of the respective partial models. Third, the case of synchronic 
intertheoretical relation between the McCulloch-Pitts neuron and the 
Rosenblatt perceptron is not an interdisciplinary relation, but cross-
disciplinary relation, where a theory of neuron in neuroscience is taken over 
to formulate a theory of perceptron in computer science (see Chapter 1, 
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footnote 1, p. 8). For cross-disciplinary relations, it is safe for now to 
consider the first point is correct.   
This research delivers some contributions to the philosophy of 
science as well as to interdisciplinary studies, especially in cognitive 
science, from where the examples come. For the philosophy of science, this 
research shows that there are many kinds of intertheoretical connections – 
not only intertheoretical reduction – that deserve more attention from the 
scientists and the philosopher of science. Secondly, to model a successful 
intertheoretical reduction, we need other kinds of intertheoretical 
connections that map the links between the terms or concepts of the 
connected theories. Thus, the structuralist theory of science can deliver a 
more detailed model than the generalized Nagel-Schaffner model. Thirdly, 
this research shows us a unique kind of the unity of science. The idea of the 
unity of science envisaged in the present work is not based on essentialism, 
reductionism, and methodological monism. However, it is based on practical 
reasons for and the goals of the researches. The unity of science promoted 
here is the result of connecting scientific theories of single or various 
discipline(s) through intertheoretical connections. However, the unity of 
science envisaged here does not only contain the epistemologically correct 
links without observational or empirical truth.  
Moreover, for interdisciplinary research, primarily cognitive science, 
this research is the first attempt to deliver mathematical models of 
intertheoretical connections between theories. We still have to build more 
models or maps of intertheoretical links for more interdisciplinary research 
to obtain a more comprehensive explanation of how scientific theories can 
be combined in interdisciplinary research to achieve its goal effectively. 
From this attempt to build several models of intertheoretical connections, 
this dissertation characterizes the V-pattern and strategy, that can serve as a 
procedure for combining several theories given as theory-elements and for 
building a new unifying theory-element. Finally, to explain some 
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phenomena – of which we cannot have a direct observation – some 
scientists attempt to develop a simulation to deeper comprehend the 
phenomena in question. It is the case for both simulations that we model in 
Chapters 6 and 7. To create a simulation, we need a more complex 
combination of theories rather than to deliver an explanation because we 
attempt to mimic the phenomenon itself. The structuralist modeling can 
model not only intertheoretical connections for creating a simulation but 
also specific adjustments needed.  
 Indeed, this research is limited to modeling and mapping the 
intertheoretical relations both within a discipline and in some 
interdisciplinary contexts. Still, this research can be extended through 
several possible types of research. For example, (1) Inspired by the 
application of Bayesian networks to the general Nagel-Schaffner account of 
reduction, we can apply Bayesian networks to the structuralist account to 
measure the degree of confirmation of the intertheoretical connections. (2) 
With the development of machine learning and artificial intelligence, I see a 
possibility to combine this research with some approaches in these fields 
such as the artificial neural network and reinforcement learning to write a 
computer program that might help us in combining theories or other 
intelligent models, tracking, and documenting the relations between them. 
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